Anthony's Treaty

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Table of Contents

Separatism and Terrorism. Most nations are founded upon a real application of these concepts, and of course, in real time, these things are not exactly the most highly regarded pursuits. It is only those members of the population, who are actively carrying out such divisive and brutal perspectives that deem these activities wise and noble. It is so confined to them that even many of those whom the separatist claim to represent are put-off and appalled at the thought of being included and embedded into their zealous web of destruction, aimed at establishing for their own demographic, a living space and identity. But what are the origins of separatism? One would assume that a person or group of people don't enter into that realm of thinking overnight. History shows that first and foremost a nation's inability to get everyone that is situated within its geographical boundaries to perceive all inhabitants thereof to have some semblance of fundamental kinship—is a reason why countries become unstable and collapse. This instability is often aided by so-called peaceful protests. Furthermore, that semblance of fundamental kinship, even if minute in capacity, can keep distinctions among a populace from breaking out into all-out schism, where identity and land become tied together. The semblance of fundamental kinship was the case in Ukraine after their declaration of independence in 1991, of which its geographical boundaries constituted within it a population of both Ukrainian-speaking east Slavs and Russian speaking east Slavs. And amidst the great magnitude of their historical backdrop of tension and tragedy, both were able to coexist rather efficiently for a time, even in light of their cultural differences. This has to be credited to the overarching effort put forth by the mainstream to quell any notion that such differences need to be prioritized in each other's daily lives. This aspect can keep at bay, those grievances involving parties of different cultural backgrounds. It also allows people to disassociate and suppress from their interactions—both positive and negative—an ethnic connotation that would—if allowed to crystallize within their own conscious framework—place them on a path towards aloofness and disappointment towards the other demographic. These measures aimed at de-prioritizing the distinctions amongst a populace allows everyone to assert themselves in various institutions, without them having to feel as though their cultural backdrop would only serve to stifle their efforts. In the midst of this dynamic, there are exceptions, in which those who do encounter grievance embark upon the path to separatism even in lieu of a paradigm that encourages otherwise. But it must be said that, even in that case, the mainstream effort to deprioritize the distinctions keeps the separatists from launching

excursions into the mainstream. They simply remain aggrieved in the background, that is, until their opportunity arrives—the opportunity to latch onto the peaceful protest movement and incite violence. Oftentimes, the extreme version of the separatist—the terrorist, will use the public protest as their signal to take action and launch brutal attacks on the mainstream population, in the hopes of triggering self-preservation amongst the populace and compelling them to situate themselves within their own respective demographic against the rest. But the systemic danger of public protesting is not always relegated to being within a nation state. It can take on a residual transnational form, where protest in one country can embolden and trigger terrorism in another. An example is how "Black Lives Matter" protests in the United States could be used by terrorists in France as a signal to launch attacks on the mainstream population there. There is no mainstream concept of race in France, so in order for separatists to find fuel for their agenda, they must look to social developments outside of their own country.

It must be the case that initial separatism must arise from toxic familiarity, where grievances with one type of people who represent a certain cultural framework piles up on the individual and compels him to cultivate a hostile worldview towards those he has become too familiar with. This is where too much of trying to unify peoples of various differences backfires. Just as there are humans who are wired to develop animosity towards those who are unfamiliar to them, there are those who can harbor animosity towards those who have become too familiar to them. Hence why radical nationalistic terrorism within the confines of a well-defined geographical space is often carried out by people who are familiar with the cultural or racial backdrop that their victims represent. They either grew up in environments which heavily exposed them to those types, or had fall-outs in the past with people of that demographic and had as a result become cynical of that particular cultural group. Now imagine someone harboring all those grievances and frustrations that have come about from direct personal experience with a certain type of people, but no real mainstream avenue to justify an expression of this anger. He is then confronted by a mass movement in which what represents his cultural backdrop is pitted against what represents the cultural backdrop of those he has come to harbor antipathy towards. Now, he has been provided an environment conducive to releasing his frustration. But since he is of the "Familiarity breeds Contempt" psychological framework, his actions and motivation will only last until he perceives the schism to be complete. Once the schism is complete, those of the rabble rousing "Stranger equals Danger"

mindset will take up the fight from there and insist on its continuation since they will have no familiarity with their target and no problem with dehumanizing them as a result of that. These types are endowed with a mindset that has been passed down from previous generations and maintained arduously even as society has progressed over the years.

In Ukraine, the small culturally-defined groups, whether pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, have maintained themselves for decades, keeping a tradition passed down from generation to generation, preferring to stay within this insulated framework of familiarity and predictability. Their main objective is the continued practice of their culture and customs, and within their own realm of insularity, they are able to promote ideas which revolve around the significance of their members, while downplaying the significance of those outside of that circle. Zionists, Ukrainophiles, Russophiles, Radical Muslims, White Nationalists, Black Nationalists, Neo Nazis, Jehovah's Witnesses all maintain from generation to generation a certain insularity and exclusiveness, and promote the idea of a future revolution against the bulk of humanity, one in which their particular group, even in their smaller numbers, will somehow prevail. Thus, they are always ready for conflict with those unfamiliar to them, should this scenario present itself. But for the most part, are content to stay in the background, not looking to upset the mainstream balance, so long as they can continue on with their respective practices. Perhaps, they may come out for some minor public demonstrations here and there, but nothing major. It is when that individual who maintains a very personal and direct grievance with a group largely shunned by the insulated group, goes out and declares an allegiance to the insulated group before carrying out a vicious act of terror against those he has a grievance with and who are at the same time shunned by the insulated group. In many cases, this person has only had minimal contact with the insulated group. But his action has placed the insulated group on the radar and has set not only them, but also those the insulated group claims to represent against the rest of society. An example is a black nationalist who goes out and commits an act of terror while claiming solidarity with "Black Lives Matter." He thus places both the insulated Black Lives Matter group, and the demographic they claim to represent on the radar of hostility, setting them all against the mainstream. Same with a radical Muslim going out and orchestrating an act of terror, while expressing solidarity with an insulated fundamentalist Islamic group that claims to represent all Muslims or true Islam. The terrorist thus with his heinous actions set fundamental Islam and those that fundamental

Islam claims to represent against the rest of society. And in many cases, the terrorist's ties with the fundamental group was very minimal. The terrorist was also found to be born and raised in an environment that exposed him heavily to those he became antagonistic towards. There are numerous example of this dynamic, even historical ones. And it is likely this dynamic played a role in what transpired in eastern Ukraine, but it is difficult to know from which side did this dynamic first apply itself. We can surmise that perhaps at the beginning of the mass demonstrations in Ukraine both in 2004 and in 2014, there may have been people in western and southern Ukraine that may have developed a cynical worldview of the more pro-Ukrainian element, as a result of compiled grievances incurred throughout his/her life among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. This person could have been bullied in school, overlooked at a place of employment, or had a severe lack of success in the romantic/dating sphere. Let say this person has a foundational backdrop of Russian heritage, but for the bulk of his life, never gave much significance to it, and didn't view himself as any different from Ukrainian speakers, even if he was technically part of the Russian demographic. Now 2004 and 2014 comes around with ethnocentric/culture/language-fueled demonstrations all over the country and then all of a sudden, this person begins to view those unfavorable situations in his life from an ethnic perspective. Of course this was always brewing beneath the surface, but in retrospect never allowed any real expression, which can perhaps be credited with the overarching paradigm established by Ukrainians throughout much of the 1990s, which insisted that the ethnic/language factor not be prioritized. But now with these mass demonstration bringing to the forefront ethnic and cultural issues, this person begins to view every unfavorable interaction in his life as a subset of Ukrainian ethnocentrism against Russian culture. He thus becomes a sympathizer to the pro-Russian element and allows the mass movements to redefine his thinking. He becomes radical and angry, as his memory takes him back to all those times that he was treated unfairly, and unlike before when he didn't perceive those interactions to carry an ethnic connotation, he now does and starts to harbor antipathy towards the Ukrainian element. He starts to seek out fellowship with pro-Russian groups and begins to propose various types of attacks on Ukrainians, even volunteering to carry out some of them. Meanwhile, even during the demonstrations, there are still segments of the population who remain steadfast in maintaining fellowship with both Russian-speakers and Ukrainian speakers. But this newly radicalized person is preparing to carry out an event that

will ultimately set the insulated pro-Russian group he has made contact with and everyone that group claims to represent against the rest of Ukrainian society. The rest of the population thus have no choice in the matter except to fall into their formation accordingly. The longstanding antagonism between the insulated group of Ukrainian-speaking nationalists and the insulated group of Russian-speaking nationalists reaches critical mass, with one side able to point to a terror event as a broader war in which one culture is trying to overpower and wipe out another. Now more people in the population begins to perceive more of their interactions in terms of ethnicity and culture, and language, and thus become more separatist as a result. In Ukraine, this dynamic has gone both ways. Not only have thousands of Ukrainian police and military officers defected to join the pro-Russian side. There are some native Russian-speakers who have defected from the pro-Russian side to join the pro-Ukrainian side. Look at the Azov battalion, a pro-Ukrainian militia group with a large portion of Russian speaking eastern Ukrainians. It is clear that their compilation of grievances throughout life must have involved a highly familiar Russian element, since much of eastern Ukraine is Russian-speaking.

When a schism reaches this level that it has in Ukraine, getting back to a point in which these cultural issues are not at the forefront of Ukrainian life is virtually uncharted. Protests, damages, terrorism, perceived discrimination at every turn is not something that can be undone overnight. But if something isn't done to curb these sentiments, the next predictable step is some form of genocide, or should I say in this regard of east Slavic history, fratricide. It is readily apparent that these nationalist groups are not going away, since they are generational and carry an element of tradition, and in many cases just want to retain their cultural practices. However, when individuals who become highly aggrieved radicals, overstimulated by mass movements and past grievances join those groups, offering to carry out terrible actions on their behalf, it not only consigns the group into an escalated conflict, but also draws everyone the group claims to represent into a broader war. Would it be enough for a group to simply disavow an individual who has claimed to act on their behalf. In many cases, the opposition will not allow the group the honor of such a gesture, since it becomes very easy to presume that members of the group had a hand in the planning and encouragement of the attack. Perhaps, the Ukrainian government can act as a middleman between the pro-Russian nationalists and the pro-Ukrainian nationalists and maybe strike a deal in which each group would be allowed to continue to exist, in

exchange for reporting members whom they deem to be too radical or problematic. Of course, other factors would have to be settled first, such as the territorial issues that have arisen over the course of the conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. But after this is done, nationalist groups must come to an agreement in which each group will avoid the temptation of assigning blame to the entire group when one person acts as a lone wolf on behalf of a group that never condoned or encouraged his act. There are a lot of factors that come into play when a group is faced with having to hand over one who is linked to them, and looking back at history, peace between two nations was often contingent on one nation handing over a lone perpetrator. An example are the wars between the English settlers in New England and the Native American tribes in the 1600s. King Phillip, a native American chief of the Wampanoag tribe with members of other Native tribes, embarked on attacks against English settlers at a time when the native Americans were just getting ready to adopt English customs as a result of King Phillip's father's positive relationship and alliance with the settlers. Its likely that growing up, Phillip could have had some run-ins and negative interactions with English settlers, and thus developed a hostile familiarity along the way. Obviously, with this contempt, King Phillip likened himself to be acting on behalf of all Native Americans, but would end up not only meeting resistance against the colonist, but also resistance from fellow Native Americans, who were eager to hand him over and end the conflict that he instigated. Yet this "handing over" always proves very difficult because in many cases, there is the issue of proving the perpetrator is guilty. We can look back at the Osama Bin Laden terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Following the attack, the United States issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the country where Osama bin Laden took refuge over the years, to hand over Osama Bin Laden or face an invasion from the United States. The Taliban maintained that there was no proof that Osama Bin Laden was involved and also stated that they have a policy in which they do not hand over guests living in their country. From a peace perspective, had the Taliban decided to hand over Osama Bin Laden, no war would have ever taken place in Afghanistan. These examples highlight potential issues in getting groups to hand over members whom would act of their behalf or simply act but at the same time have strong ties to the group. There is a proof element involved. Another example is the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria by a Bosnian Serb nationalist in 1914. This was followed by Austria giving an ultimatum to Serbia in which Serbia would either allow Austria to conduct an internal investigation into

the assassin's links or face an invasion of their country. One has to ask what would have happened had Serbia allowed Austria to conduct an investigation into the ties of the Serbian nationalist assassin who considered himself to be acting on behalf of all Serbians. There may have been no World War I. Obviously, one can gather that mistrust is a huge element in groups allowing another entity, or for that matter, an opposition entity to have access to their domain. Evidence can be tampered with, investigators can act without proper ethic simply for the sake of presenting justification to act militarily. In light of all these examples, there has to be something that would work in which both sides of the conflict would agree for measures that would mitigate the possibility of violent conflict, if it is the case that the perpetrator's actions were never directly encouraged or condoned by the suspected group. Another aspect to take into consideration is the chain of events leading up to the perpetrator's action. Citing those aforementioned examples, one can ask what were the instances in the life of those individual perpetrators, which led them to carry out their respective crimes. Was it a failed romance? Was it an instance of being treated unfairly or discriminated against in legal or property matters? Was it public proclamations by a said group, of which alienated the person from the group, leading him to feel shunned. The simple feeling of being shunned is a greatly overlooked aspect that gives rise to dangerous rabble rousing. All of this is where one needs to think, and discourse needs to create a more intricate formula for measuring these components.

One thing is for certain, every aspect and every component thereof that has given rise to the climax of the Ukrainian conflict, must in the future, become cognizant of the lone radical element that can hijack and conflate their purposes. For instance, those who want to embark on public protests, must become aware that even if their intentions are peaceful, all it would take is one radical person to turn their demonstration into a violent riot. Same with nationalists groups. Even if their intentions are strictly defensive and tradition-based, they must remain aware of the dangers that one person can place them in, if that person should decide to go out and claim to act violently on their behalf. And ultimately, the Ukrainian government itself must, should the country stabilize again, make every effort to consider at every juncture the possibility of public outcry and, when after a certain amount of time has passed and things have cooled down so much that those in office may feel as though no one is looking anymore, reconsider their outlook and make sure that every step is one that keeps in mind a public insistent on its municipal

authorities adhering to behaviors congruent to their standards. When things become stable and stagnant, no institution is immune to complacency. And it is this complacency, which can serve as the initial catalyst that sparks the unrest which leads to a drastic overhaul of the stability that had come to be taken for granted.

Chapter 1: The Genesis of Ukraine

Background information concerning the Ukrainians and their history provides context on what is currently happening with the Ukrainian-Russo conflict, which began with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and has been ongoing as of 2021. It should be made clear that there is historically a fraternal backdrop that must be considered in terms of how the precipitating factors leading up to the conflict should be defined. This should provide clarity on the feasibility of any potential options explored for the purpose of initiating peace concessions between Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainians define themselves as a distinct Eastern European race, different from that of Russians and Poles in both culture and temperament. They maintain a set of peculiarities that permeate their prevailing social and moral codes. There are profound differences in language, customs, traditions, religion, way of life and communal organizations that distinguish Ukrainians from other eastern European and Slavic races. However, when it comes to haplogroup distribution, researchers discovered that the genetic pattern of Ukrainians is near identical to that of Russians. The major Y-chromosome DNA haplogroup in the Ukrainian gene pool is R1a, and occurs in 43% of the Ukrainian population. This same haplogroup is found in 46% of the Russian demographic. This is why much of Ukraine's history both as far as relations with Russia and internal schism within Ukraine is concerned, is based largely on language and religion, and not so much on ethnicity. The genetically close connection between Russians and Ukrainians makes it impossible to argue on the grounds of genotype, especially when observing the historical nature of conflict between the two parties. Fratris is a more fitting term to apply to history of the East Slavic peoples.

For thousands of years, Ukrainians have lived in the areas they continue to inhabit. Starting in the 7th century in Kiev, Ukrainians established a governing body, and soon after, Kiev became the center of the economic, intellectual and political life in eastern Europe as the capital of a federation consisting of East Slavic, Baltic and Finnic peoples. This would last from the late 9th century until the mid-13th century. The federation was known as Kievan Rus'. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus all claim ancestral origin from what comprised that region. In the 13th century, Kiev and much of eastern Ukraine was invaded and conquered by the Mongols. In the 14th century, a great part of western Ukraine was weakened by Crimean Tatar invasions before being conquered by the Poles in 1340. Tatars were any Turkic peoples originating from northern and central Asia. They inhabited parts of the Mongolian empire, but were not Mongols, as they spoke a Turkic language. Many of them would

eventually establish settlements in what is now known today as Crimea. Tatars later became part of the Mongol army.

As the geographical overlay of eastern Europe continued to unfold, northern Ukraine became confederated to the Lithuanians and later conjoined with the Polish empire--via the Lithuanian king's marriage to the queen of Poland, to which after became the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Of course, this was arranged mainly for the sake of fending off Tatar invasions. This new primarily Orthodox population in the Commonwealth thereupon agreed to unite with the Catholic Church under the Union of Brest in 1595, which established Greek Catholicism as the primary church of the empire, and would be a key factor that triggers the eventual establishment of Ukraine's statehood.

In 1599, the de facto tsar of Russia, Boris Godunov, who considered himself a Muscovite(Muscovy was the name of the Russian Empire before the complete gathering of Rus' lands), ordered the construction of a series of fortifications in both the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and southern Russia in order to help protect Russia from Crimean Tatar raids. These areas were inhabited by a group called the Don Cossacks, a predatory militant group feared by Russia. Russia at that time felt it would be strategically wise to fortify Don Cossack lands for the sake of protecting Russia from Tatar raids. Many Ukrainians had also sought refuge there, after attempting to flee failed Cossack uprisings in southern Ukraine.

The Union Of Brest served to alienate those inhabiting the rural frontier, in particular a group of Orthodox separatists known as the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks were a single entity, but its political center was inhabited by the Zaporozhian group, who established their operations in southern Ukraine. Their numbers grew over the years and they also became a major asset to the Polish armies in their wars against the Ottomans. However, as the Cossacks grew in power, Poland became concerned and began restricting enlistments in the Cossack armies and also started withholding wages. This led to rebellion in 1637 and 1648, which allowed Ukraine to eventually gain their independence from the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This rebellion became known as the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The major insurrection, however, took place between 1648 and 1657. The Cossacks, which were a group of East Slavic Christian Orthodox separatists led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, would wage a series of battles against Poland. The Cossacks felt their basic cultural standards were incompatible with the prevailing culture established in the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as a result of the Union of Brest established in 1595. Most Ukrainians and much of the Commonwealth at this time had

become Greek Catholics or Uniates since the Union of Brest declared a religious shift from the Orthodox church to the Catholic Church.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky had recently joined the Cossacks and rose quickly through their ranks. In 1646, he was embroiled in a land dispute when his estate was being contested by the son of the military commander who controlled it. The Cossacks had their own system of estate management. Moreover, during the dispute, the son had sent associates to harass Khmelnytsky and conduct raids on the property. Consequently, Khmelnytsky's own son would be attacked and injured during the raids. Khmelnytsky proceeded to reach out to the Polish Crown for help, but they refused to get involved. So now angry at the Commonwealth, Khmelnytsky would seek help from the Cossacks and incite a rebellion. In 1648, he led a group of 500 Cossacks to the Zaporizhian Sich, overtaking it from the Commonwealth forces. (*Zaporizhian Sichs were defense formations and fortress developments used by the Cossacks to acquire and defend land space and also claim statehood. A number of these were established and destroyed during the time of the Cossacks*) Once there and after successfully defending it from being reclaimed by the Commonwealth troops, Khmelnitsky used his diplomatic skills to recruit more men. Subsequently, the Cossacks elected him to become Hetman, which is simply the highest ranking military commander. Khmelnytsky spent much of his energy building up his forces. He sent delegates to Crimea, entreating the Tatars to join him since they would now have a common enemy in the Commonwealth. Word of the uprising quickly spread throughout the region and many began to defect from the Commonwealth to join Khmenlnytsky's forces. Khmenlnytsky's forces went on to achieve decisive victories in the battles of Zhovti Vody and Korsun. Khmenlnytsky then demanded that the Polish crown increase the number of registered Cossacks, return the Orthodox churches taken from the them, and also compensate them for wages withheld over a period of five years. Later, Khmenlnytsky had his forces join a peasant uprising at the Battle of Pyliavtsi, which further weakened Polish grip over the empire. Consequently, Ukrainian Jews were forced to flee from town to town, as many of them were slaughtered during the uprising. Jews were accused by peasants of being agents for the Commonwealth. During this time, many Jews were landleasers and were thus seen by the peasant class as oppressors. After the Battles of Zbarazh and the Zboriv, Khmenlnytsky halted his campaign after being promised by the new Polish king, John Casimir II, that the Cossacks would be granted various privileges throughout the empire. At this point, Khmenlnytsky stated that he was the sole autocrat of Rus', claiming Ukraine, Podolia,

Volhynia, and proclaiming that his "land and principality stretched as far as Lviv, Kholm, and Halych." The Treaty of Zborów established in August of 1649 permitted him to establish an independent Cossack principality in Ukraine. The treaty also banned Jews from working or living in camps where Cossack forces were stationed. When the fighting resumed in 1651, Khmelnytsky's forces suffered defeat at the battle of Berestechko, when they were betrayed by the Crimean Tatars, who would arrest Khmenlnytsky as the Polish advanced. The Cossacks suffered 30,000 casualties, and after the battle, the Crimean Tatars released Khmenlnytsky, forcing him to sign Treaty of Bila Tserkva, which reduced the number of registered Cossacks. The conflict now consisted of 3 parties against each other: The Cossacks, the Crimean Tatars, and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Tatars allowed neither side to prevail during the conflict. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Bila Tserkva had not been ratified by the Polish parliament. So at the battle of Batih, the Tatars rejoined the Cossacks, helping them achieve victory before handing over to them, 8000 Polish-Lithuanian prisoners whom the Cossacks would slaughter en masse. The Cossacks had ultimately established Ukraine as independent from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Khmelnytsky.

Seeking legitimacy and protection for Ukraine, Khmelnytsky sought alliance with foreign government. He first reached out to the Ottoman Sultan in 1651, but after significant disapproval among the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks agreed to accept overlordship of the Tsar of Russia, Alexei Mikhailovich. In 1654, under the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Cossacks pledged their allegiance to Russia(Muscovy). Now fearing Russia's growing influence, the Tatars subsequently joined the Polish. With the help of Russia, Ukraine was now able to fight off Tatar and Polish raids. After Khmelnytsky's death and subsequent infighting amongst the Cossack elite, Russia and Poland would divide the Ukrainian lands in 1667. Poland received the territories west of the Dnipro, while Russia would get Kiev and lands east of the Dnipro. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth met a slow demise, eventually becoming divided amongst Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the 18th century. During the time proceeding the 1654 Russia-Ukraine alliance, many Russians began to settle in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Much of Russia's historical discourse points to the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 as Ukraine's attempt to reunify with Russia and complete the gathering of Rus' lands. This was considered to be an attempt at "eternal union." Ukrainian intellectuals argue that Khmelnytsky's brief rule was the establishment of a "state", while at the same time downplaying the role Cossack Orthodoxy played in

Khmelnytsky's decision to make Ukraine a protectorate of Muscovy. However, Ukrainians asses correctly that unions between two states in which each state maintained its legal and administrative autonomy were common in medieval Europe.

Chapter 2: The Genesis of Russia

The Russians are known to have originated from the East Slavic demographic in ancient Kiev, before moving to western Russia towards present-day Suzdal and Murom. Another wave of migration by East Slavs to western Russia originated from Polotsk enroute towards Novgorod and Rostov. From the 7th century, East Slavs made up the bulk of the population in western Russia. In 860, the Rus' had invaded Constantinople, which was then part of the Byzantine empire. The Rus' seized the opportunity to attack while the Byzantines were preoccupied with their conflict against the advancing Arabs in Asia Minor. The Byzantines, however, quickly returned and the Rus' immediately withdrew from Constantinople. Afterwards in 863, the Patriarch of the Byzantine empire, Photius, would send missionaries Cyril and Methodius to the Rus' to convert the Slavs to Christianity. Both Cyril and Methodius understood the Slavic language and helped the Slavs establish their Glagolitic alphabet, which was later replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet, which resembled loosely the Greek alphabet and was developed in Bulgaria by monks in Ohrid and Preslav. By 867, the Rus' had accepted a bishop. This would be the birth of Russia's eventual establishment of Orthodox Christianity.

Russians began their history in 862 when the Rus' state was first formed in the north near Novgorod. It was then ruled by Varagians(Vikings). The Slavic and Finnic tribes drove out the Varagians, but shortly afterwards invited them back due to both the lack of structure and continuous in-fighting amongst the tribes. They elected Rurick, a Varangian chieftain, to rule over their Rus' territory. At that time, territories of the East Slavs were divided between the Varangians and the Khazars. In 882, when Prince Oleg of Novgorod seized Kiev, the northern and southern lands of the Eastern Slavs became united under a single authority, as Oleg sought to bolster defenses against Khazar conquest. Southern expansion of the Rus' placed considerable pressure on the Khazars, and after Oleg gained access to the Black Sea, the Khazars lost much of their influence in the region as Oleg launched excursions into Khazar territories along the sea coast and eventually established trade agreements with the Byzantine empire in 907 and 911. In 912, Igor would assume the throne of Kiev. Igor was thought to be the son of Rurik, the Viking chieftain ruler of the Rus' people. Regardless, his reign was largely unsuccessful. He embarked on an expedition to Transcaucasia, which upended much of his forces. His ships were set

fire in another expedition to Byzantium, where he attempted to catch Byzantium off-guard as they fought the Arabs in the Mediterranean. During the conflict, the Byzantine emperor Romanos I Lekapenos devised a plan in which his ships would mount flamethrowers known as the Greek Fire to their ships and use them to attack Igor's fleet. This led to many of Igor's forces and ships getting destroyed. A second attack was devised by Igor and involved raiding the provinces of Bithynia and Paphlagonia, which are east of Constantinople. However, the Byzantines would flank them and force Igor to retreat. They also ambushed Igor's forces as they traveled back to Kiev, setting afire more of their ships using the Greek Fire. Igor mounted one more assault in 944, using both fleet and foot soldiers to attack Constantinople. But this time when the Byzantine emperor got word of this large-scale attack underway, he instead chose to offer renewed trade concessions. Still and all, this subsequent treaty established in 944 was less advantageous than the one Oleg obtained from Byzantium in 911. In 945, Igor and Byzantium finally signed a peace treaty, ending the Rus'-Byzantine War. Ultimately, Igor did find success in expanding Kiev's dominion over the Pechenegs, a nomadic Turkic peoples often employed as mercenaries. He also expanded the authority of Kiev over the east Slavic tribe, Drevlyane. Igor was later killed by the Drevlyane after attempting to collect tribute from them. The trade relationship established by Oleg and Igor with Byzantium would eventually give way to the Christianization of the Rus' under Vladimir the Great in 988.

After Igor's death, his son, Sviatoslav I, succeeded him. Sviatoslav was vital in expanding Rus' control over the Volga valley and the Pontic steppe region. He also conquered Khazaria, which was perhaps at that time one of the strongest kingdoms in eastern Europe. As the Rus'-Byzantine treaty established by Igor in 945 was holding steady, Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros Phokas invited Sviatoslav to help him fight against the Bulgarians in the Baltic region in 968. Sviatoslav agreed and launched a successful campaign against the Bulgarians, defeating Bulgarian ruler Boris II and conquering all of northern Bulgaria. However, this expedition would leave Kiev open to attack. So the Byzantines decided to seize the opportunity by persuading and bribing the Pechenegs to attack Kiev. Once Sviatoslav got wind of this, he promptly returned to Kiev and repelled the Pecheneg invasion. Consequently, as a result of Byzantine's treachery, Sviatoslav refused to hand over to them those lands he conquered in the Balkans. He instead embarked on new conquests there, and captured the city of Philippopolis. Meanwhile, Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros Phokas would be overthrown by John Tzimiskes, who then became the new emperor. After Tzimiskes implored Sviatoslav to withdraw his forces from Bulgaria,

Sviatoslav mobilized his men for an invasion of Constantinople and seized Adrianople. However, this occupation was short-lived, as the Byzantines would repel Sviatoslav's forces with a counteroffensive. Later, Tzimiskes and his army occupied Bulgaria and convinced Sviatoslav to withdraw from the Balkans in exchange for safe passage home. But nevertheless, fearing that Sviatoslav would regroup, the Byzantine emperor persuaded the Pecheneg Kurya to ambush and kill Sviatoslav as he traveled back to Kiev. After Sviatoslav was killed in 972, his 3 sons Oleg, Yaropolk, and Vladimir would contend for the throne. It is here we see fratricide become a major theme in Kievan Rus' affairs.

Vladimir came to power in Kiev after reclaiming Novgorod from his brother Yaropolik, who seized Rus' after murdering his older brother, Oleg. After Yaropolik's fratricide, Vladimir, who was at that time the prince of Novgorod, was forced to flee to Scandinavia. He then managed to gather an army of Vikings in Norway and reclaim Rus' from Yaropolik. During his reign, after expanding the territories of the Rus', Vladimir wanted to unite his empire under one religion because much of Kiev was already comprised of many pagan religions. So Vladimir sent envoys to study religion in neighboring countries that were looking to persuade the Rus' to accept their faith systems. His envoys considered the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian faiths, but ultimately settled on Christianity after visiting Constantinople and being awestruck at the splendor of the cathedrals there. Prior to this, Vladimir practiced Slavic paganism. After seizing the town of Chersonesos in Crimea, Vladimir requested to marry Byzantine emperor Basil II's sister, Anna, and in order to appease the Christians in Byzantium who felt it absurd for a pagan to marry a Byzantine imperial princess, Vladimir chose to get baptized at Chersonesos before making his wedding vows. When he returned to Kiev, he destroyed all the pagan monuments and established Christianity as the religion of the Rus'. He also built "the Church of the Tithes," and dedicated it to St. Basil. The Christianity established in Kiev would eventually become known as The Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' and would operate under the jurisdiction of Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Vladimir was succeeded by his son Sviatopolk I, whom Vladimir had imprisoned for plotting his overthrow. When Vladimir died in 1015, news of his death was concealed from Sviatopolk to keep him from claiming the throne. However, when word of Vladimir's death did reach Sviatopolk, he quickly seized power in Kiev. He then moved to kill his brothers, Boris, Gleb, and Sviatoslav—all of whom he considered a threat to his power. (*We see this fratricidal element arise once again, indicating that this is becoming a growing theme in the historical development of east Slavic ethnology*.) However, word

of the fratricide would reach Vladimir's other son, Yaroslav, who was then prince of Novgorod. With the backing of the citizens of Novgorod and the Vikings, Yaroslav waged war against Sviatopolk and defeated him in 1016, forcing Sviatopolk to flee to Poland. There, however, Sviatopolk gathered an army and returned to Kiev in 1018 and reclaimed it from Yaroslav. But Yaroslav would return and eventually defeat Sviatopolk for good in 1019.

Much of Yaroslav's rule centered around reducing Byzantine's influence on Kiev. He went on to conquer a number of cities from the Poles, such as the Cherven cities, and also establish an alliance with the Polish king, Casimir I, who would marry Yaroslav's sister, Maria in exchange for recognizing the Cherven cities as a part of Kiev. Yaroslav ended up marrying the daughter of king Olof of Sweden. After eliminating the Pecheneg threat to Kiev in 1037, Yaroslav then launched a campaign against the Byzantine empire by invading Constantinople in 1043. But after defeating the Byzantine fleet, Yaroslav's ships encountered fierce storms at sea, causing them to return to Kiev empty-handed. The legacy of Yaroslav was the continued defense of Kiev and the construction of new monuments: the Saint Sophia Cathedral, monasteries of St. George and St. Irene, and also the Golden Gate of Kiev. Yaroslav was succeeded by his 3 older sons, Izyaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod. Together, they formed the Yaroslavichi triumvirate, which ruled for 20 years. Part of the deal with Poland that was orchestrated during Yaroslav's reign—which held that in exchange for Poland recognizing the Cherven cities as Kiev territory, the Polish King Casimir I would marry Yaroslav's sister, Anna—was that Iziaslav, Yaroslav's son, would marry Casimir's sister Gertrude. After this was arranged, Iziaslav went on to have three sons, Yaropolk, Mstislav and Sviatopolk. Later, Iziaslav was removed from power during an uprising in 1068, when the Polovtsy tribe broke through the defensive lines established by Iziaslav's father. After being unable to stop the Polovtsy raids on Kiev, Iziaslav was removed from power by a Kievan mob, who replaced him with Prince Vseslav of Polotsk, whom Iziaslav had recently imprisoned. The mob was upset that Iziaslav would not give them arms to fight against the Polovtsy. Consequently, Iziaslav fled to Poland. After his brother Sviatoslav managed to subdue the Polovtsy raids, Iziaslav returned to the throne in 1069 with the aid of the Polish army. He would, however, in just a few years be deposed by his brothers in 1073, which essentially broke up the triumvirate and reignited the ongoing fratricidal theme that defined the ascension to power of previous reigns. For the time being, Sviatoslav had taken over briefly, but Iziaslav was able to remain in contention by seeking help from the German king Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor, who would crown him king of Rus' in 1075. In 1076,

Iziaslav returned to Kiev and reclaimed the throne. Sviatoslav, however, had already died and had been succeeded by his brother, Vsevolod Iaroslavich. When Iziaslav reclaimed the throne, he made a deal with Vsevolod in which Vsevolod would renounce Kiev, but receive Chernigov. But Oleg, Sviatoslav's son, as a result of not getting along with Vsevolod, gathered an army of Polovtsy and drove Vsevolod out of Chernigov. Subsequently, Vsevolod went to Iziaslav for help and both would join forces and march against Chernigov, but the citizens there resisted and Iziaslav would later die during the conflict. Oleg was eventually forced to retreat from Chernigov, allowing Vsevolod to claim the throne. Vsevolod then proceeded to unite Kiev, Chernigov, and Pereyaslavl as core principalities, and also place his oldest son, Vladimir Monomach, in charge of administration in Chernigov. Vsevolod died in 1093 and was succeeded by Iziaslav's son, Sviatopolk II. After Oleg I reclaimed Chernigov, Sviatopolk and Monomach became embroiled in a long internecine struggle against Oleg. Sviatopolk died in 1113 and was replaced by his successor, Vladimir Monomach(Vladimir II), who would become a saint of the Eastern Orthodox Church. He put forth a number of reforms that stabilized the political climate in the Rus'. His reign between 1113 and 1125 is considered by many to be the last of the golden years of Kiev. He was later succeeded by his son, Mstislav I, who would spend much of his life in constant battle against the Polovtsy, Estonians, Lithuanians, and the princedom of Polotsk. He would also be the last ruler of a united Rus' kingdom. Mstislav died in 1132 at the age of 55 and was succeeded by his brother, Yaropolk II.

During his reign, Yaropolk II was occasionally undermined by his brothers. For example, after Yaropolk appointed his nephew, Vsevolod Mstislavich, then prince of Novgorod, to succeed him at the Pereyaslav principality, Yaropolk's half-brother Dolgoruki would later drive out Vsevolod. Yaropolk then appointed his son, Iziaslav Mstislavich,(who also received Turov) to Pereyaslav. This was also contested. Yaropolk and Dolgoruki wouldn't come to an accordance until 1134, when they both agreed that Yaropolk's brother, Viacheslav Vladimirovich, would replace Iziaslav and take the throne of Pereyaslav. When it came to Vsevolod, the people of Novgorod were angry at him for accepting the assignment to Pereyaslav, considering it a betrayal since Vsevolod had taken an oath to die in Novgorod. So when Vsevolod attempted to return there as prince after Yaropolk decided to appoint Viacheslav to Pereyaslav, the Novgorodians rejected him. This led to a paradigm shift in Novgorod, to which all throughout the next century, Novgorodians would exert considerable influence, dismissing and inviting a number of princes. Yaropolk died in 1139 and was succeeded by Viacheslav

Vladimirovich, who was after a short time driven out by Vsevolod II. Vsevolod II was then succeeded by Igor II.

Igor II encountered significant disapproval among the populace regarding his ascension to the throne due to the fact that he was largely regarded as corrupt and greedy. Because of this sentiment, his cousin, Iziaslav II, was subsequently invited to take the throne from Igor. After Iziaslav defeated Igor, he had him thrown in a pit, where his health proceeded to deteriorate and after complaining of illness, Igor requested that he instead be allowed to become a monk. After Iziaslav agreed and ordered his release, Igor went on to the monastery at St. Feodor to take his monastic vows. However, after a short period of time, he was killed by a mob after being suspected of plotting to reclaim the throne from Iziaslav. His lifeless corpse became associated with a number of miracles and he was eventually made a saint. Iziaslav II died in 1154. Yuri Dolgoruki would subsequently seize power in Kiev, but only briefly, before being poisoned to death at a Kievan feast in 1157. His reign was followed by Rostislav I's, but after one week, Rostislav was driven out by Izaislav III. Mstislav II would then claim the throne later that year in 1157 and remain in power until 1169, when Kiev was seized by Andrey Bogolyubsky, son of Yuri Dolgoruki. Mstislav was exiled to Byzantium before dying in 1172.

Andrey moved to appoint his brother, Gleb, as prince of Kiev and attempted to reunify all the Rus' lands, but after his brother Gleb died in 1171, Andrey lost much of his grip over Kiev. His reign was marked by moving his capitol from Kiev to Vladimir, along with the construction of a number of churches and monasteries there. One in particular was the Assumption Cathedral. As a result of a plot orchestrated by boyars of Suzdal and Rostov, Andrey was killed as he lay in bed on June 29, 1174. He was succeeded by Mikhail of Vladimir, oldest son of Yuri Dolgoruki.

In fear of the boyars, Mikhail would flee Vladimir for Chernigov. Andrey's nephew, Roman I, was installed before being ousted as Mikhail returned to reclaim the throne in 1175. Mikhail thereafter died in 1176 and was succeeded by his brother, Vsevolod III, who would force the boyars into submission and further develop the new capital, Vladimir. He embarked upon several raids, such as the one in Volga Bulgaria. He appointed prices in Novgorod and wed his daughters to princes in Kiev and Chernigov. He eventually died in April of 1212. But before his death, Vsevolod intended for his son, Yuri, to succeed him in Rostov, while his other son, Konstantin, would succeed him in Vladimir. However, Konstantin demanded both Rostov and Vladimir. This led to Vsevolod disinheriting him and passing his throne to Yuri. Unsurprisingly, after Yuri ascended to the throne following Vsevolod's death, Konstantin subsequently

moved to oust him from Vladimir. After doing so, he did, however, allow Yuri to have Rostov. Konstantin would die 2 years later, which then allowed Yuri to reclaim Vladimir. Unfortunately, it was during Yuri's reign that the Mongols began their invasion of the region. First, the Mongols advanced into Russia in 1232 and then into Vladimir in 1237. Yuri was killed in the battle of Sit River in 1238 as Mongol forces defeated the Vladimir-Suzdal armies. After his death, Yuri's younger brother, Yaroslav II, moved to Vladimir from Kiev and was crowned grand prince of Vladimir. After Vladimir was destroyed by the Mongols, Yaroslav met with the then leader of the Mongols, Batu Khan in 1243 at his capital, Sarai and was allowed to return to Vladimir. After the Mongols gained control of Kievan Rus', appointments to the throne in Vladimir had to be approved by the Khan. Two years later, Yaroslav was invited to conference with Güyük Khan in Karakorum, but was poisoned there and would die a week later.

After Yaroslav's death, Sviatoslav III was appointed ruler of Vladimir, but his reign was short lived as he would be ousted by his nephew, Mikhail Khorobrit of Moscow. This occurred as Andrey II was actually the one approved by Guyuk Khan to be the next grand duke of Vladimir. And so it was the case that upon returning to Vladimir from Karakorum, Mongolia after receiving his appointment, Andrey discovered that the throne was already occupied by Mikhail. Ultimately, Mikhail would be killed in battle with the Lithuanians months later. When Andrey took power, he attempted to exert some independence from the Great Horde of the Mongols. He went on to marry the daughter of Danylo of Halych. Danylo was despised by the Mongols. Meanwhile, Sviatoslav, with Alexander Nevsky, approached the Horde asking to be appointed back to the throne. Nevsky reported that Andrey was withholding tribute from the Horde. As a result of this meeting, the Mongols decided to send a military expedition to remove Andrey from power after hearing of this infidelity. But In 1256, Audrey would travel to Sarai and ask for pardon for his infraction and when he returned to Vladimir, Nevsky assigned him the eastern territories of Vladimir, which included the towns of Nizhny Novgorod and Gorodets on the Volga. When Nevsky died, Andrey attempted to claim all of Vladimir, but this attempt was stifled by Yaroslav of Tver, his younger brother, whom the Great Horde had already decided to appoint as the grand duke of Vladimir. Andrey was forced to settle in Novgorod. Yaroslav died in 1271 and was succeeded in Vladimir by Vasily of Kostroma, who henceforth also ascended to the throne in Novgorod. He would rule until 1276 and be succeeded by Dmitri Alexanderovich.

Dmitri had previously been put in charge of Novgorod by his father Alexander Nevsky in 1259. But after Nevsky died, the

Novgorodians expelled Dmitri due to his young age. Novgorodians had become increasingly more influential in dismissing and assigning princes. In previous times, the prince of Kiev or Vladimir would appoint the prince of Novgorod, but since 1139, the Novgorodians, if aggrieved, would invite their choice to come to Novgorod and seize the throne. After a decade of wresting with his uncles for the throne in Novgorod, Dmitri was finally afforded the opportunity to ascend to power in both Novgorod and Vladimir, when both his uncles, Yaroslav III and Vasily of Kostroma died in 1276. Dmitri would later establish a fortress called Korporye, to the dismay of the Novgorodians, who eventually forced him out of Novgorod. As Dmitri attempted to ease tensions with the Novgorodians, his younger brother, Andrey of Gorodets, went to the Golden Horde to get permission to replace Dmitri as grand duke of Vladimir. So in 1281, Andrey returned to Russia and seized Pereyaslav and forced Dmitri to flee to Scandinavia. After claiming the throne in Vladimir, Andrey was invited by the Novgorodians to take the throne in Novgorod. In the mean time, after establishing an alliance with Nogai Khan, Dmitri was reinstated as grand duke of Vladimir in 1283. However, Andrey would battle with Dmitri for the Vladimir throne over the next decade, finally reclaiming it in 1293. From that point over the next decade, Andrey was engaged in conflict with a coalition organized by Daniel of Moscow, Mikhail of Tver, and Ivan of Pereslavl looking to re-institute the rota system of collateral succession. Andrey ruled until 1304.

After Andrey died, Mikhail would become grand prince of Vladimir in accordance with the rota system of collateral succession. He was also confirmed by the khan of the Golden Horde. He would then go on to be accepted as the Prince of Novgorod. However, once there, Mikhail ran into conflict with the Novgorodians and responded by proceeding to cut off grain shipments to the city. This act would lead to Moscow becoming more influential throughout the empire than Vladimir since it was the case that while Mikhail was away, Yuri of Moscow stepped in to assume control of affairs in Novgorod. As Mikhail would again reclaim control with Mongol help in 1316, the Khan in Sarai appointed Yuri of Moscow to replace Mikhail as grand prince of Vladimir. To enforce the decree, the Mongols provided military support to Yuri. However, Mikhail defeated Yuri and captured his wife, who was also the khan's sister. She later died in Mikhail's custody. Kavgadii, who was released by Mikhail, returned to Sarai and reported that it was Mikhail who ordered the murder of the khan's sister and subverted the Mongol decree. The Great Horde then summoned Mikhail and executed him in 1318. Still and all, Mikhail's piousness during this ordeal earned him Sainthood in the Russian Orthodox Church.

In 1319, Yuri came to power but was opposed by Mikhail's son "Dmitri the Terrible Eyes", who reported to the Horde that Yuri was misappropriating tributes due to them. So when Yuri was summoned by the khan, Dmitri killed him. Subsequently, Dmitri was executed by the Horde for such an act. After the death of his older brother, Yuri, Ivan I gained control over the principality of Moscow, and would also be instated as grand prince of Vladimir by the Great Horde. Thus Ivan I had little trouble cooperating with the Mongols, collecting tribute from the other Russian principalities on their behalf.

In 1327, the residency of grand prince of Vladimir was moved to Moscow, which then solidified Moscow's influence over the region in what became known as the state of Muscovy. This is where East Slavic history and ethnology would segue or branch off into the development of Russian cultural identity. In the 14th century, the grand princes of Muscovy would attempt to regather all the Rus' lands. This effort was most demonstrated during the reign of Ivan III. He conquered Novgorod in 1478 and Tver in 1485. In 1480, Mongol influence over Muscovy came to an end and Muscovy gained sovereignty for all Rus' lands, and by the early 1500s, nearly all of Rus' had become united. Ivan would acquire part of Ryazan and the submission of the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl. The city of Pskov was later conquered by his son, Vasiliy III. Ivan III was the first Muscovite ruler to label himself "tsar" and "Ruler of all Rus'." He battled with Lithuania for control over former principalities of Kievan Rus' and was able to advance westward and expand Muscovy's dominance. As Muscovy began to solidify, all the rulers within Muscovy came to consider it to be their collective territory. Princes would claim jurisdiction and influence over certain areas. Ivan III, however, insisted that lesser princes yield to the grand prince of Muscovy and his descendants as the undisputed authority over military, judicial and foreign affairs. Muscovite rulers would slowly evolve into a powerful autocrat known as a "tsar." "Tsar" was to be considered on equal footing with other terms used to describe powerful rulers, such as emperor or khan. After Ivan III wed Sophia Paleologue, who was the niece of the Byzantine emperor, Muscovy appropriated many symbols and customs of Byzantine.

Under Ivan III, "tsar" as an autocrat implied independent ruler. When Ivan IV came to power, it would come to mean absolute and unlimited power. In 1533, Ivan IV became "tsar" and was recognized by the Orthodox Church. A monk would state that when Constantinople capitulated to the Ottomans in 1453, the tsar of Muscovy would have a legitimate claim as official Orthodox ruler and that Moscow would have the right to consider itself a successor to

other central bases of operations for Christianity, such as Rome and Constantinople. This outlook shaped the Russian view of Orthodoxy. Under Ivan IV, tsardom reached a zenith in terms of its level of power. Ivan IV would thus later become known as Ivan the Terrible, as he stretched the limits of his power to an enormous degree. Combined with his mental instability, Ivan the Terrible went on orchestrate extreme acts of violence. He became grand prince of Muscovy in 1533 as a child, during which time boyars attempted to serve as regency until he would come of age in 1547. And in 1547 when his time did come, Ivan IV assumed the title "Tsar and Grand Duke of all Rus'" and his coronation was reminiscent of those used in the coronation of Byzantine emperors. His reign marked the change from the Grand Duchy of Moscow into "Tsardom of Russia." Ivan IV instituted a number of reforms for the law code, the military, and the local government, all intended to fortify Muscovy from neighboring enemies. But in the late 1550s, Ivan would become hostile towards his associates and officials. After dividing Muscovy into both a private and public domain, Ivan relegated the private domain for the bulk of his terror and cruelty. His agents moved to execute anyone that raised suspicion in Ivan. Ivan's ire against the boyars would lead to him breaking down their influence in Muscovy affairs. He ordered the confiscation of their property and had many of them publicly executed. This policy was called "oprichnina." Boyars were normally instrumental in developing Muscovy and when they were suppressed by Ivan, much of the empire began to suffer. Trade became less efficient and peasants attempted to leave Muscovy. This would give way to the origins of legal serfdom, tying peasants to their land. In 1572, Ivan scaled back his oprichnina policies. Despite the brutal domestic policy of Ivan IV, Muscovy continued to expand. In 1552, Ivan conquered Kazan' Khanate on the middle Volga and afterwards, he would seize the Astrakhan' Khanate. As a result, Muscovy gained access to the Volga River and Central Asia. Ivan IV's rule marked the end of Muscovy and the beginning of what we have come to know as "Russia."

Chapter 3: Intellectual Discourse

Both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists are divided on the legacy of Kievan Rus'. In order to affirm the historical foundations of their statehood, Ukrainian nationalists often argue that they maintain the continued ethnic and authentic cultural tradition of the old Kievan Rus', while Russia, formerly Muscovy, is made up of people descended from Finno-Ugric tribes; that as cultural influence of Kiev later extended to Vladimir and then to Moscow, the eventual domination of the region by Mongols greatly altered and washed out much of the original east Slavic DNA signature that existed in Ancient Kiev. On the other hand, Russian nationalist

historians argue that political, linguistic, and religious legitimacy was passed onto Moscow. They further argue that when the Mongols conquered Kiev, many of the core East Slavic components of Kievan Rus' fled to Russia to escape the Great Horde, while those who remained became assimilated and mixed in with other races as a result of Polish-Lithuanian dominance, leaving the true cultural tradition in Moscow. Another aspect of the debate over Kievan Rus' is the extent of Muscovy's attempt to gather the lands of Rus'. The fact that Muscovite grand princes were committed to this goal affirms that Muscovy was the legitimate successor of Kievan Rus'. This, along with the fact that the grand princes of Moscow were descendants of Vladimir the Great and other Rus' rulers. According to Russian intellectuals, Ukraine was never really a true state, but a "Little Russian" extension of the Russian race, ultimately by way of providence, destined to fall under the dominion of Muscovy. During the Soviet Union era, it was taught that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians are historically "brother nations" all originating from ancient Kievan Rus'. Over the course of time, the Soviet Union would present Russians as the big brother of the group. Nonetheless, the notion of brother easily fosters ideas that Ukraine is not fundamentally an independent entity. Yet this type of discourse is not completely shunned by the Ukrainian perspective. There is the existence of a Ukrainian nationalist movement called the Ukrainian National Assembly and the linked Ukrainian Self-Defense Organization, which agrees on the unity of East Slavic peoples. However this group believes that Ukraine, not Russia is entitled to being the dominant state of the Rus' peoples since the original center of the Kievan Rus' empire was Kiev. There are other intellectuals that consider the notion of Kievan Rus' being either Russian or Ukrainian to be a far-fetched one.

After the Mongols invaded Kievan Rus' in the 13th century, the seat of the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' became split between Grand Duchy of Moscow in Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Vilnius. As Kiev began to lose its influence over the Rus' territories, the seat of the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' would first be moved to Vladimir in 1299, before being moved to Moscow in 1325, where the patriarch of Constantinople would continue to appoint the Metropolitan. The name was subsequently changed to the Metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia and all Rus'. However, in 1458, the Grand Duchy of Moscow decided to start appointing their own metropolitans without approval of the Constantinople patriarch. This fomented the establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church. With The Union of Brest in 1595-1596, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia and all Rus' broke from the Eastern Orthodox church and submitted to

the Pope of Rome. This established the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church or Uniate Church. The Russian Orthodox would remain in Moscow.

Scholars are largely unsettled on what tribes inhabited the eastern Slav territories first. Some contend that the Vikings or Varagians were there before the Slavic and Finnic peoples, whom they believe later assimilated with the Varagians. Others insist there is evidence that Slavs were there before the Vikings arrived. Those East Slavs who remained in Kiev and much of Ukraine insisted that they are ethnically distinct from the Russians who are also of East Slavic origin, asserting that present day Russia only appropriated the name "Russia" after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654. Prior to that, Russia was known as Muscovy. Muscovy's expansion was premised on a gathering of Rus' lands. When this was complete, Muscovy changed the name to Russia. However, Ukrainians point out that the treaty with Muscovy established Ukraine as an independent nation with a freely chosen supreme head called a "hetman." The treaty also gave Ukraine the right to engage in diplomatic relations with other states, along with the freedom to exercise free trade with all foreign nations. Not only that, but also the right to maintain an independent judicial system; the right to choose a leader for the army, and finally the right to establish an independent Ukrainian Church. When it became clear that Muscovy would not honor those terms, Ukraine rebelled. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Russia and Poland partitioned Ukraine and made the Dnieper the frontier between their two empires. Left-bank Ukraine belonged to the Tsardom of Russia and Right-bank Ukraine belonged to Poland-Lithuania.

Chapter 4: End of the Hetmanate and start of Russification

Peter I, the Tsar of Russia from 1682 – 1725, attempted to centralize his control over the empire by implementing reforms to the Russian army after Russia lost significant territory in the Great Northern War. The Great Northern War was Russia's battle for supremacy in Eastern, Central and Northern Europe against the Swedish Empire, which was then the leading power in the Baltic region. Russia was invaded by Sweden, but knowing of this in advance, Russian forces retreated as the Swedish army advanced into Hrodna. Russia employed a scorched-earth policy, burning buildings and crops before the Swedish forces would arrive, minimizing resources available to them when winter came around. Thus, the winter of 1709 would consequently deplete Swedish forces significantly. Just prior to this, Russia was attempting to implement reforms to the Russian army, which consequently drew the ire of Ukraine, and caused rebellion to ensue. Ivan Mazepa, the leader of this rebellion, felt that this measure taken by Peter I, who is more famously known in historical literature as Peter the Great, would

threaten the autonomy of the Cossack Hetmenate; an autonomy granted to them by the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654. The move to centralize the Russian army forced the Cossack forces to fight in distant wars on behalf of Russia, leaving their own territory open to Tatar and Polish raids. After suffering heavy casualties as a result of this new arrangement in which Cossack forces would fight distant battles while being ill-equipped to adapt to a warfare that was becoming increasingly advanced, Mazepa came under intense scrutiny and numerous demands were made for him to be replaced with a Russian general. Mazepa had become Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine in 1687 after ousting Ivan Samoylovych, whom he accused of attempting to secede from the Russian Empire. After Right-bank Ukraine launched an uprising against Poland, Russia allowed Mazepa to intervene. Mazepa was able to secure a large portion of Right-bank Ukraine from the Polish. Poland had been considerably weakened by an invasion of Swedish king Charles XII. And when the Swedish king secured the election of Stanisław I Leszczyński to the Polish kingship in 1705, both Polish and Swedish forces attempted to invade Ukraine. Russia knowing in advance of this plan, declined to protect Ukraine from the invasion. Mazepa considered this a violation of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. So when the Polish and Swedish forces advanced on Ukraine in 1708, Mazepa decided to join forces with them in the hopes of transferring control of Ukraine to Sweden. However, only 3000 Cossacks followed him. The rest remained loyal to the Tsardom of Russia. This rebellion that was led by Mazepa allied with Sweden was quelled by Peter the Great in 1709 at the Battle of Poltava. After the time of Mazepa, Russia launched a brutal policy of repression, which was pursued openly and ruthlessly. Peter instituted oversight measures over the autonomous Ukrainian administration. Everything pertaining to the administration of the hetman chancellory had to pass through the hands and watchful eyes of Muscovite officers. In 1722, the power of the hetmans was rendered in-effectual. In 1764, Catherine II completely abolished the office of the hetman.

Slowly, the assertion of Ukranian national identity became more oppressed in Ukraine. In 1720, Russia restricted the printing of Ukranian books and literature. In 1775, the "Zaporogian Sich," was destroyed. The “Zaporogian Sich” was statehood for the Cossacks from the 1500s to the 1700s, and were located in southeastern Ukraine. They were established to defend against Crimean Tatar raids. The Cossacks, a Ukrainian self-defense force, would construct a number of fortifications aimed at stopping Tatar hordes, and ultimately unify those fortifications to form a central fortress, the “Zaporogian Sich.” The first Zaporizhian Sichs were established on the island of Small (Mala) Khortytsia and near the modern city of

Marhanets. Tatar forces destroyed both in 1558 and 1593 respectively. A third sich was built on the Bazavluk island. It lasted until 1638, when a Polish expeditionary force—in response to a Cossack uprising —destroyed it. These settlements constituted an early proto-state. In 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytsky took control of a sich at Mykytyn Rih, near present-day Nikopol in order to conduct an uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This resulted in the establishment of the first Cossack Hetmanate. The Sich changed location on numerous occasions and was finally destroyed in 1775 by Russian General Peter Tekeli on direct orders from Catherine II. By 1780, the Cossacks were only organizing on a voluntary basis, defending Ukraine from Turkish raids during the Russo-Turkish War which began in 1787 and lasted until 1793. The Russians would began to resettle the Cossacks along the Kuban River. Thus in the 1800s, the Cossacks would eventually change their name to the Kuban Cossacks. But beginning in 1783, the Cossacks and peasants of Ukraine became subjected to serfdom by the Russian government. Serfdom was a form of indentured servitude that restricted peasants to their land. They would work the land, but be unable to leave. However, unlike slavery, they had some protections of the law, as they could not be bought or sold individually. They were simply parcel of the land and sold together with the land. Serfs that occupied a plot of land was subject to the lord who owned it, and had to work under his authority, but in return for this servitude, the serfs could cultivate a portion of the land in order to try and maintain their own sustenance. Much of serfdom was voluntary since during a famine, the only options were to starve or become a serf. And much of the aristocracy that profited from serfdom was Russian. During this time, Russia also forced the assimilation of the Ukrainian people into Russian culture. Serfs were forced to speak Russian and accept Russian political ideals. This was a crushing blow to Ukrainian resistance to assimilation. Russification of Ukraine would remain a strong component of Russian and Soviet policy until 1991.

After abolishing the Cossack Hetmanate, Catherine II converted it to what was called “Little Russia.” It was divided into to the vice regencies: Kyiv, Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi. Catherine II’s justification for claiming territories was largely based on her study of Rus' history, for she held the perspective that Poles were hostile enemies and that Ukrainians were a fraternal alliance. It was at this juncture, that Ukrainians were forced to serve the interests of the Russian empire. The Russian language became mandatory in schools and publications. It also became the administrative language in the Orthodox church. The policy of Russification was extended into all

facets of social life; in Left-Bank Ukraine, Kyiv, Slobidska Ukraine, and later in Right-Bank Ukraine—regained from Poland when Tsar Nicholas I successfully suppressed a Polish insurrection in 1831. After his army advanced into Warsaw in 1831, Nicholas I formed the "Western Committee", which was assigned the task of examining the Ukrainian provinces taken from Poland and planning their integration into the Russian Empire. The annexed territories from Poland, any of which had a large population of Ukrainians, became subject to the Russification policy initiated by Catherine II. Every measure was taken to bring the new provinces into the domain of Russia. In 1840, Nicolas I abolished the legal and self-governing framework used during the times of the Lithuanian-Commonwealth and the Hetmanate, and policies were enacted to enforce Russification throughout the empire. This included the conversion of Ukrainian Uniates(Ukrainian Catholics) to Orthodoxy(Russian Orthodox), and the enforced curriculum of historical narratives that favored Russian nationalism, both in schools and universities. Nicholas I placed the responsibility of ensuring assimilation of Ukrainian people into Russian culture on the shoulders of his minister of education, Count Uvarov. Uvarov believed that the success of this undertaking would require investing hopes in future generations since young minds are more easily shaped by early education. Any curriculum geared towards a presentation of history that overlays a commonality of East Slavic Rus' peoples would be more easily embedded into the minds of a new generation of young Slavs. This approach of targeting future generations was applied by both the Romans and Napoleon after their respective conquests of various peoples. Uvarov sought to introduce narratives that would justify Russia's annexation and assimilation of western provinces into the empire, but this required explaining the history of northeastern Rus' (Russia) as connected to that of southwestern Rus' (Ukraine). Uvarov offered an award of 10,000 rubles to anyone who could achieve this amalgamation. It would be Nikolai Ustrialov who eventually found a way to achieve this. In December of 1836, he completed the first volume of a four volume work that would later become standard curriculum throughout the empire. The book re-asserted ideas established during the reign of Catherine II. It also advocated centralized state control over political and economic affairs.

Language and culture would also become a major part of Russian policy implementation. Russian was installed as the official language to be used in schools located in the western provinces. While there were challenges in unifying Ukrainian and Russian history, the state was more concerned about Polish non-

assimilation since it would prove more difficult to suppress separatist notions which distinguish Polish from Russian. Russian archaeologists thus undertook excavations in places such as the Golden Gate in Kyiv to prove historical Russian influence there. Nicholas I also tried to unify Russian Orthodox with Ukrainian Greek Catholicism or Uniates. He tasked losif Semashko with finding a way to achieve this. A former Uniate, Semashko was impressed with the splendor of Orthodox churches and proposed that a Uniate Spiritual College be established, but separate from its Greek Catholic element. He also proposed the establishment of a Uniate Seminary, but one that would train Uniate priests in a manner aligned with Orthodoxy. As a former Uniate, Semashko proved to be the ideal person in persuading Uniates to acquiesce to the Russian Orthodox church. This became vital in serving the empire's goal of Russification. Semashko convinced Uniate priests to accommodate a number of features which were part of the Orthodox church policy. He persuaded priests to replace Uniate books with Russian ones. He also advised that the Uniate priests grow beards—the Russian Orthodox church considered the clean shave to be a form of blasphemy. In 1832, Nicholas I approved of Semashko's idea of subordinating the Uniate Church to the Orthodox Synod. On 12 February 1839, the synod adopted the Act of Union, which was drafted by Semanshko and requested the incorporation of 1.5 million parishioners into the Orthodox church.

Some Ukranians resisted Russification. Historian Mykola Kostomarov was one of such. As an assistant professor in the Department of Russian History at Kyiv University, he, in 1846, along with other intellectuals, such as poet Taras Shevchenko, formed the Cyril and Methodius brotherhood. In his books, "Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People" and "The Statute of the Slavic Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius: Its Main Ideas", Kostomarov articulated and promoted ideas subversive to Russification; such as Christian piety, democratic republicanism, Ukrainian national renaissance, Ukrainian messianism, and Pan-Slavic federalism. As a consequence, he came under political surveillance. In 1847, 2 days before his wedding, he was arrested and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in the Peter and Paul Fortress in Saint Petersburg, followed by exile. Other members of the Cyril and Methodius brotherhood were also arrested and exiled. These Ukrainian nationalists and others who would follow suit would become known as "Ukrainiophiles." This led to a large crackdown on the promotion of ideas that upheld Ukrainian separatism. In a memorandum issued by officers of the "Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery", which was

the Russian empire's secret police, it was stated: *"Through the minister of popular education, to warn all those dealing with Slavdom, antiquity, and nationality, as well as professors, teachers, and censors, that in their books and lectures they sedulously avoid any mention of Little Russia, Poland, and other lands subject to Russia that may be understood in a sense dangerous to the integrity and peace of the empire, and on the contrary, they strive as much as possible to incline all lessons of scholarship and history toward the true loyalty of all those tribes to Russia."* Meanwhile, the Polish were standing between the Russians and the Ukrainians. Many Polish renounced their Catholic faith and accepted Orthodoxy, but also assumed many facets of Ukrainian identity. These Polish noblemen were called "khlopomany." This group alarmed the Russian empire, which has put forth considerable effort in trying to embed the Polish into Russian society. The Polish are a west Slavic people, and like the Russians and Ukrainians, they also formed the common Slavic group that existed in the 7th century. They later migrated to central Europe before the emergence of Kievan Rus', the geographical area where Russians and Ukrainians share a common ancestry. During the Polish insurrection in 1831, many Ukrainian Uniates fought alongside the Polish against the Russian advance. It became evident to Russia that Polish accommodation of Ukrainian culture threatened the Russification movement. In 1859, key leaders of the Pan-Russian movement like Sylvestry Gogotsky began formulating doctrines that could subvert the Ukrainian movement, doctrines which were aimed at unifying all Slavs under one faith and language. In 1862, all Ukrainian Sunday schools were dismantled. The minster of internal affairs, Pyotr Valuyev, issued what was called the "Valuev Circular", which intended to restrict the use of the Ukrainian language for documents and print publications distributed amongst both narrow segments of the population and amongst the larger masses. This would include Ukrainian translation of the Gospels. The "Valuev Circular" would prove to be most effective in curtailing the spread of the Ukrainian language, culture, and identity. Nevertheless, Ukraniophiles continued to operate in Kyiv in smaller segments. On May 18, 1876, Alexander II while on vacation in Germany, signed the Edict of Ems, which was aimed at stopping the activities of the Ukrainophiles, which the empire felt was a danger to the state. A number of prohibitions were established. They included bans on the importation of all Ukrainian-language publications into the empire, bans on the publication of religious text, grammar, and books in Ukrainian for both the common people and the upper classes, bans on existing Ukrainian-language publications from school libraries, and bans on the use of Ukrainian

language in theatrical performances, songs and poetry readings. Alexander II also ordered strong reprisals against Ukrainophile activists like Mykhailo Drahomanov and Pavlo Chubynsky, both of whom were exiled from Ukraine. Teaching positions in Ukraine became entirely filled with Russian teachers, while the Ukrainian teachers were reassigned to Russia. The Edict of Ems also approved subsidizing a newspaper called "Slovo", which was published in Galacia, a country within the Austrian monarchy. Galacia was a very diverse country consisting of Poles, Ruthenians(East Slavs), Ukrainians, Rusyns, Jews, Germans, Armenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Roma and others. But the newspaper "Slovo" was heavily inclined against Ukraniophiles, and for this reason, Alexander II, personally approved of the subsidy which amounted to 2000 gulden. After Austria's Seven Weeks war with Prussia, Austria became a dual monarchy known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and later the appointment of a Polish governor in Galacia would be met with hostility by the East Slavic Ruthenians. ("Ruthenian" was how Rus' people identified themselves in Polish territories.) In response to Austria's accommodation of Polonism, the 'Slovo" began promoting Russophilia, which led to many Russophile priests immigrating to the Russian empire. As adherents of Russification policy, these Orthodox converts from Greek Catholicism, would settle amongst the remaining Uniates and force them to convert to Orthodoxy.

When Nicholas II became Tsar in 1894, the Russian Empire had become plagued with corruption and oppression. At the same time, Russia was seeking to establish a shipping port on the Pacific Ocean for its maritime and navy trade. Leery of the Russian empire's imperialism, the Japanese feared that Russian encroachment would interfere with their interests in Korea and Manchuria. Japan was looking to expand into mainland Asia. So Japan offered to recognize Russian influence in Manchuria in exchange for Russia recognizing Japanese influence in Korea. The Russian empire refused, insisting on establishing a buffer zone between Russia and Japan in Korea. When negotiations failed, Japan attacked a Russian navy fleet at Port Author, China in 1904, and would weaken the Russian forces considerably. Refusing to surrender, Nicholas II called a conference at St. Petersburg in 1905 in order to generate more support for the war. However, many socialist groups that attended the conference considered Russia's imminent defeat at the hands of the Japanese as indicative of a need for reforms. When these demands were ignored at the conference, the socialists and workers groups marched to the Tsar's palace at St. Petersburg. There, things would take a violent turn, as the Russian forces opened fire on the demonstrators,

killing hundreds and as a result, strikes and demonstrations broke out across the country. In an attempt to stabilize the country, Nicholas II decided to ease up on Russification policies, granting people the freedom to choose their religion. Subsequently, 150,000 Ukrainians converted back to Greek Catholicism, leading many of the Orthodox clergy, who devoted their lives to converting Uniates to Orthodoxy, feeling betrayed. In response to demands for reforms amid the wave of violence, Nicholas II declared the formation of the Duma, which was to serve as the lower house of a new legislative body. Elections for the Duma took place in 1906, and Ukrainians were able to elect their own representatives capable of promoting Ukrainian autonomy. A Ukrainian Caucus existed in the 1st and 2nd dumas in 1906 and 1907. The last 2 dumas, however, had a different electoral system established by the law in 1907, which limited the representation of peasants and minorities in the dumas. On account of that, the Ukrainian voice became less influential. Nicholas II had issued the Russian constitution of 1906 called "fundamental laws", giving himself autocratic power and the ability to dissolve the Duma at will. When Russian nationalists warned him about the separatism that could ensue amongst other groups such as the Belarusians, Nicholas II ended the 1st and 2nd dumas. The following 3rd and 4th dumas would heavily favor landowners.

Russian nationalists formed the Union of the Russian People in 1905. Their goal was to re-assert Russian nationalism and support for the monarchy throughout the empire. Naturally, this was well-received by Nicholas II. Their base of operations was in West-bank Ukraine, and the union upheld the idea that East Slavs comprised one race, and that there was no difference between Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians. They were able to garner the support of Ukrainian peasantry by scapegoating Jewish and Polish landowners and middlemen. As a result, many Ukrainian peasants sacrificed their identity, believing the Union would serve their economic interests. A number of brochures were produced, which spoke out against the idea that the Ukrainian language was a separate language. On the other hand, those who participated in the Ukrainian nationalist movement were tagged as "Mazepists." The Union also pointed out the dangers of the Ukrainian movement to the Russian state. It noted the futility of Ukrainian nationalism and its inability to appeal to the peasantry, due to the fact that it was mostly cultivated among students and intellectuals.

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated by Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo, the provincial capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The motive for the assassination was Austria's annexation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, the mostly Slavic province. This move by Austria upset the balance of power in the Balkans and stifled the ambition of Pan-Slavic nationalists. Serbia was perhaps most angered by the annexation. After the assassination, Austria demanded that they be allowed to conduct an internal investigation in Serbia. After consulting with Russia, an ally of Serbia, Serbia refused the demand. Three days later, Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia. In response, Russia declared war on Austria. These course of events triggered the start of World War I, then known as the Great War.

Chapter 5: The Rise of the Bolsheviks

On August 18, 1914, Russia advanced into Austria. Consequently, Russian nationalists saw this as an opportunity to put a final end to Ukrainian nationalism by crushing Ukrainophile elements in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and incorporating them into the Russian empire. On August 19th, the Russian army captured eastern Galacia from Austria. Greek Catholic(Uniates) Ukrainians made up 65% of the population there. Poles made up 22%. Russia immediately enforced policies aimed at integrating Galacia into the Russian empire, forcing Ukrainian Greek Catholics to assimilate into Russian culture by converting to Orthodoxy. This Russification of Eastern Galacia may have also been largely provoked by Austria's persecution of Russophiles, just prior to Russia's invasion. Russophiles believe that Ukrainians are ethnically no different than Russians. Furthermore, some Russians disagreed with Russia's decision to annex eastern Galacia, fearing the consequences of enjoining a mostly Ukrainophile country with the Russian empire, as they believed that Ukrainian separatists in Galacia could incite Ukrainian separatism throughout the empire. Nonetheless, Russia moved forward with its agenda in Galacia. The names of streets and public squares were denominated into themes that represented Russian culture and politics. The Ukrainian language was phased out of schools. Books written in the Ukrainian language were prohibited. Ukrainophile organizations were closed. The head of the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church was arrested and exiled to an Orthodox monastery. In contrast, Russophile leaders and organizations in Galacia were supported, while Russophile activists who were jailed by the Austrian empire were subsequently released. Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalists in the Russian empire stood by unable to intervene, as they were under scrutiny as possible defectors and supporters of the Austrian regime. Russian nationalists warned that Ukrainian nationalists could undermine Russia's efforts in the war, since many of the Ukrainophiles in Galacia did in fact support the Austrian empire. As a result, many Russophiles believed that Ukrainophiles in the Russian empire could share in those sentiments. This would put the onus on

Ukrainian nationalists in Russia to prove themselves loyal to the tsar. Russia's early success against Austro-Hungary would be short-lived. When German Army intervened, the Russian Army was steadily pushed back. The subsequent loss of morale combined with poor planning upended the Russian empire. During the Russian setbacks in World War I, Russians at home were complaining of food shortages and low wages and demanding an end to the war. Anti-war and anti-capitalist demonstrations began taking place throughout the empire. A revolution ensued in February of 1917, leading to Nicholas II abdicating his throne. This was followed by widespread rioting in Petrograd and other Russian cities. A provisional government was installed with the conditional support of the Mensheviks, a faction of the Russian socialist movement. The other two were the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks wanted the provisional government to pursue a plan for peace without annexation. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian People's Republic declared their independence and claimed all the traditionally Ukrainian settled territories. This was followed by a surge of rallies all throughout Ukraine.

The provisional government re-asserted its intentions to continue the war effort with France and Britain, but after more setbacks in finding ways to end the war, the provisional government would be ousted by the Bolsheviks in October of 1917, led by Vladimir Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. Lenin was previously exiled by the Russian Tsarist government for his Marxist revolutionary activities in the late 1800s. He was arrested, charged with sedition and exiled to Siberia. He later moved to Western Europe to continue his theoretical development of Marxism. After a failed revolution against the Russian Empire in 1905 by proletariat revolutionaries, Lenin would thereafter call for World War I to be transformed into a worldwide revolution against capitalism. Because Lenin was an anti-war activist, Germany became instrumental in facilitating his return to Russia in the hopes that he would stifle Russia's war efforts against Germany. Lenin returned to successfully lead the October revolution against the Russian Tsarist empire. From there, Russia would eventually go under Soviet control. Ukraine, however, refused to cooperate with the new Bolshevik government in Petrograd. Prior to the October Revolution of 1917, when the provisional government was installed in Russia earlier that year in February and March, the Central Rada was formed in Ukraine, which united deputies, workers, and peasants, as well as members of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Initially, they supported the provisional government. They even wired congratulations its new head, Georgii Lvov. Aleksandr Kerensky, the

minister of justice was also congratulated by the Rada. But shortly afterwards in June, the Central Rada claimed autonomy. As Ukraine became influenced by internal conflict between the rising Bolshevik movements and Ukrainian nationalism, the Central Rada would later renounce autonomy. However, as the allegiance of the peasant class drifted away from the Ukrainian nationalists towards communism, the Central Rada would become hostile towards the Bolsheviks. After the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, the Central Rada used the opportunity to seize power in Kiev, proclaiming the Ukrainian National Republic, designating its territory and confirming its federal relationship with Russia. Regardless of this proclamation, the rise of Bolshevism in Ukraine gave Russia the leverage to make demands upon them. Ukraine's refusal to cooperate led to a Bolshevik invasion of the country. Before the October Revolution of 1917, Lenin intended to recognize Ukrainian independence, but changed his stance afterwards. Lenin's initial stance on Ukrainian independence was mainly for the sake of facilitating the overthrow of the provisional government. After this was achieved, Lenin withdrew support for the Central Rada, believing it did not share the anti-capitalist outlook of his Bolshevik movement. Inevitably, the Bolsheviks would look to seize power in Ukrainian territories. Lenin sent Russian troops to Kyiv, the capital of the Ukrainian People's Republic. This unit was led by Mikhail Muraviev, who seized the capital in January of 1918, arresting and executing anyone on the streets caught speaking Ukrainian. In fact, anyone suspected of being an enemy of the Bolshevik revolution was killed. The Bolsheviks established a rival government in Kiev, the People's Secretariat. The Central Rada, however, sent a peace delegation to Brest to negotiate with the central powers. Essentially, the Central Rada was secretly seeking out Austro-German protection from the Bolsheviks. Hence why the Central Rada would subsequently claim its independence from Russia. Following this declaration, the Central Rada pushed forward passing a series of laws aimed at economic, labor, and land reforms. After signing the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, ending Russia's involvement in World War 1, Russia was left having to recognize the Central Rada and remove its troops from Kiev. The German Army then took over Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia as accorded by the treaty, and the Central Rada would ultimately become a puppet government. But when the Central Rada failed to deliver on its promises, such as providing grain shipments to Germany, the German command dissolved the Central Rada and in-stalled another puppet government led by Hetman Skoropadsky. He formally declared the overthrow of

the Central Rada, suspended the Ukraine People's Republic(UNR), and outlawed the Communist Party in Ukraine. The Socialist Directorate of Ukraine, however, would eventually overthrow the Cossack Hetmanate and then re-establish the UNR in November of 1918. This placed Kiev back under the control of the Bolsheviks.

In August of 1919, the White Army, led by General Anton Denikin, and made up of Russian nationalists who hated both the Bolshevik and Ukrainian movements, seized Kyiv from the Bolsheviks. They then enforced a widespread Russification policy, making Russian the language of both state institutions and schools. By early 1920, Ukrainian National Republic fighters would drive Denikin's forces from Ukraine. As the Ukrainian army became locked in a guerrilla war against the Bolsheviks in the ongoing Soviet-Ukrainian War in 1920, the Ukrainians made a plea to the west, complaining of the restrictions placed on their civil liberties and cultural rights. Julian Batchinsky wrote a memorandum to the United States in 1920, requesting that the US recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic:

Washington, D.C.

May 12, 1920.

The Honorable, The Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington.

Sir:

In view of the present status in eastern Europe, and in deference to the unsettled affairs of the territory of the former Russian empire, which are now pressing for a definite solution, I, as the representative of the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, conceive it to be my duty to submit for your consideration this memorandum setting forth the just claims of the Ukrainian people to political and economic independence. As a consequence of the facts herein explained, I respectfully ask the Government of the United States of America to extend recognition to the Ukrainian People's Republic as a free state.

The national aspirations of Ukraine embrace political liberation for all Ukrainians, consolidation of all free Ukrainians into one state,

the erection of a constitutional democratic republic, and economic co-operation with neighboring and other states.

Ukraine's claim to independence is based upon the following principal grounds:

(1) The existence of the Ukrainians as a well-defined, separate, group-conscious race, with a continuous historic and cultural tradition;

(2) Their occupation, over a period of centuries, of the lands where they now dwell;

(3) Their age-long efforts, increasingly of popular origin, to achieve and maintain political independence;

(4) The obvious interest and desire of the entire Ukrainian population to organize and sustain its economic life free of exploitation by neighbors and foreign powers; and

(5) The crying need for a new order in eastern Europe, and the permanent elimination of the historic struggle between Poland and Russia to control the natural resources of Ukraine.

By all the canons of ethnology and history, the Ukrainians form a distinct racial unit. In America there has been a popular impression that Ukraine is merely a province of Russia, identified with it linguistically and racially. This is a misapprehension. The leading anthropologists, even among the Russians, agree that the Ukrainians constitute a physical type clearly different from the Great Russians, the White Ruthenians or the Poles. In culture and temperament they display peculiarities which permeate their whole social and moral nature. Their language is a separate Slavic tongue, and not merely a dialect of the Great Russian.

"Between Ukrainians and Russians," says Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, a learned student of Russia, "there are profound differences of language, customs, traditions, domestic arrangements, mode of life and communal organizations. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities...."

"The historic development," says the official statement of the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, "contributed toward the creation of two nationalities: the Great Russian and the Ukrainian. The historic life of the two peoples failed to develop a common language for them. On the contrary, it really strengthened those dialectic variances with which the ancestors of the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and those of the Great Russians, on the other, made their appearance in history. And, of course, the living Great Russian idiom, as it is spoken by the people of Moscow, Riazan, Archangel, Yaroslavl or Novgorod cannot be called a 'Pan-Russian' language as opposed to the Ukrainian of Poltava, Kiev or Lviv (Lemberg)."

The Ukrainian race is as nearly autochthonous as any in central or eastern Europe. A brief survey of history shows that, for more than one thousand years, the Ukrainians and their forbears have continued to occupy approximately the same lands which they now inhabit, except for temporary recessions and re-colonizations caused by Mongol invasions. In the ninth century they were already settled in the vast and fertile plains and woodlands lying between the Carpathian Mountains and the Sea of Azov, and embracing the valleys of the Dniester, Pruth, Boh, Dnieper and Donetz.

Organized government in Ukraine began with the ancient state of Kiev. The ascendancy of Kiev also marks the period of Ukraine's greatest political expansion. From the ninth to the thirteenth century, Kiev was the center of the economic, intellectual and political life of eastern Europe, uniting the entire ethnographic Ukrainian territories. The name by which this state was known was "Russ," taken from the name of the reigning dynasty. This term was later appropriated by the Great Russians. "Because of the Byzantine commerce, learning and craft," observes the Polish historian Zakrzewski, "Kiev, the 'mother of Russ cities,' was for the Poland of the eleventh and twelfth centuries what Rome had been for earlier Germans." The French geographer Reclus notices that academies flourished at Kiev and Ostrog before the Great Russians owned a single high school, and draws attention to the fact that Russia, during the regenerative period of Peter the Great, received her teachers from Ukraine.

The fall of Kiev and Ukraine's subsequent loss of autonomous statehood in the fourteenth century can only be ascribed to the old system of military conquest. The affairs of eastern Ukraine became confused and decadent through the constant Mongol pressure which

began in the thirteenth century. One hundred years later, part of western Ukraine also, weakened by frequent Tatar invasions, fell a prey to Poland, to whom she was a tempting prize because of her rich soil.

The Polish conquest of Ukraine started in 1340 and, after thirty-five years of the bitterest warfare, the Poles succeeded in annexing an area of land approximately coextensive with the present provinces of Kholm and Eastern Galicia. This they never succeeded in assimilating, in spite of the most tremendous efforts. Simultaneously Volhynia and other northern Ukrainian territories became confederated with Lithuania in order to gain protection against the Tatars. The marriage of the Lithuanian king to the Queen of Poland and the union of the two realms drew these Ukrainian lands also in 1386 into an informal union with the Polish empire which, in 1569, in spite of Ukrainian protests, was made definite, and lasted until 1648.

In that year the whole Ukrainian people rose, under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, and put an end to this union, which was incompatible with their interests and with their type of civilization. Then, anticipating further Polish efforts to destroy the newly won independence of Ukraine, and menaced by other foes, particularly the Turks, then the strongest military power in eastern Europe, the Ukrainians concluded an agreement of confederation with the Czar of Muscovy in 1654. It is interesting to recall that Khmelnitsky was expressly advised against this step by Oliver Cromwell, who declared that the Czar would never permanently recognize a free people.

The most important clauses in the treaty of 1654 guaranteed a freely chosen supreme head for the Ukrainian state, called a "hetman"; the right to engage in diplomatic relations with other states, except Poland and Turkey, when the cognizance of the Czar was necessary; free trade with all foreign nations; the complete independence of the judicial system; the right to choose a leader for the army, over whom the "hetman" had supreme control; and, lastly, the independence of the Ukrainian Church.

Muscovy did not live up to these terms, and the result was a succession of Ukrainian uprisings, directed now against Russia just as they had formerly been aimed at Poland. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Russia and Poland made common cause and partitioned Ukraine, making the Dnieper the frontier between their two empires. The most important rebellion against this last measure

was that led by Mazeppa in 1709, which was quelled by Peter the Great. After the time of Mazeppa, Russia's policy of repression was pursued openly and ruthlessly. Peter instituted a supervision over the autonomous Ukrainian administration, vesting authority in Muscovite officers, through whose hands passed everything pertaining to the hetman's chancellery. In 1722 the power of the hetmans was cut down to nothing. In 1764 Catherine II. abolished the office altogether.

Meanwhile, in order to assure possession of Ukraine, the Russian government was making every effort to assimilate the Ukrainian people. One step toward accomplishing this was the suppression of Ukrainian literature. In 1720 a special censorship over the publication of Ukrainian books was established in Kiev. In 1769 even the printing of Ukrainian primers was forbidden, and Russian text-books were introduced in spite of the protests of Ukrainian educators.

Step by step, national feeling was stifled in Ukraine. In 1775, the "Zaporogian Sitch," the last bulwark of Ukraine's autonomy, and the basis of the Ukrainian Army, was destroyed. In 1783 the peasants of Ukraine, free since 1648, when they had thrown off Polish domination, were again subjected by the Russian government to serfdom in its most cruel form. Hundreds of thousands of free peasants and Cossacks, together with millions of acres of Ukrainian land, were distributed among the favorites of Catherine II.

This measure had the effect of crushing the resistance to Russification among the Ukrainian nobility, and estranged them from the common people. The serfdom of the small farmer was so profitable for the gentry that the preponderance of the aristocracy became superficially Russian. Under pressure of Russian schooling, administration and military service, they adopted the Russian language and political ideas. To achieve this desirable result, the Muscovite government did not hesitate to persecute ruthlessly anything that could be held as a reminder of the republican régime in Ukraine. At the same time, an analogous Polonization of the upper classes was being carried out in western Ukraine. The last quarter of the century witnessed a temporary eclipse of the Ukrainian spirit of nationalism.

The French Revolution released forces that had been imprisoned in the hearts and minds of the people. A wave of nationalistic feeling

swept through Europe, bringing inspiration to the Slavs as well as to their western brothers. Every branch of the Slavic race awoke to a realization of its history, its traditions and its great men. The Ukrainians shared in this renaissance. Between the revived nationalism and the spirit of democracy a natural alliance presently sprang up. Especially in the Dnieper district, there began an enthusiastic study of the country's history, and a perusal of old documents and popular traditions. The keenest interest was manifested in everything pertaining to ethnography, philology and popular culture. It was the tardy recognition of the people as guardians of national culture which did much to break down the lack of sympathy which had so long prevailed between the nobles and the lower classes.

But the Ukrainian movement was confronted by a bitterly hostile Russophile bureaucracy. It is remarkable that Russo-Ukrainian policies should have remained so static from the time of Peter the Great onward, while a number of changes were taking place in Russo-Polish relations. Yet such was the case. The Ukrainian language was restricted time and again. Ukrainian economic life was hampered in several ways. The Ukrainian serfs, upon their liberation in 1861, had been granted smaller allotments than the Russian serfs. This resulted in overpopulation of the agricultural districts, emigration and a high death rate. The lack of schools made remote the possibility of improving farming methods. Ukrainian industry suffered a set-back through the unfavorable tariff policies adhered to by the Russian government and by the fact that no banks, except those with central offices in Moscow or Petrograd, were allowed to establish branches in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the nineteenth century witnessed a notable growth of Ukrainian national feeling. The early years of the century constitute the period of literary rebirth. Then followed the educational work among the common people. Private schools were organized, and pamphlets and books were distributed. Cultural organizations were formed, and a pronounced interest in science was displayed. This entire revival so alarmed the Russian government that, in 1878, the Czar prohibited by ukase almost all publications in the Ukrainian language. Still, the literary impulse was not suppressed. It transferred itself to Eastern Galicia and Switzerland and, in spite of grave obstacles, succeeded in winning for the Ukrainian a worthy place among Slavonic literatures.

Side by side with the cultural advance, a political reawakening of the Ukrainian people was taking place. It was appreciated by the Ukrainians that political liberty for their land and race was expressly conditioned upon the overthrow of the Czarist government. Accordingly they bent their efforts in that direction. Ukrainians organized and took a leading part in the Decembrist uprising of 1825. In the subsequent revolutionary movement they were again prominent, and two-thirds of the leaders were natives of Ukraine. The events of March, 1917, were largely made possible by the Ukrainian regiments stationed in Petrograd, who refused any further allegiance to the Romanovs and became supporters of the newly created authorities. Later on, the Ukrainians were the first of the subject nations of the Russian empire to organize their own government. On November 20, 1917, Ukraine was proclaimed an independent nation by the Central Rada, the provisional Ukrainian parliament. The struggle to win recognition for this independence is still in progress.

The expediency of Ukraine's claim to exist as a self-governing nation does not, however, rest merely upon racial, ethnological and historical bases. There are primary economic considerations which press for its admittance to the circle of free nations.

The Ukrainian people inhabit a land 330,000 square miles in extent, with a population of 45,000,000. This territory is not merely abundantly self-supporting, but is, in fact, one of the richest areas on the earth's surface. Four-fifths of the entire extent lie within a belt of deep, black earth, which produces bounteous crops of wheat, barley, rye, oats, sugar-beets, fruit, tobacco and vegetables. Under the Ukrainian ethnographic territory lie mineral riches: coal, petroleum, iron, manganese, salt, phosphate, kaolin, graphite and many other substances of commercial value.

In the normal pre-war period, Ukraine used to supply about 5,000,000 tons of grain for export annually. Most of this was wheat. The last three years, particularly 1919, have seen good harvests in Ukraine. At the present moment, when western Europe is unable to feed herself, Ukraine has an excess remaining from the crops of 1917, 1918 and 1919, to an amount of not less than 10,000,000 tons of different kinds of grain. Besides this, the country can guarantee a minimum yearly export of 300,000 to 600,000 tons of sugar; 9,000 tons of tobacco; 17,000 tons of sugar-beet seeds; and 10,000 tons of flax and hemp yarn. Besides these products, Ukraine used to export annually

before the war: 65,000 tons of eggs; 6,500 tons of raw hides; 12,000 tons of pork and dressed poultry; 9,000 tons of beef; 240,000 head of beef cattle; 15,000 head of horses; 130,000 hogs; and large quantities of wool, feathers and hops.

In minerals, Ukraine may export in a short time as much as 100,000 tons of manganese ore annually; 500,000 tons of iron ore; and considerable amounts of phosphates, salt and soda. With reorganization of transportational facilities, she can furnish from 6,000,000 to 10,000,000 tons of coal and coke, as well as benzol toluol, anthracen phenol, naphthalin and other valuable coal tar derivatives; about 90,000 tons of coal tar; sulphuric acid, ammonium salts and many other raw and semi-manufactured products.

The preceding enumeration of the physical resources of Ukraine shows how mistaken is the conception that Ukraine could not maintain an economic existence independent of Russia. If a country possessing such extraordinary natural advantages and wealth as Ukraine cannot stand alone, how can one justify the independence of Italy, Greece, Poland, Jugoslavia, Finland and other European nations whose right to autonomy is not questioned, but whose natural endowments are far less favorable to economic freedom.

The converse of the same proposition; viz., that Russia cannot live without Ukraine, will not survive impartial criticism. Although it is quite clear that, in reasoning to this end, other interests than those of Ukraine supervene, it is nevertheless worth while to examine this point of view in order to expose its falsity.

The three fundamental bases of opposition usually advanced are: (1) Ukraine is the granary of Russia and is necessary to Russia for a large part of her food supply; (2) Ukraine separates Russia from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, thereby closing the outlet to the Mediterranean; (3) Ukraine possesses a supply of coal and iron which is necessary to Russia.

The first objection is refuted by an examination of statistics. Figures for the years previous to the war show consistently that Ukraine's exportations of cereals to other parts of the Russian empire did not reach more than 10 to 15% of her total export; i.e., about 36,000,000 bushels annually. Nearly all of this was destined for Poland, Lithuania and White Ruthenia. Russia proper never consumed more than a very small fraction of Ukraine's grain. She did not need it

then and will not need it in the future. She is virtually self-sustaining in cereals, and the small surplus needed can readily be obtained from the fields of Siberia and the region of the Volga.

The second allegation, that Russia needs the Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, is readily disposed of by a reference to Russian maritime experience. The official Russian statistics of the traffic of merchandise by rail show no southern port which served as an outlet for the products of the territories situated north of the ethnic frontier of Ukraine, with the single exception of Rostov-on-the-Don. Novorosseysk was the port used by the Ukrainian Cossacks of Kuban and the northern Caucasus. Up to the present time, Russia proper has depended almost exclusively upon the Baltic ports. By special treaties with the new Baltic states, Russia is assuring herself a continued use of their ports. There is no reason why, if it should appear necessary and advisable, a similar conciliatory agreement with Ukraine could not arrange for a common use of the Black Sea ports.

With regard to Ukraine's coal resources, it is true that the Donetz basin furnished 70% of the total coal output of the former Russian empire, and the Donetz basin is mostly within the ethnographic limits of Ukraine. But it is also a fact that four-fifths of this coal was consumed in Ukraine itself, and that northwestern Russia and the Baltic provinces never used the coal from the Donetz basin, because it could not compete in price with English or German coal. Furthermore, northern and central Russia are well supplied with wood and peat, and with coal from the vicinity of Moscow. Ukraine has very little wood or peat, and the exhaustion of the Donetz basin for the sake of Russian industries would leave her without fuel resources. The Urals and Siberia, too, are supplied with local coal, while in the Kuznetsky district in west Siberia are vast deposits, scarcely worked as yet because of the lack of railway lines into Siberia.

The iron fields of the Urals and of other provinces of Russia proper have not been extensively exploited, and before the war Ukraine did indeed furnish three-fourths of all the iron supply of the former Russian empire. But the beds of iron ore in Ukraine are not very large, and it would be erroneous to assume that they could adequately supply the needs of all Russia for any long period of time. In any case, it is safe to conclude that, if the metallurgical development of Russia is continued and her mines consistently

worked, she will be entirely able to get along without iron imports from Ukraine.

Finally, there is no obstacle to permanent economic co-operation of Ukraine and Russia, and brisk commercial dealings between the two independent states. But political disentanglement is a first requisite. The richness of Ukraine has always made it a tempting region for exploitation by neighboring states. This is more than ever true today. If such exploitation is not to be carried on at the expense of and to the detriment of the Ukrainian people, a separate state organization is necessary to assume protection over their economic interests.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a free Ukraine does not imply an economically isolated Ukraine. Constant traffic with friendly foreign powers is desired by all the Ukrainian political parties. Ukraine lacks machinery, capital and trained experts. The railroad question is of enormous importance. Before the Revolution, all of the rail lines of Ukraine yielded considerable profits, especially those known as the Southwestern Railroads. But Russia did not see fit to use this income in the construction of further roads and, as a result, Ukraine possesses a very inconsiderable network of railroads: only about 11,115 miles. This is much less than the country needs. The war almost completely wrecked and demoralized even this inadequate transportational system. The railroads must be rebuilt, and the insufficiently developed public highways must be improved and extended. The regulation of navigable rivers is another matter of great importance, and the vast available power possibilities of the rapids of the Dnieper and other streams must be exploited. Central power stations must be erected, new methods introduced in mining, grain elevators built and agriculture, milling, sugar refining and other industries given an upward impetus by the application of scientific management and fresh capital.

Inability to contest the force of the foregoing historic and economic considerations has led certain foes of Ukrainian independence to make the assertion that the Ukrainian national movement is artificially stimulated and does not receive support from the masses of the population. This contention is controverted by the most obvious facts. For more than two years the Ukrainians have been actively fighting for their liberty, in spite of almost incredible obstacles. They have had no support from any foreign source in this struggle; they were attacked at one and the same time by the Bolsheviki and anti-Bolsheviki: they were blockaded; they were

unable to secure ammunition or sanitary supplies. They did not give up, because they realized that the question was one of life or death. No other nation in modern times has fought for its independence under such difficult circumstances, and none has expressed its desire for freedom more strongly. The plebiscite of blood is the most sincere evidence of the will to self-determination.

However, prolonged and stubborn fighting has not been the only way in which the Ukrainian people have shown their desire to be free. They have had several opportunities to manifest their wish in a more peaceful and regular manner. Thus, the Central Rada, which represented all classes of Ukrainians, and included in addition representatives of the various non-Ukrainian nationalities in the land, proclaimed Ukraine's independence in 1917. When, in December of the same year, the Bolshevik propagandists questioned the representative character of the Central Rada, a general congress of the workers and peasants of Ukraine was called, and this congress, chosen after the Bolshevik method, made haste to affirm its support of the Central Rada by a vote of 2,000 to 70. There was also in 1917 a formal election of deputies to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Ukraine elected 230 deputies in all. Of those, 75% or 175 members, were Ukrainian nationalists.

After the overthrow of the pro-German Hetman Skoropadsky in 1918, and assumption of authority by the Directorate, even the Ukrainian communists declared themselves in favor of a free Ukraine and protested to the Russian Soviet Government against its proposed invasion. Their protest went unheeded, and when the Russian Bolsheviki occupied Kiev and endeavored to impose their system upon Ukraine, they found no Ukrainians who were willing to co-operate with them. The result was a so-called "Ukrainian Soviet Government," which is in reality anything but Ukrainian. The head is a Roumanian, Rakovsky, and the régime is nothing but a local agency of the Moscow government.

It is noteworthy that the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by General Petlura, which I have the honor to represent, is the only government which the Ukrainian people have been willing to support. On the other hand, they have revolted against all foreign invaders who have attempted to impose their own rule upon the Ukrainians. The Germans, the Bolsheviki and the forces of General Denikin all met with vigorous resistance. If now the Polish forces are in Ukraine and the population does not oppose

them, it is because the Poles are acting in conjunction with the Ukrainian forces under Petlura, as their allies.

It is also necessary to consider the opinion entertained in some circles that an independent Ukraine must inevitably fall under the influence of Germany and become a German outpost in eastern Europe. The reason generally advanced as a basis for this suspicion is that Ukraine concluded a separate peace with Germany in February, 1918, at Brest Litovsk. In this connection, it should be remembered that Roumania, too, concluded a separate peace with Germany. Yet Roumania has continued to be considered an ally of Germany's opponents, and it is everywhere recognized that she only negotiated with Germany because of the bitter fact that she was forced to do so. Ukraine was in far worse condition than Roumania when she concluded her peace with Germany. Roumania had at least an organized state and a loyal army. Ukraine's government was in its infancy, its state organization was slight, and its army consisted chiefly of the remnants of the demoralized Russian forces. The Ukrainian leaders were faced by several wars; on the one hand by the war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria; and now on the other, by the new conflict with the Russian Soviet Government. Under the circumstances, Ukraine had to choose between submitting entirely to the Bolsheviki, in which case the country would be over-run by Germans anyway, or making any kind of outright peace with Germany and then hoping for the best.

Subsequent events proved that Germany never had any interest in a permanently independent Ukraine. Toward the end of the war, she was in desperate need of foodstuffs. Today she wants, not merely foods, but also a new and fruitful field for banking, commercial exploitation and the sale of German goods. Germany has grown to consider eastern Europe as a natural market for her products. What she wants is a Greater Russia, whether it be Czarist, Bolshevist or Constitutional. Under the circumstances, it is more plausible to suspect the Germans of plotting to re-establish "Russia, one and indivisible," than to regard them as friendly to a free Ukraine.

At the present moment, the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic is a matter of international expediency, because there can be no peace in eastern Europe as long as Ukraine is subjected to any neighboring nation. Proposals to deal with the Ukrainian people as if they had no moral right to self-determination are an obvious contradiction to the principles enunciated by President Wilson at the

time of America's entrance into the war against Germany and her allies. The attempt to carry them into effect can only result in continued unrest in eastern Europe. The relegation of all Ukraine to Russia would mean at best the arbitrary compulsion of the Ukrainians to a federation which, if advisable, should come at their own instance and of their own free will; not because of outside pressure. At worst, it would renew their servitude. The partition of the country between Poland and Russia will not only produce continued restlessness and discontent within Ukraine itself, but will also continuously tempt Poland and Russia to make war on one another, in order to extend their respective spheres of influence. An independent Ukrainian state, on the contrary, would establish a balance of power in eastern Europe, which must be regarded as the surest guarantee of peace in that portion of the world.

The foregoing statement covers, in outline form, the main grounds upon which Ukraine bases her claim to independence. This memorandum is presented to you, Mr. Secretary, in the hope that the Ukrainian situation will be thoroughly examined, and it is my earnest belief that a careful study of Ukrainian affairs will sustain the request for recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic which I have the honor herewith to submit.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your very obedient servant,

Julian Batchinsky,
Diplomatic Representative of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

By 1921, the Soviet Red Army would reclaim most of Ukraine. On December 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was officially established in Moscow. Lenin was elected honorary chairman of the congress since he was not present, having suffered a stroke days prior as a result of lead poisoning from a gunshot wound as a result of an assassination attempt. Lenin’s initial desire to acknowledge Ukrainian independence was also challenged by the fact that only very few members in the Bolshevik party could speak Ukrainian. The Bolshevik party was comprised mostly of Russians and Jews. Despite that being the case, Lenin felt it was more feasible to make concessions on language and culture, without resorting to allowing Ukrainians to form an independent state. Religion, however, was off limits since a major precept of Bolshevism was mili-

tant atheism, which was mandated throughout the Soviet Union. Both Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches were closed.

Stalin, who was slated to be Lenin's successor, wanted Ukraine to be an independent autonomous republic in the Russian federation, but subject to Moscow. Stalin considered Lenin as too soft on nationalists, while Lenin considered Stalin too harsh. A year after Stalin was appointed General Secretary in 1922, he moved to crush Ukrainian and Georgian opposition, first with political methods, and later with violence. After the head of the Ukrainian government advocated for "a handing over" of some of the central government's power to the republics, a gesture which Stalin considered absurd, Stalin proceeded to remove him from power and sent him into exile. Lenin's proposal to make concessions for the Ukrainian language encountered obstacles in the early 1920s. Party membership in Ukraine was 45% Russian, 33% Ukrainian, and 14% Jewish. A good portion of the proletariat in Ukraine was Russian or Russian speaking. Dmitri Lebed, the second secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee, asserted that Russian culture and language was already embedded into much of the working class in the cities of Ukraine, while Ukrainian language and culture was more relegated to the country side. This notion spread amongst Ukrainian Party leaders. This lack of progress in linguistically Ukrainizing the cities disturbed Oleksandr Shumsky, Ukraine's Commissar of Education. He requested that Stalin replace the head of the Ukrainian party with someone who was ethnically Ukrainian. However, his pleas to Stalin would be met with disdain. Stalin wrote a letter in 1926 to the policy-making committee in Ukraine, criticizing the attempts at Ukrainization of the working class, stating that Ukrainization attempts would give off the impression of Ukrainian separatism and also an impression of hostility to Russian culture, Lenin, and the Soviet Union. Stalin eventually replaced Shumsky with Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk. After Stalin consolidated power, his position on Ukrainization of Ukraine became increasingly pessimistic. Stalin's secret police stated that Ukrainians were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the regime and thus seeking out fellowship with Ukrainian nationalists, Whites, and Poles. This report led to a decisive change in the "Nationality" policy of the Soviet Union. By 1929, Korenizatsiya, which was the policy of the Soviet Union to integrate non-Russian nationalities into the governments of their respective soviet republics, would no longer be enforced. Leading figures of the Korenizatsiya were removed and purges of national republics ensued. 474 alleged Ukrainian nationalists were arrested and tried. The communists accused Ukrainian academics of plotting

an uprising with both Ukrainian nationalists and Jozef Pilsudski, an old enemy of the Bolsheviks, who in 1926 rose to power in Poland. Many were convicted and sent to the gulag, Stalin's brutal system of forced labor camps, where many died from either disease, starvation, or execution. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was the founder of the Central Rada, was also arrested and exiled in 1931, and would later die under mysterious circumstances in Russia in 1934. Stalin believed that Ukrainization efforts in Ukraine had been hijacked by extremists and violent separatists seeking to incite the Ukrainian peasantry against the USSR, and much of this coincided with Stalin's collectivization efforts to consolidate individual peasant households into collective farms. Stalin believed that Ukrainian Nationalism compelled the peasantry to resist collectivization, and while fearing Ukrainian nationalistic elements would spread outside of Ukraine to other territories of the USSR, Stalin took measures to stop the development of national consciousness amongst Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine. This led to the Russification of thousands of ethnic Ukrainians. At this juncture, the language concessions proposed by Lenin were no longer applied throughout the Soviet Union.

Stalin blamed the rise of Ukrainian separatism on Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk, whom Stalin appointed as Ukraine's Commissar of Education, replacing Oleksandr Shumsky. Mykola eventually killed himself, fearing he would be arrested. Oleksandr Shumsky, was later arrested for supporting anti-USSR propaganda and was executed on Stalin's orders in the 1940s.

Chapter 6: The Holodomor

As a result of collectivism and the subsequent great famine (Holodomor) which killed millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s, many Ukrainian peasants were forced to migrate from the countryside into the cities. A large number of them found themselves having to learn the Russian language, as Ukrainian was being suppressed. The Holodomor was known as the Terror Famine and lasted between 1932 and 1933. It has become widely accepted in Ukraine as genocide of the Ukrainian people committed by the Soviet regime. Official estimates of the death toll range between 7 and 10 million Ukrainians. In the late 1920's, Stalin was seeking to end private ownership of land. So he introduced a program to collectivize farms. At this time, Ukraine was the major bread basket for the Soviet Union, due to its fertile soil. Under collectivization, grain quotas were increased and since grain would be confiscated by the state, the farmers and most rural Ukrainians had less grain to consume. Because so many farmers resisted giving up their land to the Soviet Union or having their land pooled into a collective coalition of farms, many were ultimately exiled. Meanwhile, anyone who

attempted to alleviate their starvation by taking grain from fields or storage facilities were executed. Because of grain shortages, the Soviet Union would supply grain to farmers via a rationing system. By 1933, reports of mass starvation were highest in Kharkiv Oblast, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsia, Donetsk oblasts, and Moldavian SSR. Many even resorted to cannibalism. A great number of people blamed collectivization policies for the famine, as peasants were forced to give up farms and livestock to state-owned farms, where they would work as laborers. This led to hundreds of peasant uprisings. Also, output expected by farmers was changed from the typical grain to other crops like sugar or cotton, which resulted in a large amount of grain going unharvested. In retrospect, it is certain that implementing the new system of collectivization led to a drastic decline of farming efficiency. It is also widely accepted that the famine was intentionally orchestrated by the Soviet Union in order to bring Ukraine and peasant rebellion under control through the use of starvation tactics.

Stalin instituted a five-year plan for the sake of accelerating industrialization and a forced collectivization of farms in 1928. In 1929, implementing collectivization became problematic since farming practices were already well-established in Ukraine and Southern Russia. Most peasants were independent farmers, a tradition reinforced by the Cossack way of life as a self-ruling people. Another factor that reinforced this individualism was the general resistance to Communist rule during the years between 1917 – 1921. Stalin's collectivization efforts coincided with the dekulakization campaign against rich peasants and rebels who resisted collectivization. Rich peasants would be known kulaks. There were also grain-procurement campaigns, which were grain quotas that the state would expect farmers to be meet for a very low price. Both dekulakization campaigns and grain procurement campaigns instilled fear in peasant farmers, who were afraid of being labeled kulaks. This served as a means of stoking fear in order to compel farmers to join collectives. The Soviets used harassment, intimidation, violence, and deportation as a way to punish those who resisted. Some Ukrainians, nonetheless, remained adamantly reluctant to join collective farms since they considered collectivization a form of expropriation. Those peasants who did join essentially allowed their private property to be seized, leaving themselves relegated to the status of being a dependent farm laborer. Many Ukrainian peasants considered this fate to be a secondary form of serfdom. So the resistance applied in reaction would often escalate into uprisings in which peasants would perpetrate violence against

state officials. This would lead to Soviet authorities retaliating against peasant violence and protests with brute force. Of course, this was expected by the resistors. When taking everything into account, we see how the forced collectivization, grain quotas, dekulakization campaigns and the corresponding reaction and outrage amongst the Ukrainian peasantry could be disastrous in terms maintaining the efficient labor needed for agriculture. One can thus easily asses how the result of that would give way to massive grain shortages. Yet, Bolshevik leaders continued to propagate collectivization as the path to economic advancement and the true intention of Socialism. Furthermore, there was an oversight benefit of forming state controlled farms—it allowed for state supervision over the peasantry, during a time when Stalin was becoming increasingly suspicious. Moreover, collective farms were considered more beneficial than individual farms when it came to meeting targeted grain quotas. The Soviet Union wanted to accelerate industrialization through exports and also provide cheaper food for fast growing cities. The peasants however, bared the brunt of that burden, as it was the case often that grain targets were too high to meet. In 1930, the quota was achieved. But in 1931, climate and unrest over collectivization resulted in a much lower harvest that year. As Ukraine could not meet the grain quota, the Soviets nonetheless squeezed out whatever they could there, even resorting to confiscating grain from starving farmers. By December of 1931, famine had taken over and deaths as a result would rise in the first half of 1932. This alarmed Ukrainian officials. They wrote to Stalin requesting a reduction of grain-procurement targets. However, Stalin was angered by this request and insisted on maintaining the grain quotas, and then proceeded to blame the crisis on Ukrainian officials. He also became paranoid that Ukraine would attempt to secede from the Soviet Union if the crisis got worse. Unsurprisingly, Stalin would state his desire to remove Ukraine's top leadership. He also passed the Five Ears of Corn law, which declared collective farm property as state property and theft of grain or other property punishable by death. While the grain quota was lowered, it was still unrealistic and by late 1932, mass starvation would break out in Ukraine. Stalin, nonetheless, employed coercive measures towards getting starving peasants to give up their grain. He banned trade and blocked entire villages, allowing no one to leave. Stalin also targeted party officials in Ukraine who were attempting to feed the starving peasants. Consequently, many party officials were fired, some were jailed and executed. Stalin sent two of his lieutenants, Molotov and Kaganovich to Ukraine in order to pressure party leaders there to conform to grain quotas. In October of 1932, Molotov

and Kaganovich were sent to Ukraine with thousands of Communist Party officials to retrieve very ounce of grain, even storages that were hidden by starving peasants. These actions would further ignite the famine and lead to more starvation deaths in late 1932 and the first half of 1933. In addition to the famine, more oppressive measures on culture were applied in December of 1932, when a resolution was passed rolling back rights given to Ukraine—rights which pertained to the implementation of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. Stalin had criticized Ukrainian leaders for taking advantage of language concessions in order to instigate Ukrainian nationalism both in Ukraine and in the Kuban. A second resolution was passed in January of 1933, which prevented peasants from leaving Ukraine in search of food in other places.

Pavel Postyshev was appointed Stalin's personal representative in Ukraine. As Stalin's envoy, Pavel Postyshev was given dictatorial powers to purge the Ukrainian Party of Ukrainian nationalists. He was sent into Ukraine in 1933 with Soviet Secret Police after ordering Ukrainian Party leadership to meet their quota for grain exportation, despite repeated warning of the mass starvation being caused by collectivization. There, he and over a 100,000 trusted party members from Russia would enforce laws to protect state property, standing between the Ukrainian farmers and their crops and livestock. They would also search homes and farms, confiscating any grain being withheld by starving Ukrainians. Postyshev unleased a reign of terror on Communist party officials and academics in Ukraine suspected of being nationalists.

The Holodomor would have a devastating impact on Ukrainian national identity. The spread of the famine coincided with policies that rolled back Ukrainian language and cultural concessions instituted by the Soviet Union. This was followed by a crackdown on nationalistic elements within Ukraine, both within communist party circles and academia. Soviet policies during this time would stifle any sense of autonomy felt by the Ukrainian people. In the Kuban, many Cossack farmers were deported and much of the region were de-Ukrainisized. The time-frame of the Holodomor, which comprised of mass starvation and Soviet violence against Ukrainian officials, marked the shift in Soviet policy towards a more Russian-centered state. Stalin was acutely aware of the non-Russian nationalistic elements that arose during the Bolshevik revolution. He knew that any solidarity along ideological lines amongst both pro-Russian and non-Russian elements in the communist party could easily be broken by growing nationalism amongst non-Russian bolsheviks. Stalin observed the situation in Ukraine during the revolutionary period

between 1917 and 1920. He noted their move for independence under the Central Rada, and had always considered that this non-Russian nationalism could be a possible roadblock towards installing Bolshevism in Ukraine. Stalin was always leery of this possibility, but yet prior to the famine, he would always take a conciliatory approach publicly to avoid giving offense to non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union. He did this by pointing out the dangers of Russian nationalism, or what he called "Great Russian Chauvinism." Nevertheless, when it came to Russia, Stalin was always certain that all of Russia was a solid base for Bolshevism, since, inner Russia with its homogeneous Russian population was the base of the Bolshevik revolution—while most of the counter-revolutionary components were situated in the southern and eastern border regions, which consisted of Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Chechens, Ingush, Muslims, and Ukrainians. Yet Stalin may not have foreseen collectivization as something that Ukrainians would perceive to be a form of great Russian chauvinism, but he was nonetheless well aware of the difficulties in attempting to economically unite the republics of the Soviet Union. At the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in April 1923, Stalin warned of the danger that Russian nationalism posed to the Union:

The basis of this Union is the voluntary consent and the juridical equality of the members of the Union. Voluntary consent and equality—because our national programme starts out from the clause on the right of nations to exist as independent states, what was formerly called the right to self-determination. Proceeding from this, we must definitely say that no union of peoples into a single state can be durable unless it is based on absolutely voluntary consent, unless the peoples themselves wish to unite. The second basis is the juridical equality of the peoples which form the Union. That is natural. I am not speaking of actual equality—I shall come to that later—for the establishment of actual equality between nations which have forged ahead and backward nations is a very complicated, very difficult, matter that must take a number of years. I am speaking now about juridical equality. This equality finds expression in the fact that all the republics, in this case the four republics: Transcaucasia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R., forming the Union, enjoy the benefits of the Union to an equal degree and at the same time to an equal degree forgo certain of their independent rights in favour of the Union. If the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Republic are not each to have its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, it is

obvious that the abolition of these Commissariats and the establishment of a common Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for the Union of Republics will entail a certain restriction of the independence which these republics formerly enjoyed, and this restriction will be equal for all the republics forming the Union. Obviously, if these republics formerly had their own People's Commissariats of Foreign Trade, and these Commissariats are now abolished both in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the other republics in order to make way for a common Commissariat of Foreign Trade for the Union of Republics, this too will involve a certain restriction of the independence formerly enjoyed in full measure, but now curtailed in favour of the common Union, and so on, and so forth. Some people ask a purely scholastic question, namely: do the republics remain independent after uniting? That is a scholastic question. Their independence is restricted, for every union involves a certain restriction of the former rights of the parties to the union. But the basic elements of independence of each of these republics certainly remain, if only because every republic retains the right to secede from the Union at its own discretion.

Thus, the concrete form the national question has assumed under the conditions at present prevailing in our country is how to achieve the co-operation of the peoples in economic, foreign and military affairs. We must unite the republics along these lines into a single union called the U.S.S.R. Such are the concrete forms the national question has assumed at the present time.

But that is easier said than done. The fact of the matter is that under the conditions prevailing in our country, there are, in addition to the factors conducive to the union of the peoples into one state, a number of factors which hinder this union.

You know what the conducive factors are: first of all, the economic coming together of the peoples that was established prior to Soviet power and which was consolidated by Soviet power; a certain division of labour between the peoples, established before our time, but consolidated by us, by the Soviet power. That is the basic factor conducive to the union of the republics into a Union. The nature of Soviet power must be regarded as the second factor conducive to union. That is natural. Soviet power is the power of the workers, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which by its very nature disposes the labouring elements of the republics and peoples which form the Union to live in friendly relations with one another. That is natural.

And the third factor conducive to union is the imperialist encirclement, forming an environment in which the Union of Republics is obliged to operate.

But there are also factors which hinder, which impede, this union. The principal force impeding the union of the republics into a single union is that force which, as I have said, is growing in our country under the conditions of the N.E.P.: Great-Russian chauvinism. It is by no means accidental, comrades, that the Smena-Vekh-ites have recruited a large number of supporters among Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messieurs the Smena-Vekhites are singing the praises of the Bolshevik Communists, as much as to say: You may talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that you will achieve what Denikin failed to achieve, that you Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at all events will resurrect, the idea of a Great Russia. All that is not accidental. Nor is it accidental that this idea has even penetrated some of our Party institutions. At the February Plenum, where the question of a second chamber was first raised, I witnessed how certain members of the Central Committee made speeches which were inconsistent with communism—speeches which had nothing in common with internationalism. All this is a sign of the times, an epidemic. The chief danger that arises from this is that, owing to the N.E.P., dominant-nation chauvinism is growing in our country by leaps and bounds, striving to obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather all the threads of government into the hands of Russians and to stifle everything that is not Russian. The chief danger is that with such a policy we run the risk that the Russian proletarians will lose the confidence of the formerly oppressed nations which they won in the October days, when they overthrew the landlords and the Russian capitalists, when they smashed the chains of national oppression within Russia, withdrew the troops from Persia and Mongolia, proclaimed the independence of Finland and Armenia and, in general, put the national question on an entirely new basis. Unless we all arm ourselves against this new, I repeat, Great-Russian chauvinism, which is advancing, creeping, insinuating itself drop by drop into the eyes and ears of our officials and step by step corrupting them, we may lose down to the last shreds the confidence we earned at that time. It is this danger, comrades, that we must defeat at all costs. Otherwise we are threatened with the prospect of losing the confidence of the workers and peasants of the formerly oppressed peoples, we are threatened with the prospect of a rupture

of the ties between these peoples and the Russian proletariat, and this threatens us with the danger of a crack being formed in the system of our dictatorship.

Initially, Ukrainization policy in the USSR was intended to solicit pro-Soviet sentiments, both amongst Ukrainians living in Ukraine and abroad in Poland. In 1921, prior to the Holodomor, the Communist Party issued the New Economic Policy, which allowed farmers to maintain private farms and freely place surplus grain on the market in exchange for paying a tax to the state. These measures would be instrumental in initially getting Ukrainians to adhere to Soviet rule. However, initial attempts by the state to make concessions for Ukrainian language and cultural development in Ukraine may have been construed by Ukrainian nationalists as a green-light to over-assert Ukrainian nationalism and autonomy. This led to allegations that Ukrainian communist leaders were attempting to Ukrainize the Russian proletariat in Ukraine by force. While Stalin did have his reservations about Ukraine, he didn’t believe that concessions which were meant to garner positive response to Soviet rule, would trigger this type of extreme Ukrainian nationalism. Up to this point, it was always maintained publicly that Russian nationalism would be the culprit. In 1926, Stalin excoriated Ukraine’s minister of education, Oleksandr Shumsky and prominent communist writer, Mykola Khvyliovy. Stalin felt that in seeking to Ukrainize the Russian-speaking proletariat there, Shumsky would alienate Ukrainians from the Soviet Union and from Russians in general. This fear grew into paranoia in the ensuing years and gave way to the forceful policies that would have tragic consequences for the Ukrainian people and upend any growing nationalistic sentiments amongst them. While Stalin continued to point out the dangers of Russian nationalism, much of the Soviet crackdown on nationalism would target Ukrainian version of it. In 1931, Ukrainian intellectuals suspected of having ties to Ukrainian nationalists in Poland were arrested and jailed. In 1933, Stalin decided to replace Ukraine’s top leadership and by 1934, Stalin would consider Ukrainian nationalism the major threat to the Soviet Union. Shifting from his previous stance that Russian nationalism was the greatest threat to the Soviet Union, Stalin now pointed out both Russian nationalism and Ukrainian Nationalism to be the real danger. In his report to Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in January of 1934, Stalin stated:

What is the deviation towards nationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism or the

deviation towards local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of "one's own," "national" bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. It is a departure from Leninist internationalism. If you want to keep both deviations under fire, then aim primarily against this source, against those who depart from internationalism—regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards local nationalism or the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism. (Stormy applause.)

There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the chief danger: the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be foolish to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable for all times and for all conditions as regards the chief and the lesser danger. Such recipes do not exist. The chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the state. (Prolonged applause.)

In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the chief danger; but when the fight against it ceased and it was allowed to grow to such an extent that it linked up with the interventionists, this deviation became the chief danger. The question as to which is the chief danger in the sphere of the national question is determined not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxist analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by a study of the mistakes that have been committed in this sphere.

There was an existing backdrop of Ukraine nationalism and Soviet hostility that compels one to presume that Stalin was a perpetrator of genocide against the Ukrainian people. This tension may have been further cultivated by the fact that the Soviet Union had to continuously remind itself on how integral Ukraine was to its standing as a nation. And on the heels orchestrating this “Terror Famine”, Stalin does not consign the people of Ukraine to being an enemy of the Soviet nation. He instead proceeds to present the Russian segment of the Soviet nation as the big brother to the other non-Russian republics. In this regard, Stalin cannot be deemed “genocidal.” He is in fact and without question, fratricidal. There has

to be a distinction between the two, since genocide would have a backdrop of ethnic tension. In contrast, we see that the precursor to the Holocaust was an alienation of a smaller group of people(Jews) from a larger group of people(Germans), both with different ethnic backgrounds. Hitler made an enemy of Jews and held no intention to accommodate them into the German state. The hostility was clear at the outset and the outcome was predictable. But Stalin on the other hand believed he was acting in accordance with brotherly virtues by trying to economically unite both the Russian and non-Russian republics within the Soviet Union. And when things didn't pan out as he expected, he lashed out at Ukraine and unleashed a horrific and tragic circumstance upon them, all while remaining keen on maintaining and asserting what he believed was his "big brother" outlook, since Russians saw no ethnic distinction between them and Ukrainians. This is why the Holodomor has to be relegated more-so to fratricide than genocide. This fratricidal element played out micro-cosmically during the times of Kievan Rus', when Vladimir the Great rose to power, having to contend with the fratricidal element within his own family. With the Holodomor, this fratricidal element within the East Slavic ethnology displayed itself at the macro-cosmic level between Russia and Ukraine and resulted in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians.

As Russification re-surged in Soviet territories, the main Soviet newspaper, Pravda, published on January 30, 1936 a front-page photo of Joseph Stalin embracing a happy young Buriat girl while also holding a bouquet of flowers. The image was meant to underscore the leading role and impact of Russians throughout the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Stalin asserted a tone of brotherly subjugation, when in a speech at the 17th Party Congress in 1934, stated it was not the rise of Ukrainian nationalism that he considered a threat to the USSR, but the lack of resistance to it that allowed such a movement to become more insulated against the Soviet nation as a whole. Stalin's goal here, after the Holodomor, was to present the USSR as a family of different nations led by Russians, and also justify any measures taken to keep this family together. Throughout the 1930s, Stalin rarely missed an opportunity to mention the Soviet Union and the Russians in the same sentence. We see that his program for the USSR was becoming more ethnocentric in favor of Russian. Even the tsars, during this time, whom were previously anathematized and excoriated by the Bolsheviks, had come to be exhorted for their achievements as Russians. A number of films were produced, depicting the tsars as great Russians. In 1937, the film "Peter the first" was personally approved by Stalin.

Chapter 7: World War II and the Aftermath

A few years prior to World War II as Stalin prepared the nation for possible invasion, he began a program of purging various institutions of elements and people considered to be potential traitors. Germans, Polish, and Japanese were targeted first, followed by Ukrainian nationalists. Between 1937 and 1938, 335,000 of these people were arrested and jailed. 73% were executed. Stalin also feared that Ukrainian nationals living outside of the USSR could provide safe passage for enemy forces. As a result, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east and then established a non-aggression pact with Germany, allowing the Germans to take Poland via the west. After Hitler, dictator of Germany, successfully invaded and conquered Paris, Stalin moved to identify potential supporters of a German invasion of Ukraine. Both Polish and Ukrainian nationals were targeted. After the Soviet invasion of Poland, 22000 Polish military and intelligence personnel were executed. 11,000 Ukrainian nationalists were deported from Polish territories to Siberia. Hitler would invade the Soviet Union in June 1941, breaking their non-aggression pact. The Soviets, during their retreat, implemented a scorched-earth policy—evacuating personnel, executing prisoners, destroying buildings, crops, and mines. This was done to minimize the German army's access to resources when the winter would ensue. By the fall of that year, Ukraine and many of the USSR's non-Russian provinces were taken by the Germans, who were advancing eastward. Many of those who fought for the Red Army(army and air force of the USSR) in non-Russian provinces held a very poor sense of loyalty to Moscow. Ukrainians initially welcomed the Nazi advance, since there had already been a widespread belief that Germany was a natural ally, and many Ukrainians in Galacia were opposed to both Poland and the USSR, and considered the Nazis as their liberator. Ukrainian nationalists, upon Germany's entry into Lyiv, had declared statehood. However, this was immediately revoked by the Nazis, who would arrest and jail Ukrainian nationalists who made the decree. The Nazis then moved to institute ethnic purges of Ukrainian Jews, and also left intact the collective farms instituted previously by Stalin. The remaining Ukrainians were forced to work on behalf of the German war effort and many were shipped to Germany as a result. Parts of Ukraine was transferred to Poland and Romania, while the rest would be occupied by German forces. Cultural activities and education were restricted. The Ukrainian Orthodox church, however, was allowed to convene its operations. Galacia was perhaps one of the only places in Ukraine that was permitted by the Nazis to function civically and culturally. Due to political restrictions, anyhow, many Ukrainians nationalists would go underground and hone their ideology. Secret

Communist party groups were established and so was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army(UPA), both of whom conducted guerrilla warfare against the Nazis and each other. However, the UPA did collaborate with the Nazis against Soviet and Polish forces later in the war. After the Soviet victory against the Nazis at the battle of Stalingrad in 1943, Stalin launched a counteroffensive, eventually driving the Germans out of Ukraine. By October of 1944, all of the Soviet Union was reclaimed by the Soviets. The Polish-Ukrainian border was redrawn and Poland agreed to renounce claim over Volhynia and Galicia, and deport Ukrainians to their new western territory. During World War II, 5-7 million Ukrainians loss their lives. Over 700 cities and towns were destroyed, leaving 10 million people homeless. After the World War II, the UPA would continue to conduct guerrilla activities against the Soviets until the early 1950s.

Just prior to World War II, Stalin attempted to revive the historical narrative of legendary Ukrainian nationalist, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Film and theater productions were allowed to present the narrative in a way that fit the big brother model that the Soviet Union was propagating throughout the nation—Russians were to be perceived as the protective big brother in a family of nations. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, after establishing Ukraine, reached out to the tsar and submitted Ukraine to the protection of the Russian empire in 1654. This move was misconstrued by later tsars as Khmelnytsky's intention to re-unify the East Slavic races and the Rus' lands. However, the treaty of Pereyeslav signed in 1654 insisted that Ukraine would retain its sovereignty and independence along with submitting to the protection of the Russian empire. Yet, Ukraine choosing to position itself under the wing of the Russia at that time fit right along with USSR propaganda, which presented Russians as the protective figure of the nation. Film and theater productions were only allowed to portray that side of the Khmelnytsky narrative. When non-Russian members of the USSR failed to deter the Nazi advance, Stalin then reasserted Russian cultural dominance and removed all film and theater presentations about Khmelnytsky. Stalin also reopened the Russian Orthodox churches for worship, but allowed the Greek Catholic ones to remain suppressed. Stalin eventually placed the Greek Catholic church under the authority of the Russian Orthodox. And when Russia achieved victory against the Germans in World War II, Stalin was sure to publicly recognize both the USSR and the Russian ethnicity as the primary agents conducive to the nation's success.

After Joseph Stalin died 1953, Nikita Khrushchev came to power in the Soviet Union, serving as the General Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964. Khrushchev proceeded to denounce Stalin’s crimes and undo much of the brutal policies that defined his tenure as Soviet leader. Initiative was also taken to end the Russification of non-Russian republics. In 1937, Stalin had appointed Khrushchev head of the communist party in Ukraine, which had been the site of numerous purges. And as soon as Khrushchev would began his tenure then, which ended in 1949, the pace of those purges increased. However, once he became head of the USSR in 1953, he allowed the Ukrainian communist party to have a party boss that was ethnically Ukrainian. In 1954, Khrushchev would then launch a large scale celebration commemorating Bohdan Khmelnytsky's acceptance of Russian dominion with the Pereyeslav treaty of 1654. This tribute was a far cry from how the Russia/Ukraine union was viewed in the 1920s, when their tie was condemned as evil in Russian literature. In the 1930s, much of the Russian discourse on the subject softened considerably. However, under Khrushchev, the union would become regarded as a positive for the Russian state.

Since Stalin had failed to achieve true Marxism in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev announced that he would attempt to achieve communism the way it was intended. The result of this, as Marxist dogma conveys, would be a dissolution of national differences. This forecast hastened party leaders to move forward with merging the nationalities. At the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev declared that the various nationalities within the USSR would come to be understood as “Soviet people.” Nonetheless, the party maintained that this new amalgamation of nationalities under the designation of “Soviet” should still adhere to the foundations of Russian language and culture. And yet this served to once again compel the state to install Russification policies. Khrushchev’s tone changed considerably after 1957, when he began to purge Ukraine of nationalistic elements and introduce measures aimed at installing numerous facets of Russian culture. In 1958, the USSR revoked the right of non-Russian children to be taught in their native language. This by default set everyone on the course of learning Russian since it was mostly Russian that was spoken at universities and high-paying jobs. In Ukraine, publications in the Ukrainian language decreased incrementally between 1959 – 1965, while the number of publications in the Russian language increased. The Russification of the education system in Ukraine even deterred student interest in Ukrainian as a subject.

Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964 in a coup orchestrated by party members, led by Leonid Brezhnev, who would

become the new leader of the Soviet Union. While Khrushchev stated an intention to achieve true Marxist socialism in the USSR, Brezhnev insisted that it was already done. However, Brezhnev did continue with the idea of one "Soviet" nationality. This would become the central theme of his policy. His efforts would attempt to summarize the way of life in the Soviet Union as a component of "Soviet" nationality. Despite this, the party remained steadfast on asserting the Russian language as the language of the Soviet nation. Brezhnev began initiating policies that would further remove non-Russian languages from the education system. In 1970, a decree ordered that all graduate theses be written in Russia. This gave way to a rising Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union amidst an attempt at uniting all the different nationalities under one Soviet umbrella. Unsurprisingly, this did not bother Moscow as much as non-Russian nationalism did. When other non-Russian nationalities began to assert their cultural identity, the USSR moved quickly to suppress and silence them. Some were sent to the Gulag. In 1972, first secretary of the communist party of Ukraine was arrested for asserting Ukrainian identity and other alleged deviations. In 1954, a secret police force known as the KGB was established under Khrushchev and was instrumental in weeding out non-Russian nationalistic elements and after 1972 became very active in purging Ukrainian nationalists from Ukrainian institutions. The number of ethnic Ukrainians with Russian as their mother tongue began to increase as Russification accelerated between 1970 and 1980. By 1980, the USSR had failed to achieve both true Marxism and the one Soviet nation cause. Meanwhile, non-Soviet Russian identity began to reassert itself through literature. A new genre called "village prose" glorified the old Russian village way of life. Many Russian nationalistic thinkers found their sense of identity in the old Russian imperial regimes. They also sought to integrate the history of East Slavic races into a Russian framework. Ukrainian lands and all Eastern Slavs had come to be known as Russian during this developing outlook. In reaction to this growing Russification, the Ukrainian Helsinki group was formed in 1975. This group argued Ukrainians had the same rights to cultural identity and expression as the Russians did. They also questioned the authority of Moscow to decide the course of various facets of Ukrainian policy. Many members of the Helsinki group were arrested and sent to the Gulag. After 1985, the Soviet Union would enter its last remaining years as a nation.

Chapter 8: Fall of the Soviet Union

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Soviet Union. The nation was already experiencing economic issues and over the last few decades, had failed to keep pace with western

countries. Gorbachev sought to implement economic reforms by introducing measures to scale back state control over the means of production. Previously, the Soviet Union was spending enormous sums of money on arms production, all while trying to maintain a command economy. When the government would present a production goal, usually they would spend much of their resources on businesses geared for that particular industry. Any businesses, within the industry, that were lagging behind would receive further subsidies. This strategy ultimately gave way to a highly inefficient economy. It reached a point in which a dichotomy arose in the Soviet Union, where what was really happening economically differentiated greatly with what was being presented. Gorbachev thus tried to implement an economy that would thrive on competition, but yet not completely undermine state influence on business. He also pushed a "glasnost" policy of openness and transparency, and allowed citizens of the Soviet Union exercise freedom of speech. People were also allowed to vote for other parties during elections. Gorbachev felt that more competition would help the Soviet state politically and economically. However, these new freedoms would ultimately give way to independence movements, which had a ripple effect throughout the Soviet Union, leading to its eventual demise. During the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991, Moscow made a last ditch effort to stifle the revival of local languages. But as Estonia and Lithuania broke from the Soviet Union in 1988 and 1990, Moscow lost its grip on the nation. Then General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, having survived a 1991 coup orchestrated in reaction to his failed reforms, handed over his presidential powers to Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation. The attempted coup led to most republics claiming their independence. Ukraine declared their independence in August of 1991. In December of that year, the Belovezh accords were signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Belarusian Parliament Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, formally ending the USSR and establishing a commonweath of independent states (CIS). All of the Soviet Republics, except Georgia and the Baltics, joined the CIS. Prior to the Belovezh accords, Yeltsin was opposed to Ukrainian independence and tried to send a delegation to Ukraine to speak to the new leaders there. Yeltsin suggested that Ukraine opt to a commonwealth citizenship. This proposal was rejected. After centuries of Russian influence, Ukraine's Ukrainian speaking demographic would live mostly in central and western Ukraine. While those living in the eastern and southern portion of Ukraine would be Russian speaking and thus have closer ties to Russia. This

would prove to be a pivotal factor in Ukrainian policy in the next 3 decades.

In December of 1991, elections were held in Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk would be sworn in as president in late December. In 1992, state symbols associated with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which lasted from 1918 to 1920, were re-adopted in Ukraine. These included the blue and yellow flag, the trident as the state coat of arms, and the national anthem entitled "Ukraine has not perished yet." However, many of the Soviet era institutions were still in place even after the independence referendum in 1991, but just under new names. The Council of Ministers was now the Cabinet of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, which was elected in 1990, became the Verkhovna Rada in 1991 and served its full term until 1994. Much of the old state machinery was still there.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would see significant growth as Ukraine began to prioritize international recognition of its sovereignty and independence. Meanwhile, Russia would pursue a policy promoting the reintegration of former Soviet republics into the new Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS). Ukraine remained resistant to such ideas and continuously opposed proposals for CIS citizenship. However, this would rank below the issues of Crimea and Black Sea fleet in terms what would ignite tensions with Russia. In the early 90s, Russian officials questioned Ukraine's control over Crimea. In 1954, Khrushchev transferred control over Crimea to Ukraine as a way to express friendship between Russia and Ukraine. The Russians, nonetheless, believed that the transfer was unconstitutional and illegitimate.

In 1992, Russian separatists would garner enough representation in the Crimean parliament to declare independence, but Ukraine would rescind this declaration. Concurrently, Russia moved to officially declare Khrushchev's transfer of Crimea to Ukraine as invalid. Crimea consisted of a largely ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking demographic and many considered Crimea to be of historical significance to Russian history. It was a base for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the setting for a number of major military events in Russian history. Tensions on this matter were settled between Russia and Ukraine when Boris Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed to establish joint control over the Black Sea Fleet for 3 years before deciding on who would control it later on.

During the Cold War, a period of heightened tension between the USSR and the United States after World War II, Russia had developed a large number of nuclear missiles and stored them in various territories of the Soviet Union—Ukraine being one of them. Just before he died in 1953, Stalin pushed an economic policy that put a

considerable portion of the Soviet budget into the economic and industrial development of Ukraine. Thus Ukraine had become the center of Soviet arms development. Many of the USSR's best scientists came from Ukraine. However, this legacy was tainted by the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant explosion in 1986, which was the worst nuclear reactor accident in history. The reactor was located near the city of Pripyat, located in northern Ukraine.

In the early 1990s, Ukraine's Minister of Defense claimed that Ukraine had 5000 nuclear weapons in its jurisdiction, along with 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles with 1240 nuclear warheads. In 1995, Ukraine would return the nuclear missiles to Russia in exchange for Russia recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine would also be compensated with fuel from Russia and aid from the United States, along with guarantees of its territorial integrity. Prior to this arrangement, the bulk of Ukraine's support came from its western neighbors: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, all who considered Ukraine's independence a shield from Russian foreign policy. The US would eventually share this outlook and help reinforce Ukrainian sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian economy, which was initially deemed favorable at the outset of their independence, declined significantly throughout the decade of the 1990s. Their GDP dropped 60% and their inflation rates soared. Ukraine's economy had been depended on arms production intended for Russia, who no longer had demand for outdated equipment. Russia was also charging Ukraine high prices for oil and gas. It also didn't help that Ukraine's president Kravchuck paid minimal attention to economic reforms, since most of his focus was geared toward state building.

Prime Minister Vitoid Fokin would opt to subsidize factories in order to curtail rising unemployment. This would trigger hyperinflation, even in Russia since Ukraine's currency at that time was the ruble. The ruble zone was established after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In response to Ukrainian triggered inflation in Russia, the Russian Central bank would no longer honor ruble credits issued by the Ukrainian National bank. Subsequently, Ukraine would issue a provisional currency called the karbovanets. However, this did not lead to better economic reforms. The new prime minister, Loenid Kuchma, tried to implements monetary controls and privatization, but unpaid pensions and wages owed to workers throughout the country led to a massive worker strike amongst miners in Donbas. Satisfying their demands required the Ukrainian government to print large sums of money, which only further fueled inflation. After Kuchma's resignation, the next prime minister, Yukhym Zviahilsky, would move to subsidize failing factories and

farms. This led to a complete collapse of the karbovanets, as hyperinflation ensued. The currency became worthless during a brief period in 1993. Rising prices wiped out savings. Salaries could not keep up with increasing costs of living, leading much of the population having to resort to a barter system of good and services. In 1993, 75% of Ukrainians lived below the poverty line. Life expectancy dropped and emigration increased. Many Ukrainians headed for Israel, US, or Germany. Black market commerce grew. Elites began looting state assets, and selling subsidized Russian oil and gas around Europe at world prices. The Communist Party which was banned in 1991 resurfaced in the city of Donetsk. Their goal was to restore the old Soviet System and make Russian the official second language. They were successful in being able to elicit a sense of nostalgia amongst the elderly as their membership rose to 130,000. Many of the elderly still had fond memories of life under the Soviet regime. And so these remnants of the Soviet Union still present in the Ukraine government made it difficult for Kravchuk to work with the Verkhovna Rada. There were numerous power struggles within the government, as Kravchuk tried to embrace a nationalistic outlook of Ukrainian history that portrayed Russia as the longstanding oppressor of the Ukrainian people. This appealed to many of the new elites on the right in Ukraine, who understood the necessity of Ukrainian language and culture in state building. Their view of Ukraine was an ethnocentric one that had to suppress non-Ukrainian elements. Kravchuk, however, even with his pro-Ukrainian stance, opted not to force Ukrainian language and culture. He did, nonetheless, garner considerable backlash in his insistence on public use of the blue and yellow flag, trident state emblem, and “Ukraine has not yet perished” national anthem, all of which alienated most of Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine. He also supported the Uniate church over the Russian Orthodox. While his efforts aided the permeation of Ukrainian language throughout Ukraine, they also provoked disrepute from Russian-speaking Ukrainians in eastern and southern Ukraine.

By 1994, pro-Russian separatism would flare up in Crimea. In response to these growing developments, the Ukraine government began to reduce the Ukrainization efforts as parliamentary elections were underway. However, the Communist Party would win 25% of the seats and become the largest party in the Verkhovna Rada. Later that summer, Kravchuk would lose the presidential election to the pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma. Yet after promising to preserve Russian culture and Ukraine’s ties to Russia, Kuchma decided to shift towards a more Ukrainian centered cultural assertion since a pro-Ukrainian

outlook gave legitimacy to his power and position as president. Understandably, he did not want to garner the reputation of being a puppet for Russia. Once in office, Kuchma would pursue closer ties with the United States, which resulted in Ukraine receiving considerable financial aid from them by the late 1990s. Kuchma would also enter into a cooperation agreement with NATO under the Partnership for Peace program in 1995. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed onto "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership." Concerned about this, Russia would sign a friendship treaty with Ukraine, in which Russia would recognize Ukraine's sovereignty and their rights to the Black Sea Fleet. Kuchma also put an end to the pro-Russian separatist movement in Crimea in 1996. With politics in Ukraine being marred by crime and corruption through much of the 1990s, which provoked protests throughout the country, the country was beginning stabilize as a state under Kuchma. Ukraine also established a new constitution in 1996, and this would help stabilize their political system. That same year, a new currency was created, the hryvnia. However, the government would continue to spend excessively, trying to meet pension and salary requirements in a timely manner. This strategy was partly for the sake of keeping support for the communists at bay. The excess spending, still and all, caused oil and gas debts to Russia to increase significantly.

After Ukraine announced economic reforms, they became eligible for International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. The IMF's financial support was based on Ukraine's ability to meet inflation and tax collection targets. Higher taxes would drown small businesses, and efforts to privatize industry were hijacked by the wealthy oligarchs, who would buyout enterprises for small sums and still benefit from government subsidies provided to those businesses, leaving little incentive to improve efficiency and productivity. They were also benefiting from a lower tax obligation. These oligarchs, for the most part, were able to use their wealth to gain considerable political influence in Ukraine. While Kuchma was instrumental in stabilizing Ukraine politically, the economic situation during his tenure still left much to be desired, and consequently, in 1998, many began to rally around the Communist party, whom once again gained the majority of seats in the Rada. However, presidential elections in 1999 went in Kuchma's favor, as he was elected to a second term, and during which, this time, economic recovery would ensue. The capitalists in Ukraine discovered new profitable enterprises, such as steel exports. Many private businesses would discover their market niches, which led to the payout of higher salaries and subsequently more consumer spending. The Russian economy also began to

improve. This had a positive trickle-down effect on Ukraine. The only roadblock to complete economic recovery were the large amounts of debt Ukraine owed to IMF, the World Bank, and Russia. Kuchma would thus appoint Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister. Yushchenko already had a background in banking as head of the National Bank. With his deputy prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko would launch a crackdown on illegal profit schemes, such as the illegal resale of stolen Russian oil in Europe at world prices. He would also lift tax exemptions granted to oligarchs. This would bring billions of dollars into the Ukrainian government. Yushchenko then moved to lower taxes for small businesses. These reforms would raise 4 billion USD for Ukraine. The year 2000 became the first year of economic growth for Ukraine since it declared independence in 1991. Unexpectedly, all of this was actually to the dismay of Kuchma, whose inner circle comprised of wealthy oligarchs, many of whom were affected by Yushchenko's crackdown. Meanwhile, both Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko's popularity grew in Ukraine.

Kuchma's links to wealthy oligarchs would give rise to reports about his role in numerous scams perpetrated by them. One such person writing about the alleged corruption in the Kuchma adminstration, was Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. His subsequent disappearance would raise alarm and in November of 2000, his headless body was discovered in a forest outside of Kiev. A short while later, audio recordings surfaced and seemed to show that Kuchma ordered his subordinates to carry out the execution. This scandal triggered protests throughout Ukraine and shed a light on corruption deeply embedded within the Ukrainian government. Socialist leader, Oleksandr Moroz would later that month reveal the existence of 300 hours worth of recordings made secretly by Mykola Melnychenko, which reveal what sounded like Kuchma's voice asking his security service chief to "take care" of Gongadze, even suggesting deporting him to Georgia so he could be abducted by Chechen guerrillas. Melnychenko was later granted asylum by the United States. After Melnychenko's revelation. some doubts still lingered about the authenticity of the voices. Later Kuchma would confirm that it was actually him speaking on the recording, but would also claim that the implicating passages were doctored. Yet, much of what he says on the tapes revealed a private side unseen in public view. This private side of him was foul mouthed, misogynistic and antisemitic. The tapes also confirmed the presence of corruption within the Ukrainian government, infractions such as election fraud, money laundering, and illegal arms dealing. It was discovered that

Kuchma approved the sale of 100 million dollars worth of weapons to Iraq, including high tech radar systems which could detect stealth bombers. These revelations appalled the Ukrainian public and many embarked upon anti-Kuchma protests. The oligarchs, however, attempted to remove both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko from their positions. They successfully engineered Tymoshenko's removal. In 2001, oligarch-influenced parties in the Verkhovna Rada would join forces with the Communists and successfully manage to unseat Yushchenko.

Nevertheless, the Kuchma scandal would place a dark cloud over a good economic year for Ukraine, as just a month prior in October of 2000, Russia signed a strategic partnership deal with the European Union, agreeing to recognize the right of former Soviet states to make treaties with other nations. Kuchma attempted to salvage his worsening reputation by officially declaring Ukraine's intention to join NATO. He even offered to send Ukrainian troops to Iraq in 2003. Kuchma's failure to revamp his reputation drew Ukraine back into the Russia's sphere of influence. Russian's state owned multinational energy company, Gazprom, moved in, demanding payments for subsidized oil and gas. Russian oligarchs also got involved, demanding Kuchma to approve the sale of other assets. Nevertheless, this influx of Russian capital would further bolster the Ukrainian economy. However, economic ties with Russia would have conditions. Now under Russian influence, Kuchma pushed through Verkhovna Rada legislation a Russia-based proposal to form a "Common Economic Space" with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Chapter 9: Start of Ukraine's Cultural and Linguistic Conflict

While the Ukrainian economy was experiencing heightened economic growth, things took a negative turn when in 2004, Pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine. The elections were believed to be rigged, since leading up to the election, Yushchenko was an overwhelming favorite, having gained enormous support for his campaign which focused on economic reform and clean government. Subsequent outcry across Ukraine, over the elections, led to heightened support for the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. However, during this unrest, which was called the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko fell ill, and physicians discovered that he had been poisoned. Unsurprisingly, Russia was considered a prime suspect. The revolution nonetheless continued and ultimately brought Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko to power as president and prime minister respectively. Yanukovych, however, would become prime minister again in 2006. The disputes surrounding the Orange Revolution led to Russia stopping gas supplies to Ukraine, which led to oil shortages in other countries.

Russia supplies the EU with natural gas, through a pipeline that goes through Ukraine. Ukraine was being accused of stealing some of that gas in order to supply its domestic needs. In 2 years, the Ukrainian economy tumbled 15% during the 2008-2009 Ukrainian financial crisis. In what seemed like an attempt to appease Russia, Yushchenko withdrew Ukrainian forces sent to Iraq to support NATO. But Russia did not buy this gesture because Yushchenko had already made it clear that he intended to integrate Ukraine into a partnership with both the EU and NATO. Another factor pitting Yushchenko against Russia was how during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, Yushchenko would meet with the leaders of Poland and the Baltic states, which are places that Russia considered to be the breeding ground of NATO's anti-Russian policy. The 2008 Russo-Georgia war was a brief 12-day conflict between pro-Russian separatists in Georgia and the Georgian government. It began on the heels of deteriorating relations between Georgia and Russia, which was followed by pro-Russian separatists in Georgia declaring autonomous the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After speculation on the scale of Russian military involvement, a ceasefire was reached on August 12th 2008. Moreover, tension between Russia and Ukraine would remain unsettled as Yushchenko would also call for the removal of Soviet era symbols in Ukraine, while at the same time honoring publicly Ukrainian insurgents who fought against the Soviets in World War II. These gestures would offend Moscow and many in Russia would consider these measures as an attempt to falsify history. Yushchencko also shunned Putin's proposal to jointly commemorate the 300th year anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in 1709, opting to instead celebrate the with the Swedish government and commemorate the partnership between Cossack leader Ivan Mazepa and Sweden's King Charles XII against Russia during the battle.

Yanukovych would become president of Ukraine in 2010, and in 2013, he opted not to push forward with an EU deal that would have given Ukraine political and financial support. He instead chose to lean Ukraine in the direction of a Russia-focused Eurasian economic union. This decision led to widespread protests throughout Ukraine. These protests were known as the Euromaidan protests and would lead to the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. During the Euromaindan protests, Ukrainians expressed their outrage at Yanukovych's refusal to sign a free trade agreement with the EU. However, things would escalate as clashes between riot police and protesters turned violent. 130 people were killed during the clash. On February 21st, president Yanukovych and the leaders of the parliamentary opposition officially agreed to convene early elections and establish the

formation of an interim unity government. The following day after the Verkhovna Rada Committee voted to remove Viktor Yanukovych from the post of president of Ukraine, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Russia did not recognize the interim government, stating that the Ukrainian procedures used to remove him were nothing more than a coup against Yanukovych. As protesters proceeded to take control of the capital buildings, the parliament declared that Yanukovych was officially no longer president of Ukraine. The vote was 328-to-0. After Yanukovych subsequently fled the country and went to Russia, he declared that he was still the acting president of Ukraine. Many pro-Russian separatists in eastern and southern Ukraine supported Yanukovych's decision not to sign the EU deal. However, Yanukovych would be replaced by Oleksandr Turchynov, who was appointed as Ukraine's acting president, and whom Russia did not recognize as legitimate. Meanwhile, Russia intervened and sent special forces to Crimea, where the majority of Ukrainians identify as Russian and have Russia as their native language. In a referendum, the Ukrainians in Crimea voted to leave Ukraine and join Russia, allowing Russia to annex Crimea in February/March 2014. After the referendum, both the UN and Ukraine rejected the vote, pointing to agreements that Russia signed, where Russia agreed to recognize and uphold the sovereignty of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Russian military pushed forward and laid siege to Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, forcing Ukraine's armed forces to withdraw. The president of Russia, Vladimir Putin gave his victory speech in March 2014: *"In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseperable part of Russia....Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour"*

In March of 2014, Yanukovych signed a letter giving Russia permission to act militarily in Ukraine for the sake of restoring order. And while under threat of ethnic conflict after Russia's annexation of Crimea, the pro-Russian separatists were directed to instigate unrest throughout Ukraine in exchange for Russian funding. The main focus

of the Russian government was securing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, which are collectively called the Donbas region. Russia wanted the pro-Russian separatists to establish a puppet state there so that gas and other supplies like water could flow into Crimea. The water canals in Donbas became a major focus of the conflict because after the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the supply of water flowing into Crimea via the North Crimean Canal, keeping 90% of its water from reaching the peninsula.

Protests broke out between pro-Russian Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian Ukrainians. The Pro-Russian protesters gathered and attempted to take control of the Donetsk RSA between March 1st and March 6th. They were subsequently dispersed by the Security Service of Ukraine. In April, about 2000 pro-Russian Ukrainians gathered in Donetsk called for a referendum similar to the one in Crimea a month before. Soon, the protesters proceeded to breach the RSA building and occupy the first 2 floors. They then warned that if regional officials would not implement a referendum, they would assume control of the regional government via a "people's mandate", and remove from office all the elected regional councilors and members of parliament. When this warning was not heeded, the activists met in the RSA building and held a private vote. As it turned out, they voted in favor of independence from Ukraine and announced the formation of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) on April 7th, 2014.

On April 12th, pro-Russian militants successfully took control of the Donetsk city office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and two other police offices. They attempted to gain control of the general prosecutor's office and other police offices, but were resisted. Nonetheless, they continued efforts towards seizing control over vital strategic infrastructure throughout Donetsk Oblast, demanding that public officials swear allegiance to the new Republic. By April 14th, the pro-Russian separatists led by Igor Girkin and Igor Bezler had seized a number of government buildings in other cities within the oblast, such as Sloviansk, Mariupol, Horlivka, Kramatorsk, Yenakiieve, Makiivka, Druzhkivka, and Zhdanivka. In Sloviansk, located in northern Donetsk Oblast, pro-Russian separatists under Igor Girkin’s command, laid siege to administration buildings, police offices, and the SBU building. They removed as mayor, Nelya Shtepa, and replaced her with Vyacheslav Ponomarev. The militants also accessed and seized police weapons and firearms, which prompted the Ukrainian government to launch a counter-terrorism offensive. The led to a standoff between the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian armed forces and marked the beginning of armed conflict

between the two. The pro-Russian separatists led by Girkin would execute 4 Ukrainian citizens during their operations in Sloviansk.

In Kramatorsk, which is also located in northern Donetsk Oblast, pro-Russian separatists after a shootout, took control of a police station on April 13th and raised the flag of the Donetsk People's Republic. They gave city officials until that following Monday to swear allegiance to the Republic, warning that if they did not comply, they would remove them from office. The Ukrainian government, however, intervened and recaptured the city from the separatists, before withdrawing, which subsequently led to separatists reclaiming it. Off and on fighting continued until July, when the separatists withdrew their personnel from Kramatorsk.

The separatists would gain control of city administration buildings and police offices in a number of other cities in Donetsk Oblast as well. At Artemivsk, they were able to access an arms depot which contained 30 tanks.

Pro-Russian militants tried to take over police headquarters in Horlivka on April 12th, but were resisted by police forces. The purpose of the siege was to acquire firearms and weapons stored at the station. Some policemen would join the separatists, giving them enough manpower to take control of the police headquarters 2 days later. The police chief was beaten and Horlivka city council deputy, Volodymyr Rybak, was kidnapped. His body was later found in a river with signs of torture. The city administration building was taken on April 30th. This confirmed separatist control of the city.

The separatists occupied the city administration building in Mariupol on April 13th. The Ukrainian government, however, later reclaimed it. Clashes between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists would escalate by May when the Ukrainian National Guard occupied Mariupol. Not before long, the separatists recaptured it and advanced onto a local police station. Ukraine would respond by deploying the military, but, were unsuccessful in pushing out the separatists, as clashes lead to a fire at the city administration building where separatists declared their Donetsk People's Republic(DPR) headquarters. On May 16th, a combined force of steelworkers, local police and Ukraine security forces reclaimed control over a number of government buildings and the much of the city. As the Ukrainian National Guard came in to provide support, the headquarters of the DPR was reclaimed and Mariupol was declared the provisional capital of Donetsk Oblast, replacing Donetsk city, which was then still under the occupation of separatists forces.

Those captured who were part of the Ukrainian army were held prisoner, while anyone fighting on behalf of a volunteer army were

shot on the spot. Igor Girkin and Igor Bezler have been accused by the Ukrainian government of orchestrating the murder of Volodymyr Ivanovych Rybak, a Horlivka politician.

After the seizure of the Donetsk RSA, the pro-Russian militants began to expand their occupation. They took control of the municipal administration building on April 16th, 2014. They would later seize the regional state television network in April and began broadcasting to Russian television channels. On May 4th, they raised a flag of the Donetsk People's Republic. In response, the Ukrainian president, Oleksandr Turchynov, launched a counter-terrorism offensive against the Russia-backed separatists in Donetsk Oblast. Optimistic, the minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov, believed that unrest and violence would be quelled quickly either by force or negotiations. President Oleksandr Turchynov then issued a decree ordering the seizure of the Donetsk RSA building. He also offered amnesty to any armed separatists who would surrender their arms.

Inspired by the actions of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk, pro-Russian groups in Luhansk Oblast would follow suit. On April 6th, 1,000 pro-Russian activists took control of the SBU building in the city of Luhansk and then demanded the release of separatists currently jailed by the Ukrainian government. After police intervened and regained control of the building, the protesters would regather outside the building and announce the formation of a 'people's government' that would be incorporated into the Russian Federation. At this gathering, they chose Valery Bolotov as their "People's Governor". The Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) was then declared on April 27th. Representatives demanded that the Ukrainian government provide amnesty for protesters and acknowledge Russian as the official language there. They also demanded that the Ukrainian government hold a referendum on the status of the region. They warned Ukraine that if those demands were not met by April 29, 2014, they would take the same militant course of action as the pro-Russian militants that formed the Donetsk People's Republic. Subsequently, the demands were not met and on April 29th, Luhansk People's Republic insurgents took control of the city administration building in Pervomaisk and proceeded to raise their flag above it. The pro-Russian separatists would also gain control of the city administration building in Alchevsk. While in Krasnyi Luch, the separatists successfully persuaded the city administration to comply with their demands for referendums on the status of Donetsk and Luhansk. They too would later raise the Russian flag over the city administration building. The city administration building in Stakhanov was captured by separatists on May 1st, followed by the

police station, commerce centre, and SBU building. On May 5th, pro-Russian separatists seized police buildings in Rovenky and Slovianoserbsk. The prosecutor's office in Sievierodonetsk would be taken by separatists on May 7th. On May 8th, pro-Russian separatists took control of government buildings in Starobilsk.

What began as protests in the Donbas region had ignited into armed conflict between the pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government. The pro-Russian separatist forces declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics—DPR and LPR respectively. Here, we see the residual effects that centuries of Russification had on Ukraine's ability to maintain a stable and prevailing statehood.

In May of 2014, fighting in the Donbas region continued to escalate. In that same month, Ukraine elected a new president, Petro Poroshenko. Meanwhile, Russia employed several tactics to destabilize the Donbas region. These included disinformation and the use of irregular fighters—Russian fighters without insignia. On May 12th, 2014, Igor Girkin declared himself "Supreme Commander" of the Donetsk People's Republic and issued a decree that all military personnel in the region swear an oath of loyalty to him within 48 hours. He also warned that any Ukrainian military personnel still present in the region would be executed on sight. He then invited the Russian Federation to employ military support in case of NATO intervention. Pavel Gubarev, president of Donetsk People's Republic, declared martial law on May 15th, and gave Ukrainian military until 9pm that day to withdraw from Donetsk. Valery Bolotov, president of the Luhansk People's Republic, did the same on May 22nd. At this point, separatists would begin launching attacks against Ukrainian military personnel remaining in the region. At an army checkpoint in the city of Volnovakha, separatists ambushed Ukrainian solders, killing 18. On the same day, a convoy of 100 Ukrainian soldiers on the move in Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, attempting to advance into pro-Russian separatists territory, were ambushed by 500 separatist fighters. The fighting would last through most of the day. Over a dozen of the fighters on both sides were killed in during the clash. However, the separatists were able to capture a few armored vehicles. The Internal Affairs Ministry stated that some of the Pro-Russian fighters had attempted to enter Luhansk Oblast from Russia, before being deterred by border security. On May 22nd, the Donetsk and Luhansk republics agreed to consolidate into what was called the confederative state of New Russia, and stated their intention to incorporate southern and eastern Ukraine into the new confederation. They also established Russian Orthodoxy as the state religion.

Volunteer pro-government militia, the Donbas Battalion, attempted to advance on separatist territory on May 23rd, but were ambushed by 200 pro-Russian separatists.

Continuing their fight against pro-Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region, pro-Russian insurgents, on May 26th, took control of the main terminal of the Donetsk International Airport, demanding that government forces withdraw from the Donbas region. The Ukrainian government responded with airstrikes on their positions, killing 40 pro-Russian separatists. Another round of airstrikes by Ukrainian forces were fired on an RSA building in Luhansk city on June 2nd, killing and wounding both separatist fighters and civilians. Fighting would escalate considerably in June as Russian tanks were seen crossing the Russo-Ukrainian border into Donetsk. The convoy of tanks and armored vehicles were said to be transporting rocket launchers to the pro-Russian fighters. The Ukrainian government had already declared that it regained control of the southern and western parts of Donetsk Oblast and the northern part of Luhansk Oblast. They would declare a ceasefire at the end of June.

In July, fighting would escalate in the eastern areas of Donetsk. Rostov Oblast was shelled intensely by the Ukrainian forces. After it was reported that a civilian was killed, Russia threatened to retaliate with airstrikes against Ukrainian military targets in the region. Ukrainian forces then proceeded to advance on the separatist strongholds in Luhansk. On July 15th, an airstrike in Snizhne left 11 people dead and destroyed multiple residences. More fighting ensued at a Ukrainian government checkpoint near the Russian border in the village, Marynivka. Much of the infrastructure there was destroyed as pro-Russian separatist shelled the area with a combination of tanks, anti-tank missiles and rocket fire. The Ukrainian guards, however, were able to drive the separatist back to Stepanivka. In the village of Tarany, 11 Ukrainian soldiers were killed by pro-Russian separatists. On July 17th, a Malaysian civilian passenger jet, MH-17, was shot down over Hrabove, killing all 298 aboard. An investigation concluded that the crash was caused by a Buk surface to air missile fired by pro-Russian fighters. According to reports, the Buk originated from Russia and was transported to a separatist controlled area on the day of the MH17 crash. It was then immediately sent back to Russia following the crash.

Luhansk was shelled significantly during the conflict as a result of the fighting between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian fighters. 20 civilians were killed during the clashes. At the same time, fighting continued to escalate in the northwestern districts of Kyivskyi and Kuibyshevskyi, and much of the area's water supply was cut off.

Government forces would reclaim Dzerzhynsk, Soledar, and Rubizhne. As the pro-Russian separatist became stretched thin amid heavy losses, the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) prime minister Alexander Borodai looked to establish a ceasefire agreement with the Ukrainian forces. The DPR commander Igor Girkin requested for Russia to intervene in the conflict. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces continued their advance. They reclaimed Sievierodonetsk and later on July 23rd, broke through the separatist blockade established near Donetsk airport. After this, they advanced toward the northwestern corner of Donetsk city. Many pro-Russian separatists began to withdraw from the surrounding areas, but yet did, however, manage to shoot down two Ukrainian Su-25 fighter jets near Dmytrivka. In Horlivka, Ukrainian forces continued launching air strikes on separatist positions. Notwithstanding, the border with Russia was yet to be stabilized and weapons from Russia were still accessible. This was because the Izvaryne border crossing was still under the control of pro-Russian fighters.

Shelling would ensue again in multiple districts of Donetsk city. In Horlivka, continued shelling resulted in the deaths of 30 civilians. Shelling would continue in the Leninskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Donetsk city. Defeats suffered by the DPR compelled Igor Girkin to implore Russia for reinforcements. He argued that the defeat of the DPR would reflect badly on the Russian Federation, since it was president Vladimir Putin that named the republic "New Russia." In the meantime, Luhansk was completely surrounded by Ukrainian government forces, with both water supply and electricity nearly cut off completely. The mayor announced that the city was on the verge of a humanitarian crisis as a result of unending rocket fire. Donetsk, on the other hand, was marred with continued fighting and relentless shelling between both sides of the conflict, and supply lines between Luhansk and Donetsk had been cut off. The shelling continued in Donetsk through the first 14 days of August, as the Ukrainian government forces continued their advance forward. Igor Girkin would resign from his post and be replaced by Vladimir Kononov. The hybrid warfare that Russia initially pursued against Ukraine was now converted into a more conventional form. Before, Russia was providing reinforcements to the pro-Russian separatists with irregular fighters, but by August 14, Russia would launch a more standard military invasion of the Donbas region. Highly secretive, Russian officials nonetheless continued to remain vague about its operations there, not presenting a clear cut answer on the matter, as NATO and the United States army would provide assessments and report Russia's incursion. Russia has been able to disguise many of its troops as pro-Russian separatists, which leaves some

doubt on the actual scale of Russian intervention. Armored personnel carriers with Russian military plates would cross into Donetsk via the Izvaryne border crossing, which was still controlled by pro-Russian fighters. DPR prime minister Alexander Zakharchenko reported that his forces contained around 1200 Russian military-trained combatants. However, in just a few days, Ukrainian forces would claim more territory in Luhansk and Donetsk, as increased shelling would claim more civilian lives. After the Ukrainian government reached out to the separatist for the sake of establishing a ceasefire, the DPR prime minister, emboldened by Russian reinforcements, demanded that Ukraine recognize their autonomy first.

With Russia's backing, counter-offensives launched by the pro-Russian separatists would stifle Ukrainian advances in Luhansk and Donetsk. The separatists targeted Ukrainian government positions in Shchastia, which is situated right along the Siverskyi Donets River in Luhansk. When Russian reinforcements arrived, the separatists were able to surround Ukrainian government forces positioned in Ilovaisk and Amvrosiivka in Donetsk Oblast, and the heavy shelling caused the Ukrainian government forces and other volunteer battalions to retreat, leaving the pro-government volunteer Donbas Battalion trapped in Ilovaisk against the separatists. Many of the Ukrainian volunteer battalions are funded by Ukrainian oligarchs, and were vital in keeping the separatists from over-powering Ukrainian government forces in Donbas. There is fear that privately funded militias which gained control over areas in eastern and southern Ukraine may not return those territories back to the Ukrainian government. The oligarchs could simply use their control over the territories to exert considerable leverage and influence on Ukrainian government policy.

As separatists forces vowed to fight their way to the Azov Sea, reinforcement Russian fighters would aid the separatists in launching an artillery barrage on the coastal city of Novoazovsk, in southern Donetsk Oblast. Prior to this, much of southern Donetsk had already been reclaimed by Ukrainian government forces. But now the separatist were able to use the village of Markyne to shell Novoazovsk. Ukrainian forces, however, were able to detain irregular Russian paratroopers in a nearby village. But Russia claimed that the paratroopers ended up there due to a botched military exercise. As Russia continued to deny the presence of Russian fighters in Donbas region, the pro-Russian separatists advanced into Novoazovsk with a convoy of 100 armored vehicles, tanks, and Grad rocket lorries, all believed to be comprised of Russian personnel trailing not too far behind. Ukrainian forces in Novoazovsk were thus forced to retreat and spare their resources for defense of

Mariupol. This new stealth invasion by the Russian Federation would change the dynamic of the conflict. Meanwhile, the Donbas battalion trapped in Ilovaisk would negotiate a withdrawal agreement with the separatists. However, the separatist would fire upon them as they vacated, killing several dozen. Now under assault from Russian artillery, Ukrainian government forces would withdraw from Luhansk International airport—a day after a Ukrainian patrol boat was attacked by on-shore artillery. The Ukrainian forces would nearly lose Mariupol to the Russia-backed separatists. But a combination of fighters from the Azov Battalion and Ukrainian government forces were able to repel the Russia-backed separatists from taking control of Mariupol.

The Azov Battalion has drawn considerable controversy, despite being the major component in aiding Mariupol's defense against the pro-Russian separatists. They initially formed as a volunteer Ukrainian nationalist militia in May of 2014, but were eventually incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine in September of 2014. While the Azov Battalion has garnered a reputation for being highly tactical and precise in their military operations, they have also been accused of engaging in looting and other tactics such as torture. Other allegations include having ties to neo-Nazis. A representative of the battalion stated that roughly 10% of their fighters were affiliated with Neo-Nazi groups. Ironically, over half in the Azov Battalion are Russian-speaking and many others travel from abroad to join their ranks. Azov was established as a special volunteer police unit regulated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was not initially established as a Neo-Nazi group, however, some of the members who later joined had Neo-Nazi ties and would appropriate symbols that resembled the ones used by the Nazis. The Azov Battalion's commander, Andriy Biletsky, had previously led the Social National Assembly and Patriot of Ukraine, which does share a similar outlook of the National Socialism installed in Germany circa 1933, where the dominant race and culture would have priority over other ethnic groups within a particular region. With this in mind, it must be said that, for Ukraine, there is a historical backdrop that has to be understood when it comes to assessing the adoption of Nazi symbolism by a pro-Ukrainian militia group. And which should contrast it from neo-Nazism in countries where groups would appropriate Nazi symbols, not just for antisemitic purposes, but mostly for its shock value. Back in World War II, many Ukrainians looked to Nazi Germany as liberators of their country against a Soviet regime that had already by then tortured and orchestrated the deaths of millions of them during the Holodomor. While the Nazis after

advancing into Ukraine, nonetheless, instituted repressive measures there, they also fought alongside the Ukrainian Insurgent Army(UPA) against a later Soviet counter-invasion. This plays a large role in some segments of Ukrainian nationalism's outlook towards Nazi Germany. In Galacia, where even today the majority of Ukrainian nationalists gather, the Nazis allowed Ukrainians there to retain much of their cultural and civic practices. This was without question a respite for them, considering Stalin's vicious policies against Ukraine in the 1930s. Moreover, by the time World War II began, Karl Marx had already become to many Ukrainians, what Hitler was to Jewish people, an instigator of their near complete demise. And the fact that there are still many symbols of the brutal Soviet era circulating the eastern parts of Ukraine does not help in terms of allowing Ukrainians to move forward amid having to remember those past atrocities carried out against them by the Soviet regime. Hitler's atrocity against the Jews had a more distant alienating connotation. While Stalin's atrocity against Ukrainians had a more domestic connotation. Both, nonetheless, targeted and had a devastating impact on a specific group of people. When the Azov Battalion enjoined with the Ukrainian National Guard, they moved to depoliticize themselves. However, a mass shooting at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand by a white nationalist linked to a member of the Azov Battalion would lead the US to push for legislation that would have the Azov Battalion labeled a foreign terrorist organization. At the moment, NATO, has refused to conduct military drills with the unit. Despite the antisemitic connotation of Azov's platform, Azov Battalion has some Jewish supporters and some Jewish members serving in the battalion. Azov leader Biletsky has since been elected into the Ukrainian parliament and left the group in 2016.

After a summer of intense fighting, Russia, Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists agreed to a ceasefire in September of 2014, as a line was established between the pro-Russian insurgent side and the Ukrainian government side. The ceasefire was called the Minsk Protocol and was violated on numerous occasions in the ensuing years. In October later that year, DPR and LPR authorities violated the Minsk Protocol by holding parliamentary elections. Fighting would subsequently escalate, and heavy shelling and casualties occurred in the Donbas region. Also, more Russian troops and heavy artillery could be seen crossing over from Russia into separatist held territory in Ukraine. Between September and December of 2014, 1000 people were reported to have died in Donbas as a result of the violence. President Poroshenko of Ukraine encouraged for a new

peace deal to be established, as both Ukrainian forces and separatist forces agreed to stop the fighting on December 9th and resume efforts in adhering to the tenets of the Minsk Protocol, such as prisoner swaps. However, in January 2015, the ceasefire was broken again and fighting would once again escalate. After brief disagreements amongst separatist fighters, violence ensued on Ukrainian government-controlled Donetsk International airport, which was bombarded by separatist artillery and taken on January 15th. Russian reinforcements began gathering momentum for the separatists. Keep in mind the Minsk Protocol established a buffer-zone between Ukrainian government controlled territory and separatist controlled territory. So this attack on the airport would be a massive breach of contract orchestrated by the separatists, and they even refused to attend a new round of ceasefire talks. Subsequently, Ukraine government forces proceeded to reclaim the Donetsk International airport on January 17th, 2015, but the fighting would then spread to other areas of Donetsk, as Ukrainian defense of the airport compelled the Russian Federation to deploy even more artillery, soldier and tank reinforcement to the Donbas region. These reinforcements allowed the separatists to reclaim the airport from the Ukrainian forces. Following the victory, the separatist fighters advanced to the line of control, firing upon Ukrainian soldiers positioned there, and capturing a number of checkpoints. They also launched a barrage of artillery fire upon Mariupol and Debaltseve. The heavy fighting and casualties would lead France and Germany to get involved in the peace process. As the United States proposed sending in US military to aid Ukraine against the pro-Russian advance, Angela Merkel, then chancellor of Germany, believed that would only make matters worse. The Franco-German plan was then drawn up as a last chance to end the conflict. However, by February 15th, the Minsk II protocol was established. But separatists would continue fighting in Debaltseve, capturing it on February 18th, 2015. Minor skirmishes would break-out throughout the year, but the main tenets of the protocol would manage to be observed, as Ukrainian and separatist forces began withdrawing heavy artillery. The skirmishes and ceasefire violations that did break-out during this time were almost entirely perpetrated by Russia-backed separatists. After peace demonstration took place in separatist held territory, both sides of the conflict finally agreed to drastically cut back on the violence in September of 2015. With minor outbreaks of violence here and there, the situation in Donbas would remain stable throughout 2016.

In Crimea, Russia accused the Ukrainians of orchestrating terrorism in 2016. As a response, Russia increased its military

presence. Ukraine then began to fear that Russia was planning a full-scale invasion of country. By 2017, fighting would once again escalate in the Donbas region. In February of that year, Russian president Vladimir Putin issued a decree stating that Russia was going to recognize personal and vehicle registration documents issued by the DPR and LPR. This meant that Russia would recognize those living in the DPR and LPR as citizens of an actual country. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia still recognizes the Donbas territory as part of Ukraine. Prior to this, those who fled to Russia from Donbas would have trouble presenting their DPR and LRP issued documents as valid. So in light of this, many considered the decree by Putin to be a humanitarian one. A renewed ceasefire was nonetheless established in February. However, Ukrainian forces reported that separatists were still violating the protocol and perpetrating minor attacks on Ukrainian government fighters. Ceasefires established in June, August and December would all be violated by the pro-Russian separatists who were employing snipers, drones, and frag grenades against the Ukrainian government forces. This led to Ukraine issuing a bill in January of 2018 that called for the Ukrainian government to reclaim territories held by the separatists. Russia considered this an attempt to start another war and a violation of the Minsk protocol. The new bill declared the DPR and LPR as occupied territories with Russia as an aggressor. The bill gave president Poroshenko the right to use military force without the approval of the Ukrainian parliament.

In, 2018, ceasefires established in March, July, and August were mostly violated by Russia-backed separatists. That same year, on August 31st, DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko was killed in a restaurant explosion. In March of 2019, another ceasefire was violated. While fighting did reduce considerably since 2014 and 2015, the Russia-backed separatists would continuously violate ceasefire agreements by employing sniper fire and drone attacks on Ukrainian government positions.

In May of 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky was elected president of Ukraine, and by October of that year, extensive negotiations had been carried out between Russia, the Russian-backed separatists, the Ukrainian government, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE). The Steinmeier-Forumla was established. It was named after the Germany's president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The agreement would allow the DPR and LPR to hold elections. Those areas would also be given a "special status" during efforts to reintegrate them into Ukraine. Both sides agreed and began withdrawing troops from the Donbas region, both later that month

and again in November. The withdrawals were followed by a successful prisoner swap. In December, Russian president Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Angela Merkel met in Paris to resume the Normandy format negotiations. Both sides agreed to exchange the remaining prisoners being held.

The global COVID-19 pandemic, which was the global spread of a deadly coronavirus strain which started in Wuhan, China. The virus began to spread to the rest of the world starting around January 15th of 2020, and affected the ongoing situation in Donbas. There, attempts to prevent the spread of the virus had cut off civilian access to various supplies since the both Ukraine and the DPR & LPR established lock-down procedures for their respective territories, cutting off passage through the line of contact. In March of 2020, fighting would escalate, leading to 18 civilian deaths in the Donbas region. In July, another ceasefire was established, which significantly decreased the violence. Between July and November, only 3 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed. At the beginning of 2021, fighting once again escalated. In 2021, in the first 3 months alone, 25 Ukrainian government fighters were killed. Between January and October of that year, 85 soldiers and 30 civilians would lose their lives as a result of military conflict. 2021 would also see a large build up of Russian military personnel in annexed Crimea and along the Ukraine-Russian border. By April, 85000 Russian troops were already in Crimea and running military drills near the borders of the Donbas conflict zone. Both NATO and the United States warned that Russia was planning a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. France, Germany, and the OSCE all reached out to Russia to engage in more peace talks, but Russia would decline to participate. Meanwhile, Ukraine rolled out new drone technology, a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2, which Ukraine would use to destroy artillery being fired by separatists forces.

A poll of Ukrainian public opinion of Russian intervention taken by the International Republican Institute in September of 2014 showed that both a majority of Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking citizens disapproved of Russian intervention in Ukraine. A later poll by the International Republican Institute showed that 80% of Ukrainians nationwide believed that the separatist held territories should remain a part of Ukraine. 73% living in separatist controlled areas also believed that those territories should remain a part of Ukraine.

In recent years following Russia's annexation of Crimea, there has been increasing support for Ukraine to join NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ukraine had applied for membership

back in 2008, however, between then and 2013, public support for Ukraine to join was low.

Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia laid claim to both sides of the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Azov. It separates the Kerch Peninsula of Crimea from the Taman Peninsula of Russia's Krasnodar Krai. Russia and Ukraine had an agreement going back to 2003, which allowed both countries to use the strait. Ukraine has a port in the Sea of Azov called Mariupol. However in 2018 as Ukrainian vessels were enroute to the port, Russia blocked Ukraine's access to the strait and then proceeded to fire upon the Ukrainian vessels as they were turning back towards Ukraine. Russia seized the ships and detained the crew members.

Between 2014 and 2018, 10,000 people have been killed by pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Many point to the Orange Revolution as the trigger of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Neverthelesss, the impetus of Russian policy change from a respect of Ukraine independence in 2000, to a hostile view of Ukraine's sovereignty may have a genesis in the way the United States and NATO applied mid-east foreign policy between 2003 and 2014 and how that application was perceived by the Russian state and its president Vladimir Putin.

Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad and studied law at Leningrad State University. From there, he went on to work as a KGB officer for 16 years, reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel before resigning in 1991. He then decided to go into politics and in 1996 joined the administration of Boris Yeltsin, where he would serve as the director of the FSB(formerly KGB) and secretary of Russia's Security Council. In 1999, he was appointed Prime Minister. After Boris Yeltsin resigned, Putin became acting President of Russia. He was officially elected later in 1999 and again in 2004. During this time, the office of President in Russia was limited to 2 consecutive terms. So in 2008, after his last term ended, Putin chose to become prime minster from 2008- 2012. Putin was then re-elected president of Russia in 2012 and again in 2018. In retrospect, we can observe a considerable change in Putin's outlook between the time of his first 8 years as president of Russia(1999-2008), and the time of his next 8 years as president(2012 -present). During Putin's first 8 years, he put forth a western friendly foreign policy agenda, even flirting with the idea of Russia joining NATO, which would have made Russia a military ally with the United States. Putin also signed on to a strategic partnership with the EU in 2000, stating Russia's intention to recognize the sovereign rights of Ukraine. However, the United States's and NATO's illegal war against Iraq in 2003, and its aggressive and

unfettered military interventions in Libya and Syria in 2011 alarmed the Russian state in what Russia felt was an audacious foreign policy where the United States was attempting to position itself as an international police force. There was also a double standard that Putin felt the United States was applying by justifying their role in destabilizing Libya and Syria, asserting regime change, militarily aiding government opposition, and yet pointing out the moral implications of other countries looking to assert their own regional interests. This only served to confirm Moscow’s suspicions of NATO. Russia believed that after the Cold War, NATO had no purpose since its initial establishment was not only for the sake of constraining German and Japan militarily, but also deterring any expansionist ambition of the Soviet Union after World War II. After NATO incorporated West Germany into the alliance, the Soviet Union, likewise, established the Warsaw pact with other eastern European countries in order to deter NATO expansion. But after the Soviet Union ended, the Soviets relinquished control over the alliance and effectively dissolved the Warsaw pact. In doing this, Russia was promised security guarantees from NATO, and Putin often states that NATO has never fulfilled these promises and that NATO only continues to exist as a provocational entity, conducting aggressive military exercises near Russia's borders on a regular basis. All these factors, along with the fact that Ukraine has been entertaining the possibility of a military alliance with the United States, played a significant role in Russia’s assertive policy against Ukraine in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. Any deescalation efforts to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will certainly have to address the issue of US/NATO foreign policy and the residual effects it has had on the foreign policy of other nations.

Crimea, historically, was the home of the Crimean Tatars, whose ethnic backdrop is comprised of a number of different races that inhabited the area throughout history. These include Tauri, Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Greeks, Goths, Bulgars, Khazars, Pechenegs, Italians and Circassians. However, the consolidating ethnic group that fomented the establishment of Tatar people were the Cumans, a Turkic peoples. In the 9th century, Crimea was con-tested between Byzantium, Rus', and Khazaria. In the 10th century, the Rus' had taken Crimea from the Byzantines. Crimea is also the place where Vladimir the Great was baptized Christian, marking the beginning of Kievan Rus'’s acceptance of Christianity. In the 13th century, Crimea had become part of the Mongol empire. During this time, the Crimean Tatars accepted Islam and Crimea would become a central area for Islam in eastern Europe. Later under Mongolian rule, the Tatars would make an attempt at independence from the Golden Horde(Mongols). This struggle was led

by Haci Giray, the founder of the Crimean Khanate. After gaining independence from the Great Horde, the Crimean Khanate would become a vassal state(protectorate) of the Ottomans from 1449 to 1783. In 1774, under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Crimean Khanate claimed its independence from the Ottomans. In 1783, Crimea was conquered by the Russians, and thereafter, many Crimean Tatars were forcibly exiled to the Ottoman Empire. Crimea would become incorporated into the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik uprising in 1917. Between 1917 and 1933, 150,000 Tatars(roughly half of their population) were either killed by famine as a result of Stalin's collectivization policies, executed, or deported from Crimea. In 1941, during World War II, Crimea was occupied by German and Romanian armed forces. After the Soviets expelled the Germans during a counteroffensive, many Crimean Tatars were accused of corroborating with the Nazis. And in 1944, the entire Crimean Tatar population was deported to central Asia, with most of them sent to Uzbekistan. In 1954, the Soviet Union transferred Crimea to Ukraine. It would not be until 1989, under Mikhail Gorbachev, that the Soviet state would attempt to make amends for the unjustified expulsion of Crimean Tatars from their native land. The legal and police restrictions were lifted and the Tatars would be allowed to return to Crimea. However, over the course of time, much of their land had already become inhabited by Ukrainian and Russian settlers. This became a source of acrimony, as Crimean Tatars were left having to occupy crude dwellings. 250,000 of them now live in Crimea, while 150,000 remain in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. Nationalism amongst the Crimean Tatars in response to what they feel are attacks on their rightful settlement in their native land could forewarn of future issues in Crimea. There have already been instances of mass violence as a result of Tatar demonstrations. In October 1992, the police tore down what was considered an "illegally built" Tatar settlement established in the town of Alushta. This was followed by unrest, as Crimean protesters marched into the Crimean Parliament and demanded the release of Tatars detained during the protest. In 1995, unrest followed when extortion of Tatar business owners by Russian gangsters and the murder of Tatar traders provoked Tatar attacks on shops believed to be Russian-owned or mafia-controlled. This ended in the shooting of two Tatars. Because the Tatars have a historical claim on Crimea, instituting policies that would keep Tatar grievances minimized may prove very difficult.

To understand the Russian-speaking segments of Ukraine is to first understand that Ukraine is very regionalized in terms of sentiment. Most people who live in Ukraine are more identified with

their local constituency, over their national republic. Prior to the unrest following the Orange Revolution in 2004, no one could know for certain where the country was headed. However, the cultural variability amongst different localities could provide a hint as to why it would be difficult to unite Ukraine on economic reforms. During Soviet rule, both Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were encouraged to adhere to both their local administrative apparatus and the Soviet Union as a whole, and at the same time disregard the nationalistic framework that overlays the territory of Ukraine. This outlook has largely continued even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as both Ukrainian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians remain more privy to being insulated by local matters over national matters. For the Donbas region, which is majority Russian-speaking, the populace there during the Soviet era had become adapted to the economic and political power being centered in Moscow. When the Soviet Union ended, there was a difficult re-adjustment in going forward without a central element in the picture. So, many in the Donbas became identified with their local or regional identity, as opposed to their national identity. Being from Donbas had become more important than being Russian and Ukrainian. This local outlook was also the same for Ukrainians in western Ukraine. Since independence, there had not been a political party that stood to represent a political or linguistic ideal to be implemented for the entirety of Ukraine, and much of Ukraine's most extreme nationalistic elements are concentrated in the area of Galacia, which is a region divided between western Ukraine and eastern Poland. In Galacia, it is claimed that the purest form of the Ukrainian language is spoken. However, many consider it a heavily polonized version. There is a similar outlook toward the language spoken in Donetsk, a place where much of the Russian nationalist element is concentrated, which maintains that the language spoken there is a mix of Ukrainian and Russian. Moreover, the main hope for the continued survival of Ukraine, should the current Donbas conflict come to an end, is based in the fact that the most extreme forms of nationalism, whether Ukrainian or Russian, are largely concentrated in areas that are geographically distant from each other. Had these elements been geographically contiguous, the current Ukraine crisis would have likely panned out much worse. Thankfully, the geographical space in between those areas of extremism, lies a much less ethnically inclined view of Ukrainian nationalism and a much friendlier outlook towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians. This indicates why in their respective presidential election wins, neither pro-Ukrainian Kravchuk or pro-Russian Kuchma received a majority of the vote in

the majority Ukrainian central regions of Ukraine. However, there is always a fear in many areas of the Donbas region that some form of Ukrainization policy is waiting around the corner. And that the prevailing Russian-language spoken in those areas would be oppressed as a result. In Ukraine, the general consensus is that there is a thin line between Ukrainian nationalism and oppression of Russian culture. While from the vantage of point of a Ukrainian nationalist, there is a thin line between a special status for the Russian language and federalism. Furthermore, the history of Russia and Ukraine, irrespective of any attempts by Ukrainians to make Russian-speakers feel accommodated, plays a large role in alienating Russian-speakers from national Ukraine. This is indicative of the fact that independence day for Ukraine does not resonate among many Russian speakers, since they feel that it is not their holiday. Public celebrations of it are oftentimes protested by Russian nationalist groups. But this does not discount the fact that many in Ukraine are tied to both sides, being ethnically mixed with Ukrainian and Russian, which at times pits them against Ukrainian and Russian extremism, both of which they consider to be detrimental to the stability of life in Ukraine. Alexei Nestnov of the BBC Ukrainian Service said of the lack of nationalist culture in the Kharkiv area in Eastern Ukraine in 1995: ***On the whole, people here wouldn't want to make a clear choice between Ukraine and Russia, if this could be avoided. And they themselves don't distinguish clearly between what is Ukrainian and what is Russian. If you enter a house here, you can't say whether it is a Ukrainian or a Russian home—in any case, families are often mixed. If it is a Ukrainian intellectual family, there might be a collection of Ukrainian literature, but this would be rare. Houses are decorated in a different way, depending on whether they are Ukrainian or Russian. If there are some traditional" Ukrainian decorations, then they may just as well be hung up by local Russians. In the villages, of course, it is different. There, people have kept more genuine traditions, songs, ornaments, and so on. But they don't really think of them as national traditions, but as local ones—it is the tuteshni feeling, not nationalism……On the whole, people here always liked the image of Russia that they received from Russian television, Russian culture, and so on. But since October 1993, and still more since Chechnya, there has been a change. People here are very peaceable, they hate the idea of war and political violence. So whereas people here—including Ukrainians—used to call themselves Russians, now this is not so popular. But people here still don't call themselves Ukrainians, so you could say they don't know what to call themselves.***

Much of the tension that arises when it comes to language is manifested at the teaching and intellectual subset. Many in the Donetsk region are afraid that if Ukrainian policies are given a stronger foothold over Ukraine's policy-making, then many of the Russian-speaking schools there will eventually be replaced by Ukrainian speaking ones. While some in eastern Ukraine support a moderate Ukrainization, the crudeness among Ukrainian nationalists on topics of Russian language restriction is oftentimes itself the culprit that gives rise to reactiveness amongst Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Language implementations also have a tendency to coincide with historical revision, and the intention of an eventual Ukrainization has already changed much of how history is explained. In textbooks, former pro Russia-leaning perspectives of history have been converted into anti-Russia outlooks. This crudeness applied in handling the transition, along with the blatant revisionism will only continue to give rise to pro-Russian resistance to Ukrainization.

The Ukrainian language itself is not drastically different from Russian. This fact worked in favor of Russification policies during the Soviet era, and can aid the Ukrainization process of today. Another element that has entered into the picture is English. Ukrainian-speakers in Ukraine have worried about the provincialism element that comes with speaking Ukrainian and how this may hinder any student's or professional's desire to advance abroad, where having an understanding of English opens the door to more career opportunities.

When taking into consideration the history of Ukraine, it becomes difficult to relegate the longstanding struggle between Russians and Ukrainians as simply an ethnic struggle. This is because both Ukrainians and Russians are both of east Slavic origin. Furthermore, many geneticists have found that DNA-wise there is no discernible difference between an ethnic Russian and an ethnic Ukrainian. So the differences between them has to be restricted to the cultural level, mainly in regards to language and religion. But yet in light of this, Ukrainians are adamant that these differences connote an ethnic distinction. However, Russians historically have believed that it does not. In an ethnic conflict, we would simply presume that one side of the conflict is drawn against the other due to genetic differences between the two, prioritized among other factors of course. But here as it pertains to Russians and Ukrainians, we have one side which believes that it is biologically distinct from the Russian and the other side that believes there is no biological distinction. In the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, things become more complicated because in Ukraine it involves Ukrainians against

Ukrainians. There are Ukrainians who view themselves as ethnically distinct from Russians(these exist more in western and central Ukraine) and there are Ukrainians who view themselves as ethnically no different from Russians(these exist more in Eastern and Southern Ukraine). Thus the latter viewpoint fits into what would be the outlook of a pro-Russian separatist fighting against the Ukrainian government. In taking all of this into account and attempting to form a more technical standpoint, a Ukrainian as distinct from a Russian would have to be someone whose ancestral backdrop was always situated in the area of what comprises modern-day Ukraine. This is usually the main premise that is used to back claims of Ukrainian distinction. However, in Ukraine today, there is this amalgamation of east Slavic peoples who are descended from Russians that migrated from Russia during the time of the tsars, mixed in with east Slavic peoples that have been permanently settled in Ukraine since the time of Kievan Rus'. This layout makes it difficult to extract a true Ukrainian from a Ukrainian who descended from Russians that migrated to the area. This could be why "language" is becoming more singled out as the main marker of identity. Otherwise, in order to bring order out of this chaos of Russians and Ukrainians becoming so interwoven over time, Ukraine would need to conduct a census on the matter, gathering those Ukrainians whose ancestry shows a permanence of settlement in Ukraine. In gathering these and confirming such Ukrainians, Ukraine—at least this way—would always have a way to access the basic foundations of their history. This of course in the event that Ukrainian culture, language, and claims of distinction completely dissolve as it becomes fully absorbed into Russian culture.

In retrospect, Bohdan Khmelnytsky fateful decision to place Ukraine under the protection of Muscovy in 1654 had historical implications that set Ukraine on a slow trajectory towards total assimilation into the Russian cultural and linguistic framework. This brings into question the legacy of Khmelnytsky. The Cossack rebellion that he orchestrated in the 1600s was largely in response to the Ukrainian Greek Catholicism that prevailed in Ukraine at that time. And the Cossacks on numerous occasions during the uprising attempted to abolish the Greek Catholic church. It is also likely that the Cossack's adherence to Eastern Orthodoxy played a large role in Khmelnytsky's decision to place Ukraine under the protection of Tsarist Russia. While Bohdan's actions led to Ukraine becoming independent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, his decision to place Ukraine under Russian protection had devastating consequences for the Uniate Church and Ukraine's future claims on

independence and sovereignty. It set off centuries of religious suppression orchestrated by the Orthodox Church against the Ukrainian Greek Catholics. This along with the fact that Russia and Cossack commonality of Orthodoxy made it easy for Russian intellectual discourse to conflate the intentions of Khemlnytsky's decision to ally Ukraine with Russia under the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654.

Chapter 10: Anthony's Treaty

In order to bring peace to Ukraine and end the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict, efforts have to be taken to persuade the Ukrainian government to stop blocking the flow of water into Crimea. In exchange, Russia should agree to remove all Russian troops from the Donbas region. The pro-Russian fighters there should renounce claims on Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and also be granted amnesty by the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian government would also give the Russian language a temporary "special status" in the Donbas region, with an intention for the Ukrainian language to slowly phase out the Russian language during a process that would take 500 years to complete. Russia should also grant the separatist fighters refugee status and pension in the case that they would opt to leave Ukraine for Russia. Another aspect of this plan should involve Ukraine asserting neutrality and disembarking on plans to join NATO. The actions of NATO forces in the middle east during the first 2 decades of the 21st century has to be pointed out as one of the factors that led to heightened tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Also the fact that the NATO has in recent years militarily abandoned the vast majority of its allies during major conflicts should further deter Ukrainian pursuit of NATO membership and military alliance with the US. In being assured that Ukraine intends to remain neutral and independent, Russia should in response be expected to reduce aggression on its policy in Ukraine and remain open to agreements in which Russia would respect Ukrainian independence. The only stipulation which should be applied to this agreement is that Ukraine would avoid military alliance with the United States for a period of 40 years. If Ukraine chooses, they can pursue or maintain trade and economic agreements with the US. Ukraine can also establish military alliances with western European countries not currently hostile to Russia. In exchange for Ukraine taking these measures, Russia would agree that a referendum in Crimea be taken every 10 years, allowing the people there to decide which country it wants to be a part of, Ukraine or Russia. If a referendum votes in favor of Ukraine, Russia would agree to remove its military forces from the region. And vice versa, Ukraine would allow Russia to claim Crimea if a referendum votes in favor of Crimea joining Russia. This should be part of a 100

year plan, where the final referendum would decide finality on the matter. In turn, Ukraine would acknowledge the legitimacy of the referendum held in 2014 as neutrally legal in accordance with international law and also take responsibility for its role in cutting off the water supply to Crimea and thus compromising the stability of the entire region. If no amnesty is granted, the pro-Russian fighters will plead guilty to terrorism for using violent means to impose secession in areas where officials there did not consent to issue a referendum. They will accept a max penalty of 10 year exile to Russia, where they would receive a pension from the Russian government. Russia would take responsibility for the violation of ceasefire agreements throughout the conflict. Because of the systemic dangers that arise with protests, such as providing a platform for violent separatists to justify terrorism, the Ukrainian government should temporarily increase taxes in Ukraine in order to help pay for damages caused by protesters. This should also deter in the future mass protests which endanger the stability of the entire region and the safety of the general populace. The UN should declare null and void any NATO sanctions against Russia which pertain to the Ukraine conflict, due to the role that NATO has played in attempting to provoke Russia with threats based on unverifiable evidence of any intention by Russia to invade all of Ukraine. Since 2016, there has been a steady, albeit slow move towards improved stabilization of Eastern Ukraine. NATO propaganda and threats against Russia only served to stifle the process of stabilization and peace.

On the home front, Ukraine should move to settle any tensions between Ukrainian and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Historically, government has attempted to unite people by enforcing edicts that would attempt to gather people under one religion or language. This tactic is largely ripe with flaws, due to the fact that forcing people into one form of cultural expression is a form of discrimination in itself. So resistance in response is to be expected. Imposing a dual language system, on the other hand, would provoke a large segment of Ukrainian nationals and should be avoided. However, schools should be given the authority to decide whether or not they want to offer Russian as a second language. And as proposed previously, this should coincide with a plan to phase out the Russian language in a process that would take 500 years to complete. Meaning, that if by the 499th year, Russian is still largely spoken in eastern and southern Ukraine, the Ukrainian political apparatus can institute a Ukrainian language mandate to completely end the use of Russian by the end of that 499th year or it can choose to extend the deadline through a voting process.

The key in stabilizing the domestic situation in Ukraine is not so much by promoting harmony, but predictability. Everyone in Ukraine should have some confidence that they will have some ability to forecast the trajectory of where their chosen path in life will take them and what the political climate may be like over that time-frame. Ukraine should also promote and cultivate, through media, successful private business owners, whether Russian speaking or Ukrainian speaking, since both will have a large effect on advocating for domestic stability in Ukraine. They also provide inspiration for others looking to attain similar economic goals. Both sides, majority and minority, must have firm agreement that violent separatism needs to be kept in check. The general public must also be aware that assembling against their local government in the future might allow violent separatists to high-jack their purpose and endanger all involved.

Ukraine must also move to implement policies that are conducive to men having access to the institution of marriage. Much of violent separatism is motivated by either lack of romantic fulfillment or a prevalence of domestic conflict. For this reason, the Ukrainian government must start paying attention to the marriage and divorce rate, along with incidents of domestic violence. The vast majority of people in Ukraine are not violent. Many live in villages and enjoy the quiet, predictable life. This should be what continues to define Ukrainian culture.

Another key to stabilizing Ukraine domestically is by monitoring how people are perceiving their positive and negative interactions within their immediate environment. Are Russian speakers in Ukraine feeling as though they are being discriminated against or shunned in their daily lives? Are Ukrainian speakers feeling discriminated against or shunned in their daily lives? In many cases, discrimination can be perception. So a solution to this is not always the attempt to correct where the person feels he/she is being discriminated against. In many cases, the key is changing how the person perceives their interactions. An example is a Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian walking down the street and noticing that a Russian-speaking Ukrainian walking by is staring at him with a stern and disapproving look, while yelling in his direction a derogatory word in the Russian langauge. The Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian can perceive that interaction to have an ethnic connotation and subsequently entertain the thought that there is a broader issue of discrimination and hate by Russian-speaking Ukrainians against Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. Depending on how aggrieved the person is, the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian can go as far as altering

his societal outlook to one that is militantly hostile towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians, all because of that one interaction. This perception can extend far beyond just glances and words exchanged in public, it can occur in the workplace over firings, unfair promotions, etc. It can happen in schools where bullying occurs. Also in romantic relationship, a person can become radicalized as a result of the breakdown of romantic relationship if elements of Russian-speaking Ukrainophilism were involved. The Ukrainian government needs to tap into these details of their society as factors affecting the sustainment of Ukrainian life. At the moment, Ukrainian and Russian speakers are aware of the conflict concerning both pro-Russian separatists in Donbas and pro-Russian Ukrianian support of the Crimea annexation by Russia. And because of this, many Ukrainians may be perceiving their interactions with those speaking the other language, to have some form of ethnic connotation. As the conflict escalates, it will become near impossible for individuals in Ukraine to separate their interactions with non-Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians from the larger ethnic conflict. A poll keeping track of how Ukrainians are perceiving their daily interactions with those speaking Russian, and vice versa, is a viable solution. Displaying the results of this at different intervals would allow the Ukrainian government to know if it needs to either apply measures to curb the perception of discrimination, or—if the poll is showing a reduction in the population's perception of discrimination—continue on with the direction their policies have been taking. The key is removing the perception of ethnic connotation in both the positive and negative interactions that typically occur in Ukrainian daily life. This is very hard to do after a major schism. If there is a rise in the perception of discrimination, then perhaps the Ukrainian government can investigate actual discrimination. But it must do so in a way that keeps the Ukrainian government from being perceived as biased. Prior to 2004, when the Orange Revolution took place, the vast majority of Ukraine was heavily geared towards appeasing the Russian-speaking demographic. This was indicative of Kuchma's election to the Ukrainian presidency, not once, but twice as a pro-Russian candidate. In 2014, Ukrainians voted pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovich into power, even after 2004 and the subsequent Orange Revolution, when many in Ukraine believed his election victory back then was rigged. So what we have in Ukraine is 3 dynamics that has led to where it is now in 2021—marred by violent separatist conflict taking place in Eastern Ukraine.

In 2004, after 2 terms by a pro-Russian candidate, it may been easy to surmise that the majority of the Ukrainian speaking

population in Ukraine was beyond this notion of separatism between them and the Russian speaking portion of Ukraine. Taking this into account, it is quite possible that the widespread public reaction to allegations of election fraud concerning pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych did not carry an ethnic connotation at all. This however was not the perception of the minority Russian-speaking demographic in Ukraine, even after a pro-Russian was elected into power for 2 consecutive terms. They would still perceive mainstream outrage at the election results to be a subset of a larger problem of Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian speaker hatred of Russian speakers. So they subsequently threatened a federalization of the eastern portion of Ukraine. This would in turn provoke Ukrainian nationalism. Nevertheless, the Orange Revolution and pro-Russian antagonism against mainstream Ukraine was followed by Viktor Yanukovych's election in 2010. Yet, this still did not ease the perception of Russian-speaking Ukrainians—a perception which maintained that mainstream Ukraine did not want to accommodate them. Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalism had already been on alert, owing back to the Russian-speaking separatist threats which followed election protests in 2004. These dynamics came to a head when, under the influence of Russia, Viktor Yanukovych withdrew Ukraine from a EU economic partnership in favor of a Russia-centered deal. Russia was already on alert after observing NATO's unfettered policy in the Middle east (*particularly in aiding the overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya and attempting to aid the overthrow of Assad in Syria*) and as result, looking to take measures to influence Ukrainian policy against possible partnerships with the EU, NATO, or the US. Now in Ukraine both sides are aware of the ethnic connotation hovering over life and politics in Ukraine and the extremists groups have latched onto protest movements, waiting for the right moment to apply violence and complete the schism. We have Russian-speaking Ukraine responding to their perceptions, Ukrainian nationalism responding to Russian-speaker separatist threats, and Russia responding to NATO policy in the middle east along with their provocation of Russia. All three dynamics would upend the sentiments held by the majority of Ukrainians who were never looking for violent conflict. And now all of Ukraine has to accept the reality of this ethnic/language dynamic hovering over all aspects of their daily life and interactions and the possibility of this becoming a catalyst driving each of them further into their respective side of the schism.

Historically, it has always been easy for minority groups to detect oppression even during times when there was no evidence of a larger ploy by the majority to discriminate against them. Perhaps, a

default vulnerable position as "minority" makes them more privy to being influenced by separatist notions, or it could be that combined with the underlying history between what comprises the majority and what comprises the minority, that makes them more keen to go along with ethnocentric activities. History can certainly shape and mold how a group may approach life. However, we see that minority groups historically have rarely shied away from taking advantage of how the actions of a larger or stronger entity against a weaker or smaller one would reflect negatively on the stronger or larger entity. The trepidation applied by the dominant group in being careful not to draw a reputation of being a bully over a smaller group can be perceived as an invitation for the smaller group to throw the dice in seeing how much it can get away with. Usually, when the limit is discovered, the larger group has already proceeded to react, making it too late for the smaller group to cut their losses. Of course, this gambling act is usually orchestrated by ethnocentrics who have succeeded in shaming their own demographic for attempting to enjoin with the larger framework of society, and they do this oftentimes by pointing to historical examples that give credence to nationalistic or separatist arguments. For this reason, minority groups as a whole have a greater tendency to hold onto the ethnocentric perspective, even in the face of evidence that would argue against the necessity of such a disposition. Because this is the case, they are more likely to turn a blind eye to separatist or violent elements lurking in the shadows within their own demographic.

It takes tremendous effort for a society, especially a diverse one, to reach a point where both positive and negative interactions would rarely draw an ethnic connotation.

When the dominant group embarks upon a conciliatory approach to civil and community life, it is never for the sake of advancing a smaller group. The reason for it, in many cases, is to bring their society to an equilibrium in which differences thereof would not be prioritized in their daily lives, thus giving the society a greater singularity. When progress toward this dynamic is upended, ethnic distinctions began to hover over all interactions of daily life. Slowly, people become less likely to believe that negative interactions they encounter did not have an ethnic backdrop affecting it. After what transpired in Ukraine in the last 15 years, it is quite plausible that Russian-speaking Ukrainians will began to perceive cultural bias at every turn, even in the slightest of glances. They will go to restaurants in Lyiv and ask if the waitress speaks Russian, to which the waitress will answer "Yes" but also roll her eyes in the process, and thus cause to patron to believe that the waitress had a cultural

bias simply because she rolled her eyes. Another example is a group of Russian-speaking friends at a park in Kiev speaking Russian, and overhearing them, another group of Ukrainian-speaking people get up and leave, causing the Russian-speaking group to think that they left because of them and their Russian dialect. Yet, it would have been possible that the other group simply had to be somewhere at a certain time, and left when that time came, which just so happened to be at the same time that the Russian speaking group just arrived or started speaking Russian. When ethnic outlooks predominate, that latter possibility is no longer considered.

Before hostilities, it was fairly obvious that Ukraine had become comfortable with pro-Russian-speaking Ukrainians running their government. Even Ukrainian nationalists, though lurking in the background, were kept at bay for the most part. Now that Russian-speaking Ukrainian separatists have helped give rise to Ukrainian nationalism, the rest of Ukraine will have to navigate through life taking this schism into account in all things they do, having to tread carefully when they come across someone speaking Russian or if they are Russian-speaking, having to tread carefully when coming across someone speaking Ukrainian.

At the moment, it is not even about culture anymore. The issue at hand is stopping the bloodshed, never-mind language. It is likely that once the fighting stops, separatism will still linger and Ukrainians will feel as though they are not living in one country anymore. The only hope then becomes both Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians who can keep Ukrainian nationalism in check and Russian-speaking Ukrainians who can keep pro-Russian nationalism in check.

There is a long history between Russian and Ukrainian, and one cannot ignore it as a factor in this never-ending conflict. Yet the real tragedy is that Ukraine has been never been allowed to start over, wipe the slate clean, and move forward because big brother always has to intervene. Perhaps history can do us a favor as thousands of Russian troops conduct drills at the Ukraine/Russia border, and as thousands of NATO fighters and Ukrainian troops do likewise in Ukraine. Should this continue on its unfortunate trajectory and see its likely conclusion, please don't refer to this as a genocide. Call it what it is and what it has always been, pure unadulterated fratricide.

Volodymyr Zelensky was elected the first Jewish president of Ukraine in 2019, which is quite remarkable considering the fact that many of Ukraine's detractors consider the country as having a longstanding history of harboring antisemitism. In some regards, there were instances of it. During the Khmelnytsky uprising, which was essentially the genesis of Ukraine's statehood, Jews were targeted and a number of them were killed due to the fact that they were perceived as oppressors by the peasant class. And of course during World War II, many Ukrainian leaders collaborated with the Nazis in persecuting the Jews. It is quite often that a precipitating factor, such as being accused of having an unfair advantage in commerce, academia, and government, is levied upon Jews and used as justification by those who are adamantly leaned in the direction of antisemitism. But even should this be the case in some aspects in Ukraine's history, Ukrainians, since their independence in 1991, have nonetheless applied within their own country perhaps an even stronger meritocratic element than France, since prior to the election of Zelensky, Ukrainians had no problem voting into power 2 pro-Russian presidents in Kuchma and Yanukovych. Even this is remarkable considering the historical backdrop, which has been a longstanding oppression by Russian culture over Ukrainian culture. This exhortation doesn't imply that Ukraine is without reservation or is forgetful of the fact that authentic Ukrainian cultural expression is long overdue. What it does indicate is that Ukraine has shown itself to be far more progressive and meritocratic than perhaps any country in all of Europe, picking whom they feel is best for the job, regardless of ethnic backdrop or creed. Perhaps the Ukrainian language is so pivotal to the existence, survival, and statehood of Ukraine, that anyone who should speak it would also be upheld as fully Ukrainian.

Another factor that stands out with regards to Zelensky being elected president of Ukraine is that prior to his election, he was a comedian, starring in "Servant of the People", which was a Ukrainian sitcom about a teacher who accidentally becomes president. Ukraine distinguishes itself here by opting for a leader that presents a disarming, light-hearted aura, as opposed to the common inclination of nations to seek one that presents themselves as strong and assertive. This is a progressive move by Ukraine. Zelensky didn't just win the election, he won in a landslide victory. And this shift away from the typical strong leader could be due to the fact that a pattern of these "strong" types falling into corruption over and over again has made it to where a comedian could garner trust in not falling sway to this aspect of corruption. In some ways it makes sense. If going in one direction is producing a similar result, the next logical

step is to try the other direction. Ukraine has adapted quickly, that is for certain. If Zelensky can avoid falling privy to cultural bias, he may set Ukraine on the path to true meritocracy and progressivism. But if he gives into ethnocentric far-right Jewish groups who want him to exert a stronger tie to his ethnic backdrop, then such could ignite antisemitism. This is what happened when Yanukovych was president—he gave in to the pro-Russian element and ignited an anti-Russian perspective among Ukrainians. This also happened in the United States, and precipitated a major schism there, both demographically and politically. Barack Obama, who was elected as the first African American President in the United States in 2008, later abandoned his all-American methodology of appealing to all Americans, and yielded to the demands of the ethnocentric black demographic that insisted he align himself with their movement. Now, America is irreparably divided. Ukraine can heal itself if Zelensky retains his appeal to all Ukrainians, no matter race, or cultural backdrop. But as far as language, there does need to be some lean in the direction of supporting Ukrainian language. This would set Ukraine on the course to a true independence and sovereignty and also protect the nation from outside forces. A major reason Russia is able to exert considerable influence as of early 2022 is because of the schism that occurred between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, and in order to curtail the permeation of this schism from expanding even further throughout eastern Ukraine, a concerted attempt needs to be made in uniting all Ukrainians under one umbrella. This would require easing up on the anti-Russian sentiments. And downplaying the significance of both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian outlooks in the lives of everyday Ukrainians. This is imperative because allowing tensions to fester between pro-Russians and pro-Ukrainians by giving credence to those sentiments only raises the likelihood of eastern and southern Ukraine coming under the domain of the Russian Federation. Zelensky must urge Ukrainians to try and go about their day, living life, and pursuing objectives for the sake of individual, family, and community. Stressing the importance of economics and innovation can aid the healing process, and fortify Ukraine from detractors of their sovereignty, but also disarm other demographics from feeling as though they are under siege as a people.

Jews in Ukraine have it more favorable than Jews in other European countries, since Jews in Ukraine, this day in age, do not experience to any significant degree, acts of violence or condemnation arising from the policies enacted by the state of Israel.

Ukraine actually voted against an anti-Israel resolution presented in the UN Human Rights Council. Nevertheless, many continue to criticize Ukraine as not having done enough to admit its past role in helping perpetrate anti-semetic violence at important junctures in its history, such as as during the Holocaust. And not only that, many are taken aback by the fact that Ukraine in recent years has pushed for the celebration of Ukrainians who cooperated with the Nazis for the sake of escaping Stalin's brutality and mass murder of Ukrainians, but ended up only assisting the Nazis in the persecution and elimination of Jews during the Holocaust.

Zelensky's advantage in appealing to both Ukrainian and Russian speakers is largely due in part to his native Russian-speaking heritage, being born in southeastern Ukraine, along with the fact that he supported the Ukrainian Government forces in Donbas. Combine those with his Jewish ethnicity, and he becomes a prime candidate to facilitate peace in Ukraine, able to identify with a diverse population while appearing a neutral component that prefigures objectivity towards grievances coming from both sides. In this manner, he can indirectly appeal to Russia without giving off the impression of a prostration that connotes weakness in the minds of some, and ultimately carve out a path to peace by using diplomacy to deter Russian aggression without alienating the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine from the larger demographic of Ukrainians. As of 2022, his tenure has not played out perfectly, since Russia as of February 21, 2022, recognized the independence of both the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic, thanks largely in part to anti-Russian rhetoric coming from the west, which only helped reignite tensions, tensions that President Zelensky aimed at resolving. This has placed a roadblock in the likelihood that these territories would be re-integrated into Ukraine. Still and all, the best way to stop the bleeding is by focusing on the Ukrainian economy and getting Ukrainians focused on their lives again. If successful, more Russian-speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine will slowly began to identify as Ukrainian again. This may not bring Crimea and parts of the Donbas region back to Ukraine, but it would help prevent a spread of Russian hegemony in Ukraine, or if such is contested by the west, a war that could result in millions of casualties.

Another key is to avoid being lured into discourse regarding the historical backdrop of Ukraine and the question of whether or not it inherently belongs to Russia. Taking the high road on this will be the wisest move, for if intellectual discourse on this matter is escalated into polemics, any attempts to resolve cultural and language divide in

Ukraine could end up being stifled. Great wisdom and discernment will be required, but President Zelensky has already perhaps had exhibited more capability than any other person in both Russian and Ukrainian history, as far as appealing to both Russian and Ukrainian speakers. After the events which have transpired in Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, Ukraine will find itself having to contend with Russian aggression and information, along with ill-advised and stubborn anti-Russian panic-inducing rhetoric from the west, both of which will have systemic implications for Ukraine's domestic and economic stability.

Certainly another method of preventing the spread of nationalistic and separatist leanings is to simply stop talking about it. Reducing and downplaying the significance of rhetoric regarding the history and contemporary can surely cause resentment in some, but at the same time demagnifying the significance of it gives a diverse population the opportunity and time to connect with everyone in their community, regardless of cultural differences. But this is difficult this day in age of social media. Another key component, which President Zelensky has demonstrated well in response to western panic-inducing rhetoric is by asserting optimism and confidence, for when the United States was propagating that Russia would launch a full-scale invasion of the country, President Zelensky assured the Ukrainian people that was not the case, and even designated the very day the US predicted Russia would invade Ukraine to be a day of unity and singing. This can be applied in future scenarios when extreme nationalism looks to assert conspiratorial rhetoric aimed at stoking fear and alienation among the population. In such a case, the President of Ukraine can quell and dismiss such notions with an incurable optimism.

Ukraine presents a unique situation that much of the west is ignorant of. At the moment, there are many in eastern and southern Ukraine who identify as Russian and feel closer ties to Russia. So anyone who likens themselves to be in the best interest of Ukraine must take into account the Russian element that exists there. Any anti-Russian perspectives aimed at signaling a support for Ukraine only serves to sow discord among a diverse Ukrainian population. The west must remain cognizant of this. President Zelensky himself is a native Russian-speaking Ukrainian. If there is to be a Ukrainization of eastern and southern Ukraine as far as language is concerned, then it has to be very slow. In Post-Eurmaidan Ukraine a small majority of Ukrainians support a future in which Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine. A bill was passed in 2019 called the Law of

Ukraine "On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language." Back in 2012, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the "Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Language Law," which allowed Ukrainians to use regional languages instead of the state one. This gave protection to the use of Russian in many parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, but limited the use of Ukrainian. Now following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the separatist uprising in eastern Ukraine, language is has become a very sensitive topic, and the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law was declared unconstitutional. President Zelensky has been largely skeptical against the new 2019 law which ensures the function of Ukrainian as the state language. But when proposals were presented to repeal the law, such as the one presented by Verkhovna Rada deputy from the "Servants of the People" party, Maksym Buzhanskyi, protests took place in Ukraine demanding a halt to Russification of Ukrainian schools. The 2019 Law of Ukraine "On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language" sees to it "the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine." It is also meant for "strengthening the state-building and consolidation functions of the Ukrainian language, enhancing its role in ensuring the territorial integrity and national defense of Ukraine," and "creating proper conditions for protection of the linguistic rights and needs of Ukrainians." Under this law, Ukrainian becomes the only state language and is to be held as the glue that binds together the population of Ukraine as one nation regardless of ethnicity and also protects the national security of Ukraine. On education, the Ukrainian language implementation is given a three year period to complete the transition—September 1, 2020 until September 1, 2023 . For students studying in official languages for countries outside of the European Union, the provisions were mandated September 1, 2020. By 2030, all secondary school final exams are to be in Ukrainian. Arts, entertainment and culture are able to use other languages if it is relevant to the content or "justified by the artistic, creative idea of the event organizer" For print media, two or more languages can be applied, however, one of them must be the Ukrainian language. The exceptions are the indigenous languages, such as the Crimean Tatar language, English, and other official European Union Languages. The law also requires that Ukrainian print media comprise over 50% of the selection in all facets of print media distribution. For publishers, the law requires that all official book publishers maintain a statistic in which books in the Ukrainian language constitute at minimum 50% of their annual publishing output. This does not apply to indigenous

languages. And for bookstores, it is the same—books in Ukrainian must constitute no less than 50% of the books sold at bookstores. Exceptions are indigenous and official European Union languages.

This law was meant to uphold the Ukrainian language, but was met with hostility from other minorities in Ukraine such as Russian, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian, all of whom will be restricted from studying or receiving an education in their native language. The supporters of this bill insists that it was not meant to prohibit other languages, only to support the Ukrainian language. Russia has spoken against the bill and considered it a violation of the tenets of the Council of Europe, the continent's leading human rights organization. President Zelensky of Ukraine has stated a desire to amend the bill, seeing how much it may drive Ukrainians even further apart.

For the sake of deterring unrest about the Ukrainization of Ukraine in terms of language, the best course of action would be to extend the transition period on Ukrainian language mandates. This strategy helps ease the fears of Ukrainian language supporters, and at the same time allows Russian-speakers to focus less on language barriers since the transition period is well into the future, beyond the time of his/her lifespan. In this manner, the Russian-speaker simply advises his offspring to prepare for an eventual transition to Ukrainian, while he himself goes about his day unperturbed about the prospect of any drastic alterations to his lifestyle. He essentially de-prioritizes it. This is what is key. Can the Ukrainian President get his people to focus on other things besides language and culture and nationality, and in doing so can he unwittingly unite all Ukrainians. This is not an easy task seeing that some parts of Ukraine have been lost in recent years. But it can be done by quietly asserting language mandates. For instance, if a very slow Ukrainzation is applied, schools that opt to adopt Ukrainian language ahead of time as their language can be eligible for government subsidies. While those schools that teach in other languages would still be eligible for deadline extension of Ukrainian language transition.

Much of the original unrest that transpired in Ukraine is centered not so much on cultural issues, but on corruption embedded within political affairs in Ukraine. And President Zelensky arrived on the scene bearing an intent to solve the corruption issue in Ukraine. His reformist intent has quelled somewhat due to the fact that many of his policies have clashed directly with the interests of very powerful oligarchs in Ukraine, who have exerted a large amount of influence on Ukrainian politics and affairs. Many in this sector argue that President Zelensky's attempt to contravene the activities of oligarchs

are only a measure aimed at drawing in more power to the government. Oligarchs are notorious for buying out businesses for small sums, and using their wealth to influence media and politics for the sake of garnering for themselves tax exemptions, which thus leaves them little incentive to reallocate their wealth into improving the conditions of the workforce. Zelensky has sought to correct this problem, since it is the case that the spark of unrest in Ukraine originated in reaction to corruption embedded in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine's anti-oligarch law gives the Ukrainian government the power to label an oligarch and restrict them from participating in politics. The president and his staff are also required to report any ties they have with oligarchs. Another aspect that cultivates the influence of the oligarch elite is Ukraine judicial system. Zelensky has also promised to change this sector, but has met resistance from judges that have blocked the bill. On October 27, 2020, the Constitutional Court ruled that the powers of the National Agency for Preventing Corruption (NAPC) are unconstitutional. This removed the requirement of declaring assets and also the penalties that are incurred for dishonesty in such asset declarations. The Consitutional Court is the highest court in Ukraine's government and its rulings cannot be reversed. There is a lack of trust in the judicial system among Ukrainians, as the salary for judges is significantly higher than the average salary in Ukraine. In many cases, the salaries of judges are grossly inflated, and many attribute this to the influence of oligarchs. Nonetheless, Zelensky moved to reinstate the NACP and the asset declaration requirements. He also attempted to establish a law in which would allow the government to fire all the Court's judges and withdraw their rulings, but this was considered unconstitutional. Since then, Ukraine has attempted too apply reforms to judicial bodies responsible for the evaluation, selection, appointment and dismissal of judges, but much of the efforts to move forward with these proposals were blocked by the Council of Judges. The desire for reforms to corruption in Ukraine will provide a foundation that will prevent the chain of events that bring about unrest, separatism, and violent conflict. Damage control and patience will be key elements throughout this entire process.

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Khmelnytsky quote on ppg 3 and 4 of "Anthony's Treaty" taken from here http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CK%5CH%5CKhmelnytskyBohdan.htm

Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation
Author: Serhy Yekelchyk
(pages 193 - 213 of this book is heavily paraphrased in the book "Anthony's Treaty" on ppg 56-62, which explain the tenures of Ukraine presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma)

Youtube Video: The Breakup of the Soviet Union Explained
by History Scope https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2GmtBCVHzY&t
(Content in this video was used for explaining the fall of the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure -see ppg 54 - 56 of "Anthony's Treaty")

Youtube Video: Holodomor: Stalin's Secret Genocide (2016 documentary short)
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(book "Anthony's Treaty" used this video to explain Pavel Postyshev's actions during the Holodomor on pg 44)

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